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ARGENTINE FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW
SUMMARY

The new Argentine Foreign Investment Law and related measures affecting foreign capital are analyzed with particular reference to Decision 24 of the Andean Pact Commission, which served
as an important source of inspiration to the Argentines. The study
is divided as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION including discussion of the foreign economic presence in Argentina;
I. ORIGINS including discussion of the political milieu surrounding its adoption and a brief summary of the structure of the
Argentine Foreign Investment Law;
Ill. Types of FOREIGN CAPITAL that may enter the country
under the Argentine Foreign Investment Law and an analysis of
key questions including the treatment of imported technology;
IV. DEFINITIONS AND CLASSIFICATIONS including the
three-way company division based on percentage of foreign participation;
V. INVESTMENT APPROVAL by the Argentine Government;
VI. REQUIREMENTS, PROHIBITIONS and other factors to
be weighed by the Argentine Government in the approval process
including discussion of industrial and regional promotion plans,
divesture or fade-out, prohibited sectors, investment in existing
companies, state purchasing, and import-export controls affecting
foreign investors;
VII. CAPITAL REPATRIATION AND PROFIT REMITTANCES including discussion of dollar denominated bonds
and the nationalization of local profits;
VIII. Treatment of EXISTING INVESTMENTS with reference to their registration, the option to remain outside of the ambit
of the new Argentine Foreign Investment Law, expropriation of
existing interests and certain special measures affecting banking;
IX. Rules affecting CREDIT, INTEREST, stock market incentives and TECHNOLOGY PAYMENTS including discussion of
parent-subsidiary relations and tax measures affecting the foreign
investor; and
X. CONCLUSION.
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THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN
INVESTMENT LAW
AND ITS ANDEAN COMMON
MARKET INSPIRATION
Robert Y. Stebbings*
I.

A.

INTRODUCTION

Background

Back in power after nearly twenty years of forced exile, the government of Juan Domingo Per6n fulfilled one of its most popularly
acclaimed promises. Following a prolonged emotion-charged journey through the first Congress since the dissolution of that body
in 1966, Argentina's new Foreign Investment Law (the "Law")
became effective in December 1973. Law No. 20.577 regulates foreign direct investments, foreign credits and contracts involving
payments abroad.' Appearing almost simultaneously, Law No.
20.575 requires registration with the government of all persons or
entities who carry out any activity related to Argentina on behalf
of foreign interests.' The Foreign Investment Law was followed in
February 1974 by a fundamental executive decree amplifying and
interpreting the original statute.'
The Argentines were primarily inspired by the pioneering innovations of Decision 24, the foreign investment code approved by
* Associated with Marcona Corporation, San Francisco. A.B., 1963, Stanford
University; J.D., 1967, Columbia University; M.B.A., 1968, Columbia University.
Member, New York Bar.

1. Law of Nov. 29, 1973 (No. 20.577), Concerning Foreign Investments
(Argen.) [hereinafter cited as Investment Law]. The Investment Law has been
published in English in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERuALS 1489 (1973). Unless otherwise
indicated, however, all translations of the Investment Law and other texts are the
responsibility of the author.
2. Law of Dec. 20, 1973 (No. 20.575), Concerning Registry of Agents and
Representatives of Foreign Enterprises (Argen.); Decree of Feb. 5, 1974 (No. 414)
(Argen.). These number far more than the Government or anyone else anticipated. Approximately 11,500 have registered rather than the estimated 1000 expected. See Buenos Aires Herald, June 23, 1974, at 10.
3. Decree of Feb. 5, 1974 (No. 413) (Argen.) [hereinafter cited as Investment
Decree].
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the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement in December 1970 for
application in the Andean Pact countries. 4 The Argentine measures attempt to improve the Andean system and adapt it to a new
environment. Many of the questions dealt with by the two political
entities are considered vital by much of the capital-importing,
non-industrial world and by investors from the developed countries
as well. As a result, a study of the Argentine rules in relation to
their Andean antecedents should transcend its geographical limitations. In the conclusion of an article examining the implications
of Decision 24, Professor Covey T. Oliver prophetically observed
that the "Mesozoic Era of direct foreign investment has
ended. . . .The future belongs to the adaptables and their lawyers." Further, he concludes that: "Decision 24 will undoubtedly
be influential in this evolution, just as 'Mexicanization' [to which
United States capital has accommodated itself] was itself influential in the formulation of the Andean Code. Decision 24, therefore,
deserves the thoughtful attention of all those who are willing to
face the future, instead of the past. . . ."
Andean integrationist spokesmen recognized that "capital is the
scarce factor in the subregion for which reason foreign contributions are essential for the fulfillment of . . . our objectives." '
Introducing the Draft Foreign Investment Law to Congress, the
Argentine President recognized "the advantages which the contribution of foreign capital can bring."7 Given the conviction that
foreign investment has a role to play in the development process,
it is hoped that this Article will prove useful to actual or potential
foreign investors interested in Argentina.
Finally, the issues involved in regulating, controlling, stimulating or emasculating foreign investment, as the case may be, are
4. Decision 24 of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement (Andean Pact),
Dec. 31, 1970, as amended, Decisions 37, 37a [hereinafter cited as Decision 24]
published in English in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 126 (1972).
5. Oliver, The Andean ForeignInvestment Code: A New Phase in the Quest
for Normative Order as to Direct Foreign Investment, 6 AM. J. INT'L L. 763, 784
(1972).
6. Decision 24, Introduction by the Junta of the Cartagena Agreement. (The
Junta is the highest regional authority under the Cartagena Agreement.)
7. Address by President Hector J. Cdmpora, Congressional Introduction, June
14, 1973, as published in the DIARIO DE SESIONES, [Camara de Diputados de la
Naci6n] 563 (June 14, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Cdmpora speech].
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interesting for the place they occupy in the forefront of the fascinating dialogue between law and development. Many countries,
not least those of the Andes and transandean Argentina, regard the
foreign investment question as fundamental in a continuing struggle for independence from foreign domination (dependencia). It is
widely believed that a truly national development can not be initiated until the question of foreign economic domination is resolved.
On the other hand, and as noted, foreign participation is usually
accepted as necessary for the achievement of national goals of
modernization and development and even, paradoxically, to end
dependencia by providing resources more quickly than they can be
mustered through internal savings. Both statutes under scrutiny in
this Article attempt to balance the sometimes conflicting goals of
national independence with the need for attracting and usingwhile also controlling-imported resources. For both statutes,
considerably more time is needed to measure the results.
B.

The Dimensions of ForeignInvestment in Argentina

It is estimated that foreign citizens presently own or control
between two and one-half and three billion dollars of the share
capital of Argentine commercial enterprises.8 Forty or fifty per cent
of this foreign investment comes from the United States, the only
country that provides reasonably good statistical data covering its
investments in Argentina. The characteristics and behavior of this
United States economic presence are probably analogous to those
attributable to investments originating elsewhere. It is estimated
that these United States investments generated average annual
total profits of 6.4 per cent during the decade of the 1950's and
averaged 12.0 per cent during the following decade. The annual
percentages reportedly transferred abroad as profits by North
American companies during these years ranged from 1.8 to 9.9 per
cent and averaged 7.15 per cent during the 1960's. Between 1965
8.

FUNDACION DE INVESTIGACIONES ECON6MICAS LATINOAMERICANAS, LAS INVER-

STONES EXTRANJERAS EN LA ARGENTINA 17 (Buenos Aires 1973) [hereinafter cited

as FIEL study]. Unless otherwise noted, specific data in this section has been
taken from the FIEL study at 17, 23, 24, 248, 252, 270 and 291. The author is
responsible for the calculation of a number of the annual averages derived from

this data.
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and 1968 United States companies remitted profits averaging 75
million dollars annually.
According to Central Bank statistics, total profit transfers from
1966 through 1973 ranged from 47.8 to 179.0 million dollars with
an annual average of 85.5 million dollars for the eight-year period.
The 1973 figure was 79.8 million dollars. These and other Central
Bank statistics include actual foreign exchange transfers as well as
the sale of interest bearing, dollar denominated bonds or bonos
externos which began in 1971.1 Profits may also leave the country
in the form of transfer price differentials resulting from the investor's imposition of artificial transfer prices for imported goods as
well as in the form of interest and technology transfer payments.
Debt amortization (excluding interest) for 1973 reportedly totalled
2,642.9 million dollars. 0 Interest payments to foreign lenders
ranged from 141.7 to 343.3 million dollars from 1966 through 1973,
averaging 202.33 million dollars. The trend has been linear and
dramatic with the highest figure corresponding to 1973.1
9. Unless otherwise noted, these and other Central Bank statistics come from
the Argentine Central Bank's Annual Reports, which were interpreted for the
author and made available by Dr. Oraldo N. Fernandez, Head of the International Accounts Department. Annual profit transfers were as follows:
year
amount (million dollars)
1966
92.1
1967
55.8
1968
97.0
1969
179.0
1970
72.5
1971
47.8
1972
60.6
1973
79.8
Actually transfers are severely limited. Faced with a critical balance of payments situation, the Lanusse Government in 1971 established an imaginative
scheme to delay the flow of foreign exchange from the national treasury through
the sale of "dollar denominated external bonds" (bonos externos) which will
be described later. Basically, the investor entitled to a transfer was permitted to
purchase in pesos at the established exchange rate interest bearing bonds, which
could then be discounted for foreign exchange on secondary markets in Argentina
or abroad. Alternatively, the bonds could be held for semiannual amortization by
the government over a five-year term.

10.

ARGENTINE CENRmAL BANK, SUPLEMENTO DEL BoLmrIN EsTADIsTIco (No. 3,

March 1973) published by the Central Bank and made available by Dr. Fernandez.
11. The Central Bank interest payment statistics are as follows:
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Technology and certain other payments for this period ranged from
51.2 to 79.8 million dollars and averaged 66.54 million dollars. In
1973, 82.0 million dollars was reportedly transferred. 12 Total foryear
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973

amount (million dollars)
141.7
152.1
145.3
151.8
179.2
225.8
279.7
343.3

12. A Buenos Aires weekly newspaper misinterpreted a carefully worded study
by the government's Instituto Nacional de Tecnologia Industrial (INTI) and reported that payments for imported technology were approximately $120 million
during 1973. The correct Central Bank figure of $82 million, however, appears on
a different page of the same newspaper. Commenting on its erroneously inflated
statistic, the periodical expressed a conclusion, which was unusual in a period of
intense concern for Argentina's economic independence: "the sum paid for royalties does not seem to be excessive. These payments. . . for technology compare
very favorably with exports which in 1973 exceeded three billion dollars of which
725 million were for manufactured goods. . . . No one can say that the economic
problems of a country with three billion dollars worth of exports flow from 120
million dollars in royalty payments. Nor that the payment of 120 million dollars
for technology which allows the development of our industry is the symbol of our
dependency." El Economista, June 21, 1974, at 5, 11.
Total exports, which include Argentina's traditional agricultural and meat
sales, may be less relevant than exports by the manufacturing sector alone. Opinions may differ over whether payments for imported technology were low in relation to manufactured exports of $725 million. Opinions may also differ over
whether the relation to exports is particularly significant (assuming an overall
favorable balance of payments). The contribution of imported technology to the
health, contentment and general standard of living of the country's inhabitants
perhaps should be put in the balance. On the other hand, some Argentines argue
forcefully that the contribution of imported technology has a negative net effect
in stifling the development of national technological and cultural alternatives.
The INTI study cited by El Economista is based on individual company estimates in 1972 of technology transfers anticipated for 1973. As INTI economist Dr.
Daniel Chudnovsky explained to the author, and as the study makes clear, the
reporting companies tended to grossly inflate their estimates. See INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE TECNOLOGIA INDUSTRIAL (INTI), ESTUDIO DE LOS CONTRATOS DE LICENCIAS
DE TECNOLOGIA CON EL EXTERIOR 9 (No. 25, Dec. 1973)

Y TRANSFERENCIA

[hereinafter cited as INTI study]. The author interviewed INTI officials and
personnel during July 1974.
The Central Bank figures represent actual payments or external bond pur-

Spring 19751

ARGENTINE FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW

eign investment service payments for profits, interest and technology thus totalled approximately 505 million dollars in 1973.
New direct investment from all foreign sources, not including
reinvested earnings, totalled an estimated 912 million dollars from
the beginning of 1958 to the end of 1969. This represents an average
annual increase of 76 million dollars over the period. The years of
1967, 1968 and 1969 showed net losses in foreign direct investment
of seven, eight and eleven million dollars respectively although
United States direct investment demonstrated an average annual
increase of 58 million dollars during 1965-1968. The overall decline
was partially the result of an outflow of Argentine capital as well
as a reduction of foreign investment in the petroleum sector. The
average annual increase from 1961 to 1969 was a mere 33.78 million
dollars. According to the United States Department of Commerce,
United States affiliates invested 170 million dollars in Argentina
during 1973. A survey in December 1973 indicated spending plans
for 1974 of 161 million dollars, a decrease of 5 per cent from the
previous year.' 3 This data obviously does not reflect the real growth
in foreign economic influence since reinvested earnings are specifically excluded as are the distorting effects of local inflation.'4
Although foreign investment represents only about six per cent
of the estimated total capital stock of the country, it is disproportionately important because of its affinity for key or particularly
dynamic sectors of the economy. A leading Argentine economist
asserts that "economic power is principally concentrated in foreign
enterprises and in state-owned enterprises."'' 5 For example, eleven
of the 25 largest Argentine companies are subsidiaries of foreign
corporations. Between 1961 and 1966 over half of the sales of the
50 largest companies in Argentina were realized by the subsidiaries
of foreign corporations." The automobile industry is entirely in
chases, but unfortunately do not segregate technology from certain other*payments such as film distribution rights and publishing royalties. The informal
estimate of an INTI staff member puts the part attributable to technology for
1973 at $50 million of the Central Bank's $82 million.
13. Business Latin America, May 1, 1974, at 142.
14. Some of the effects of inflation on investment are described in Rosenn,
Expropriation,Inflation and Development, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 845.
15. A. FERRER, LA ECONOM, ARGENTNA 252 (1973), available in English as
THE ARGENINE ECONOMY (1967).
16. Vaitsos, ForeignInvestment Policies and Economic Development in Latin

286

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 8: 277

foreign hands; FIAT has the second highest net income of any
enterprise in the country. Sixty per cent of the agricultural machinery sector is foreign as is 70 per cent of the pharmaceutical industry, virtually 100 per cent of the cosmetics industry and over 30 per
cent of the electrical appliance industry. Foreign interests are also
important in mining, petroleum and finance. 7
America, 7 J. WORLD TRADE L. 619, 620 (1973) citing Ferrer, El CapitalExtranjero
en la Economia Argentina, 150 EL TRIMESTRE EcoN6Inco 313 (1971).
17. In addition to the exhaustive FIEL study referred to throughout this section, statistical and interpretative literature dealing with foreign investment in
Argentina includes the reports of the following: the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America (ECLA or CEPAL in Spanish), the InterAmerican Development Bank, the United States Department of Commerce, and
the Argentine Central Bank. See also C. ALEJANDRO, ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC (1970); E. CIsLno, AcUMULACION Y CENTRALIZACION DEL CAPITAL EN LA INDUSTRIA ARGENTINE (Editorial Tiempo Contemporaneo,

Buenos Aires 1973); M. DIAMOND, EL VERDADERO ROL DE LA INVERSIONES ExTRANJERAS EN LOS PAISES SEMI-INDuSTRIALZADOS (1972) (mimeographed study prepared
for the Consejo Interamericano de Comercio y Producci6n (CIC7YP)); FERRER,
supra note 15; G. O'DONNEL & D. LNCK, DEPENDENCIA Y AuTOMoNu (Amorrortu
ed. Buenos Aires 1973); R. ORTiz, HISTORIA ECON6MICA DE LA ARGENTINE (Editorial

Plus Ultra, Buenos Aires 1971).
A study, which has had considerable recent popular impact in Argentina, indicates that 56.95% of the 400 largest enterprises in Latin America are controlled
by foreign capital. It does not indicate if the percentage refers to total sales, book
value or some other characteristic of the 400 as a group or simply to the numerical
total. It was published in Argentina in the monthly Cuestionario, May 1974, at
14, which credits prior publication to Progreso, a journal of economics published
by Vision.
For general studies of economic development in the third world countries see
HIRSCHMAN, THE STRATEGY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1958); H. MYINT, THE
ECONOMICS OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1964).
Additional material on dependencia would fill a relatively large library. PerA.

haps one of the most influential works in recent years, at least among Argentines,
is F. CARDOSO & E. FALErro, DEPENDENCIA Y DESARROLLO EN AMRICA LATINA (Siglo
Veintiuno Editores, Mexico 1969). The following have also had impact: M. DIAMOND, DocTRINAs ECON6MICAS, DESARROLLO E INDEPENDENCIA (Editorial Paidos,
Buenos Aires 1973); T. Dos SANTOS, LA CRISIS NORTEAMERICANA Y AMtRICA LATINA
(1972); T. Dos SANTOS, SociALisMO o FAscismo: EL NuEvo CARACTER DE LA DEPENDENCIA Y EL DILEMA LATINOAMERICANO (1973); H.

JAGUARIBE, LA DEPENDENCIA

PoLrco-ECONMICA DE AICA LATINA, (Siglo Veintiuno Editores, Buenos Aires
1970). A concise, well-written article in English by a Chilean professor sets forth
the major dependencia points of view. See Sunkel, Big Business and
Dependencia, 50 FOR. AFF. 517 (1972). See also Sunkel, Relaciones econ6micas

entre America Latinay Estados Unidos-Comentariosal trabajode Antbal Pinto,
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ORIGINS OF THE NEW ARGENTINE FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW

A. Antecedent Legislation
Consonant with its Andean inspiration, the Mexican codes' 8 and
emerging attitudes in much of the developing world,"9 the new
Argentine foreign investment law is regulatory and restrictive in
nature. Its previous codes have been basically promotional and
22 ESTUDIOs INTERNACIONALEs 32 (1973). Sunkel is commenting on the Chilean
professor, Anibal Pinto's article Relaciones Econ6micas entre America Latinay
Estados Unidos: Implicaciones y Perspectivas Politicas,which appears in the
same publication. Id. at 3. The views of Argentine businessmen toward foreign
investment in their country and dependencia are the subject of Petras & Cook,
Argentina: Dependencia y BurguesiaIndustrial,10 REvisTA LATINOAMERICANA DE
ECON6MIA 19 (1972).

It is undoubtedly superfluous to mention the popularized European view of
dependencia, The American Challenge, originally published as Le D~fi Am~ricain
by Jean-Jacques Servan-Scbreiber in 1967. Dependencialurks in every corner. At
least one local commentator feels that Argentina is entering into a relation of
dependency with the Soviet Union as a result of the recent wave of trade and
capital investment deals with the Eastern European countries. See Petersen,
Another Kind of Dependence, Buenos Aires Herald, May 31, 1974, at 8.
18. The most recent Mexican measure regulating foreign investment is the
Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign Investment of February 16, 1973, published in the Diario Oficial on March 9, 1973. In relation to this
legislation, see the presentation of Jos6 Campillo Sainz, Subsecretary of Industry
of Mexico, to the Mexican Senate accompanying the executive draft of the code
in 14 DERECHO DE LA INTEGRACION 328 (1973). See also Lacey & Sierra de la Garza,
Mexico-Are the Rules Really Changing? 3 INT'L LAW. 560 (1973); Miranda,
Foreign CompaniesInvesting and Doing Business in Mexico-Nationalization,30
Bus. LAW. 1217 (1973). For a recent general treatment of foreign investments in
Mexico see B. SEPILVEDA & A. CHUMACERO, LA INhvERSIN ExTRN RA EN MEXICO
(Fondo de Cultura, Mexico City 1973).
Derecho de la Integraci6n published in Buenos Aires by the Instituto para la
Integraci6n de Am6rica Latina (INTAL) contains Latin American statutory foreign investment material. Previously published material is listed in a note in No.
13, July 1973 at 233, accompanying the text of the new Mexican code. Succeeding
numbers contain additional items.
19. Even countries as developed as Canada and Australia are reconsidering
their traditional open invitations to foreign capital and adopting policies of regulation and control. See Fogarty, Australia y el Problema de las Inversiones
Extranjeras,22 ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES 106 (1973); Glover, Canada'sForeign
Investment Review Act, 29 Bus. LAw. 805 (1974); Jafarian & Bell, Issues Raised
by National Control of the Multi-nationalCorporation,8 COLUmn. J. WORLD Bus.
7 (Winter 1973).
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enacted to attract capital by offering preferential conditions to the
foreigner willing to invest in the country. In fact, prior to 1953
Argentina did not have a coherent statute especially devoted to
foreign investment0 Even the 1953 Statute, enacted during
Per6n's first regime from 1946 to 1955, was promotional in spite of
the nationalism of his government. It did, at least, provide for
percentage limitations on profit remittances and capital repatriations as does the new Law.2 '
With one exception, in addition to the earlier Peronist legislation, the previous foreign investment laws were applied on an optional basis. To benefit from the incentive schemes offered, the
investor had to enter into a contract with the Government or register his investment under the law in force at the time. On the other
20. Until 1948 foreign direct investment was subject only to Central Bank
financial regulation and to the provisions of bilateral payment agreements with
a number of countries. In 1948, Decree 3347 made a first attempt at official
supervision and control of foreign investments and created a government agency
to aid and promote investment. Until 1953 the entry of investments in the form
of foreign currency was subject only to Central Bank control. See FIEL study,
supra note 8, at 232-33; F. HERRERO, ASPECTOS LEGALES DE LA PROMOCION INDUSTRIAL EN ARGENTINA 90 (1965).

21. Law of Aug. 26, 1953 (No. 14.222); Regulatory Decree of Oct. 10, 1953 (No.
19.111), repealed by Decree of Dec. 18, 1957 (No. 16.640). The President was
empowered to waive-partially or entirely-import duties on capital goods forming part of an investment and, upon a declaration of national interest, to offer a
range of incentives provided for in the earlier industrial promotion Decree of 1944
(No. 14.630). Investments bad to be approved by the Executive Branch and their
value registered in pesos. Remittances were permitted as fixed percentages of the
registered value in pesos making foreign investors highly susceptible to local
inflation, especially since capital repatriation could not begin for ten years. This
law and, in particular, its regulatory decree supplemented the Andean Investment Code as inspiration for the present Peronist statute. Curiously, according
to the records of the Bolettn Oficial, this important decree never saw official
publication. The author was allowed to photocopy the original eleven page typewritten document, signed by President Per6n, at the Archivo General de la Nacion in Buenos Aires. The 1953 legislation and other Argentine measures preceding the most recent are described in the FIEL study, supra note 8, ch. XIV, at
232, and in A. RoFiA & L. ROmRo, SISTEMA SOCIOECONOsICO Y EsTRuCTURA
REGIONAL EN LA ARGENTINA, ch. 4.2, at 191 (Amorrortu Editores, Buenos Aires
1973). Among several interesting statistical tables, the latter lists the dollar
amount of investments made in given years under several foreign investment or
industrial promotion laws. Id. at 193. For studies of the Argentine economy see
note 17 supra.
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hand, however, he could invest in the country without submitting
to the norms of any foreign investment law, although he was not
excused from foreign exchange controls and transfer or withholding
taxes among other things. Furthermore, the lack of a contract with
the Government meant the lack of specific guarantees of the effect
on the investor of future policy changes. Since Argentina has a
good record of respecting its commitments, including those of previous governments, such contractual obligations are of real value.
The other exception to the optional rule was the law enacted in
1971 under President Alejandro Lanusse and in effect until the
present Law entered into force. 2 The two exceptions and the new
Law all establish compulsory registration schemes as well as approval mechanisms and a regulatory authority under executive
branch control.
The country was in such turmoil during the Lanusse government
that his law was never effectively applied2 although companies
with foreign ownership were required to register with a special
government authority and supply considerable data. According to
members of this government authority, the data was collected,
catalogued and preserved and will now be used in conjunction with
material supplied under the new Law. Although the Lanusse law
incorporated the registration and approval system, it did not limit
remittances or capital repatriation and remained generally promotional in nature.2 4 The present Law on the other hand expressly
stipulates that "[i]n no case may foreign investors be awarded
treatment more favorable than that granted national investors."
This movement from promotion to restriction or control was
22. Law of July 30, 1971 (No. 19.151), Concerning Foreign Investments
[hereinafter cited as Lanusse Investment Law]; Decree 2400, April 27, 1972
[hereinafter cited as Lanusse Investment Decree].
23. A legal practitioner in Buenos Aires with experience in the foreign investment field indicated that other than requiring the submission of data, only once
did any organ of government actually seek to apply the statute. In March 1973
the Central Bank reportedly attempted to require proof of prior registration under
the law by applicants for the purchase of an impending issue of external dollar
bonds necessary for profit and other transfers. Addresses by Dr. Bernardo Duggan, Centro de Estudios Comparados, Buenos Aires, May 23, 28, 1974.
24. In fact, transfers generally had to be effected by means of external dollar
bonds described below and in note 9 supra.
25. Investment Law, art. 19.
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fundamental in the 1970 adoption of the Andean Foreign Investment Code by the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement. Decision 24, which Latin Americans sometimes call the Common Regime (Rfgimen Comdn) is an effort to harmonize the treatment of
foreign investments and foreign investors in the Andean Group
countries-Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile,2" and Bolivia and
most recently, Venezuela, which became a member of the Subregion on January 1, 1974.? Venezuela rapidly incorporated Decision
24 into its national legal system, 2 a process not unlike the conversion of the Uniform Commercial Code and other uniform codes into
effective law in each state of the United States. In certain other
countries, the incorporation process has been more difficult, particularly when interest groups have sought to block national adop29
tion of the measures.
Among the important reasons for creating a common investment
code was the realization that the Andean nations were competing
with each other to attract foreign investment and were, therefore,
not obtaining development capital on the most favorable terms
possible.'" By presenting a common front to the outsider interested
26. In mid-July 1974 the military junta, which overthrew Chilean President
Salvador Allende, issued a decree that essentially abrogates the most important
provisions of Decision 24. Designed to attract new investment to the country, the
measure is highly promotional. Approval and registration is still required but the
government retains a free hand to permit whatever it sees fit. No maximum limits
are set on transfers of earnings or capital repatriation, which are to be established
individually in investment contracts. Estatuto de laInversi6n Extranjera,Decree
Law 600, El Mercurio (Santiago, Chile), July 13, 1974, at 26-27.
27. INTAL, Boletin de la Integraci6n 74 (No. 98, Feb. 1974); LAFTA
NEWSLETrER 4 (No. 22, Jan.-Feb. 1974). LAFTA (ALALC in Spanish) is the Latin
American Free Trade Association headquarters in Montevideo, Uruguay.
28. Decrees 62 and 63, April 29, 1974 (Venez.) published in Gaceta Oficial,
April 29, 1974.
29. See Vicufla, La Incorporaci6n del Ordenamiento JurtdicoSubregional al
Derecho Interno: Andlisis de la Prcctica Chilena, 7 DERECHO DE LA INTEGRACI6N
42 (1970); Vicufia, Acuerdo de Cartangena:Su Constitucionalidady de la Dkcisi6n 24 en Colombia, (Court decisions and other documents), 10 DERECHO DE LA
INTEGRAC16N 155 (1972); Vicufia, La Incorporaci6ndel Orgenamiento Juridico
Subregional al Derecho Interno: Andlisis de la Prdcticay Jurisprudenciade
Colombia, 11 DERECHO DE LA INTERGRACI6N 39 (1972). A current status rundown omitting the latest developments in Chile referred to in note 26 supra may
be consulted in Business Latin America, July 3, 1974, at 212-13.
30. In the declaration that forms the introduction to Decision 24, the Commis-
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in entering the area, the Andean nations might receive better
terms and more effectively apply a system of controls. In promulgating Decision 24, the Commission provided that "[tihe treatment of foreign capital may not discriminate against national
investors,""1 so that discriminatory promotional systems within
given countries would be eliminated. The Code, combined with the
Andean sectorial system, which assigns member countries exclusive rights to develop certain industries, is designed to eliminate
competition for new investments on a national as well as on a
regional level. Accordingly, President Hector Cdmpora, Per6n's
caretaker Chief Executive from May 25, 1973, until July 13, 1973,
recognized Andean inspiration in a speech presenting the Peronist
3
Government's first draft investment law to the national Congress. 1
sion stated that "[tihe common regime must likewise tend to bolster the negotiating power of the Member Countries with Other Governments, enterprises which
provide capital and technology and international organizations which deal with
these matters." Decision 24, Declaration 9.
A member of the Andean Pact legal staff has explained that the principal
concern of the drafters of the Cartagena Agreement itself was "to avoid an incentives race among the Member Countries in search of foreign investment which
would make impossible the achievement of their objectives of balanced and harmonious development. It was presumed that an 'incentives auction' would only
benefit the investor who could patiently await the result of the struggle and then
opt for the offer which benefited him most even at the cost of the host country's
interests." Guerrero, El Rkgimen Comdn de Inversi6n. Extranjeraen el Grupo
Andiana, 8 DERECHO DE LA INTEGRAcI6N 8, at 11 (1971). For essentially the same
point also see Florez, ANCOM, A Peruvian Viewpoint, 6 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus.
36 (July-Aug. 1971) and Pefia, El GrupoAndino: Un Nuevo Enfogue de la Participaci6n Internacionalde los Paises en Desarrollo,22 EsTUmoS INTERNACIONALES 44,
63, 66 (1973).
The factors that led to the drafting of Decision 24 are also discussed in J.
GRUNWALD, M. WIONCZEK & M. CARNOY, LATIN AMERIcAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

AND U.S. POLICY (1972); Furnish, The Andean Common Market's Common Regime for Foreign Investments, 5 VAND. J. TRmNSNAT'L L. 313 (1972) which in
slightly revised form appears as El Regimen Comdn del Grupo Andino para las
Inversiones Extranjeras, 14 DERECHO DE LA INTEGRACI6N 85 (1973); Oliver, supra
note 5; Perenzin, Regulation of the Andean Investment Codes, 4 LAWYER OF THE
AMERICAS 15 (1972); Schliesser, Restrictionson ForeignInvestment in the Andean
Common Market, 5 INT'L LAW. 386 (1971); Valdez, The Andean ForeignInvestment Code: An Analysis, 7 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1 (1973).
31. Decision 24, Declaration 4 of the preamble drafted by the Commission of
the Cartagena Agreement.
32. Cdmpora speech, supra note 7, at 562.
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He indicated that the principal characteristics of the bill were
derived from the earlier Peronist law and from the Andean Code.
In light of these origins as well as international interest in the
Andean Code, frequent reference will be made to its provisions in
an effort to better understand and interpret the Argentine Law.
Although the Code was occasionally used without adequate analysis or consideration of its new milieu, some fault undoubtedly lies
in the charged political atmosphere that surrounded the Law's
enactment. In any case, it is hoped that this analysis will not only
serve an informational purpose for the potential or existing investor but that it will also have some value in future drafting efforts,
in Argentina and elsewhere. For that reason, this Article is at times
critical of the legislation's draftsmen for not making their intentions clear. An understanding of those intentions with their philosophical or political bases is fundamental here since no standard
of application yet exists.
The philosophy of control rather than promotion of foreign investment is not entirely new to Argentina. Various sectorial and
regional industrial promotion laws limit their benefits or, conversely, allow more benefits to those companies with a determined
percentage of local ownership and local management. Some of
these sectorial and regional statutes are more restrictive than the
new Law and continue in effect. The existing technology law,
which was enacted in 1971 to cover foreign patents, trademarks
and know-how to be exploited in Argentina and which is soon to
be replaced by a tougher new law, differentiates between local and
foreign investors as do banking, securities, and tax legislation as
well as the state purchase statute and a variety of other measures,
not within the scope of this paper.
B. PoliticalAtmosphere SurroundingPassage of the
ForeignInvestment Law
Since many of the policies espoused by the runner-up Radical
Party were not unlike those of the Peronist coalition, Per6n came
to power in the 1973 elections with an impressive mandate for
action. One of his most sympathetically received promises in a
country where the word dependencia evokes a vigorous popular
reaction, was to put Argentina back in control of her own economic
destiny. In fact, in very short order not only was the foreign investment law drafted, but Argentines also saw legislation expropriat-
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ing for resale to local interests seven banks that had been sold to
foreigners since the 1966 military takeover as well as a law nationalizirig all bank deposits and putting the Central Bank in absolute
control of credit. These measures were accompanied by a series of
industrial promotion laws affecting foreign investors and including
a general industrial incentive law and decree and specific laws or
decrees for steel, petrochemicals, minerals, forestry, paper and regional development. A bill governing foreign technology contributions is presently in Congress.
The Foreign Investment Law went beyond philosophical judgments, symbolic values and election promises. Enormously
important interests, both Argentine and foreign, entered into the
equation. The first draft was sent to Congress by President Cdmpora on June 14, 1973, before Per6n's election. It was subjected to
a lengthy process of evolution in both houses and their committees
and emerged from Congress on November 7, 1973, somewhat
milder than its original form, partially as a result of Per6n's personal intervention.
An incident shortly after the draft bill was presented to Congress
provides insight into the political atmosphere, which surrounded
the enactment of the legislation. The now famous Krebs 'affair
began on July 23, 1973, when Max V. Krebs, head of the Commercial Section of the United States Embassy in Buenos Aires, sent
Economy Minister Jos6 Ber Gelbard a three page memorandum
criticizing the bill. Krebs insisted that the statute was unfairly
prejudicial to foreign investors and opined that it would prove
harmful to Argentina. 3 The administration seized the opportunity
to castigate the Yankees for "an undue interference in the internal
affairs of our country" and stopped just short of sending the unwitting Krebs home. 4 The latter insisted that his memorandum was
33. The United States Embassy in Buenos Aires supplied the author with the
Spanish language version of the note. The entire incident was amply reported in
the Argentine press. See La Naci6n, July 24, 28, 1973, Aug. 1-4, 6, 19, 21-23, 2930, 1973.
34. Cronica (Buenos Aires), July 31, 1973. Krebs had a predecessor whose
intervention in the internal affairs of Argentina was undeniably direct as well as
improper. Any history of contemporary Argentina describes the role of the United
States Ambassador Spruille Braden in the 1946 presidential election. It is said
that Per6n's victory that year may have been attributable to the Ambassador's
meddling. An English historian tells us that Braden: "threw himself into the
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sent in response to a request for the Embassy's position on the bill,
a decidedly unpleasant doublecross if true. Nevertheless, the Embassy apologized and admitted that some of the language in the
note was intemperate, caused by an overly hurried translation.
The press had a field day with one paper demonstrating particular
journalistic flair; Cronica suggested that the incident could lead to
the breaking of diplomatic relations with the government of the
monopolios mascachicles,the chewing gum monopolies. Basically,
Krebs was used to further educate Argentines in Per6n's third-way
Justicialistdoctrine, neither Yanquis nor Rusos. Thus, the Krebs
incident was used to demonstrate to Argentines that their new Law
would have teeth; otherwise, the United States would not have
sought to interfere.
The Draft Law was prepared and the Krebs incident took place
before Per6n's corporal return to power. Per6n reportedly intervened in order to temper the final Law.-" After assuming the Presidency he and his successor Isabel Per6n, have gradually drawn
away from the more extreme leftist factions amongst his supporters and they from him. 6 This apparent swing does not mean that
the old days of foreign dominated laissez-faire capitalism are on
their way back but it and other events suggest that the foreign
investor is welcome if he succeeds in reaching an accommodation.
The new Law is flexible enough to enable the government to offer
election as if he were campaigning for President Truman in Texas or California.
In his enthusiasm he had produced a Blue Book setting forth all the sins of Per6n
and his friends in respect to their connections with the fascists and the Nazis.
This Blue Book he circulated on a massive scale in Argentina. Per6n's ripost was
too easy. He circulated a Blue and White (the Argentine national colours) Book

telling the Americans to mind their own business, decorating this message with

some fancy variations on the anti-imperialist theme." H. FERNS, ARGENTINA, 183
(1969), also available in Spanish translation. See also M. SCENNA, BRADEN Y
PER6N 1 (Editorial Dorr Korrigan, Buenos Aires, 1974).
35. Among other allusions to Perdn's intervention, see La Ley del Candado,
El Economista, Nov. 2, 1973; La Naci6n, Nov. 8, 1973, at 1; La Prensa, Nov. 8,
1973; Business Latin America, June 28, 1973, at 201.
36. This was dramatized on May Day 1974 when Per6n in response to heckling
from Peronist youth groups during his speech in the Plaza de Mayo called them
immature and stupid. The author was present and was astounded to witness the
departure as a body of several tens of thousands of chanting youths. Ironically,
many observers are convinced that the unrelenting pressure of these Peronist
Youth groups during the years of military rule paved the way for Per6n's return.
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reasonable conditions to desirable investors. Consequently, new
sources and slightly new types of investment may be attracted to
the country. An Italian group is seeking to make an enormous
investment in the petrochemical industry, and the Soviet bloc nations of Eastern Europe are in active negotiation with the Argentines over the establishment of a number of joint ventures. Thus,
the current approach seems to spring from pragmatic realism and
a continued interest in enticing fresh investment into the country.
In spite of the modifications introduced while the Law was in
Congress, it retains many characteristics of its original source of
inspiration. Fortunately, the Andean Investment Code is a worthy
model although its offspring is the victim of several technical,
drafting defects. These may be explained in various ways: first, the
Andean model was accepted without adequate examination and
comprehension of all of its provisions and their consequences. An
example, discussed below, involves the expression perdidas netas
or net losses, which the Law indicates are to be subtracted from
the sum used to derive the foreign capital base of a firm. This
expression has no specific or generally recognized meaning in Argentine jurisprudence or case law nor is its meaning entirely clear
in all of the Andean countries. Congress has thrust an element of
Andean uncertainty into the Argentine legal system. Another explanation lies in the political nature of the undertaking and the
possibility that some legislators may not have acted in an entirely
responsible manner. Living in the country and exposed to the
media while the bill was in Congress, the author had the impression that many senators and representatives were more dedicated
to airing anti-dependencia views than to producing outstanding
legislation. Also, it must be remembered that Argentina had not
had a functioning Congress since 1966. The quality of legislation
was undoubtedly affected by the impossibility of forming highly
competent technical, advisory and staff committees on an overnight basis in spite of the existence of many outstanding Argentine
professionals. Good legislation is obviously dependent upon the
quality of the supporting technical staff involved in producing it.
Part of the problem may reside in Peronist antipathy for the
foreign investment legislation devised during the twenty years that
Per6n was prevented from returning to Argentina. A negative bias
may have prevented an adequate analysis of this body of law in the
construction of an "Argentine" approach. For instance, the vir-
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tually untested 1971 Lanusse legislation may be appreciated for its
clarity and brevity. President CAmpora in the speech (cited above)
introducing the draft bill to Congress referred specifically only to
the first Peronist foreign investment law of 1953 and to the Andean
Code. The political milieu surrounding the enactment of this legislation guaranteed defects. Fortunately, the philosophical underpinnings of the Law are usually clear, and its defects are subject
to correction.
C.

The Structure of the ForeignInvestment Law

The new Foreign Investment Law applies to direct investments
of foreign capital in the country, credit obligations with foreign
lenders and contracts or agreements of any kind that give rise to
an obligation to make remittances abroad. Excepted from this last
provision are contracts involving technology transfers, transportation and insurance. It is not clear whether contracts providing for
the payment of imports are included under the Law. The Law does
not cover imported technology as does the Andean Investment
Code37 but refers to it in isolated instances as well as in one very
important instance;" the subject is currently provided for in a 1971
statute39 while a new technology transfer law is presently being
considered by Congress.
The basic system of the Andean Code is followed; companies are
divided into three categories depending upon the percentage of
capital contributed by what the Law defines as foreign or national
investors. The category affects the treatment afforded the firm
under the Law in a variety of ways, including the manner in which
the initial investment must be approved and the economic sectors
in which the company may participate. All existing and future
foreign investment must be registered in an agency of the Ministry
of Economy in order to transfer profits and repatriate capital. New
investors must enter into a contract negotiated with an Authority
37. Decision 24, arts. 18-26.
38. Investment Law, art. 26(2).
39. Law of Sept. 10, 1971 (No. 19.231), Concerning Licensing Contracts and
Technology Transfer (Argen.) [hereinafter cited as Lanusse Technology Law];
Decree of Dec. 22, 1971 (No. 6187) [hereinafter cited as Lanusse Technology
Decree]; Resolution 119 of the Secretary of Industrial Development, Dec. 19,
1973.
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established within the same Ministry for the regulation of foreign
investments. The Law provides certain guidelines, exempts designated sectors and indicates maximum percentages, based on registered capital, which may be transferred abroad as profits or capital.
Investors with existing foreign investments may opt to subject
their investments to the Law in which case an investment contract
must be negotiated. Alternatively, they may choose to remain outside the control of the Law, except for certain designated provisions, and pay a special tax on profit and capital remittances. The
Government apparently intends to assert that the right to remain
outside the coverage of the Law is limited to enterprises that are a
party to investment contracts entered into under previous statutes.
The Law, moreover, provides for the possible expropriation of existing foreign investments in certain cases and opens up the possibility of fade-outs-the gradual transformation of an investment
from foreign to local owners-for both existing and future entrants.
In addition, access to local credit by foreign investors is restricted
and foreign loans are regulated. Interest, royalty and other payments to foreign parents receive special attention. Although the
regulatory Decree is often an interpretative aid, it is sometimes
confusing and e'ven contradictory.
III.

FOREIGN CAPITAL-DEFINITIONS AND DOUBTS

A.

Categories of Foreign Capital

The law applies to five forms of direct foreign capital investment-external credits, Argentine foreign debt securities, foreign
currencies, capital goods and profits eligible for transfer
abroad-which it describes in considerably more detail than do the
comparable provisions of the Andean Foreign Investment Code.
The Argentine Regulatory Decree enters into further, perhaps excessive, detail but shows an awareness of the practices of the multinational investor and of the consequences for the capital receiving country."
40. Investment Law, art. 1; Decision 24, art. 1. As Decision 24 matures, the
problems of interpretation and lacunae assume increasing importance. Since
these problems are not reserved exclusively for regional level decisions, questions
of national practice are fundamental. See Casanova, Anotaciones a la Aplicaci6n
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Two of the five forms of capital investment in the Argentine Law
are not specifically mentioned in the Andean Investment Code,
probably because the draftsmen felt that doing so was unnecessary. Decision 24 would undoubtedly accord them foreign direct
investment treatment by virtue of provisions for the investment of
convertible foreign exchange or local currency, which may be
transferred abroad. One of the two is the capitalization of external
credits in foreign exchange or in Argentine pesos provided that the
Authority determines that .the use of the credits justifies such
treatment. The other permits the contribution as capital of securities representing the Argentine foreign debt (Titulos de la deuda
externa nacional)upon approval by the Authority on the basis of
advice from the Central Bank taking into account the balance of
payments situation and the particular case. 4 In addition to bonds
or debentures sold abroad by the Government and government
obligations under loan agreements, these securities presumably
include the several hundred-million-dollar national debt in the
form of External Dollar Bonds (Bonos Externos) sold by the Government since 1971 in lieu of foreign exchange. Both forms facilitate the investment in Argentina of foreign exchange, which would
otherwise leave the country as debt amortization far more rapidly
than the new Investment Law will permit its flight in the form of
profits or as capital repatriation.
The three remaining types of foreign capital expressly covered
by the Argentine Law conform to the Andean provision although
Argentina provides considerably more descriptive detail. Listed
below, these include foreign currencies, capital goods and profits
eligible for transfer abroad. First, the Law allows foreign currencies
to be invested in economic sectors and zones designated by the
Executive Branch.42 This does not require elaboration. Secondly,
de la Decisi6n No. 24: El caso de Chile, 15 DERECHO

DE LA INTEGRACI6N

239

(Buenos Aires, 1974). On a regional level, the creation of an Andean Court of
Justice is envisaged. For more information see other articles in 15 DERECHO DE LA
INTERACI6N.

The problems of harmonizing local views and increasing the effectiveness of
Decision 24 have been the theme of Andean Group conferences. Argentina is, of
course, saved from the additional problems and complications of the two-level

interpretative and decision-making structures imposed by regional groupings.
41.

Investment Law, arts. 1(a)(3), 1(a)(5).

42. Investment Law, arts. 1(a)(1), 5(a); Investment Decree, art. 23.

Spring 1975]

ARGENTINE FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW

the Law covers foreign capital in the form of new capital goods and
parts in the quantity judged indispensable by the Authority. These
goods may not be alienated by the investor for any reason for a
period determined in accordance with their nature.4 3 The Decree
abandons this case-by-case flexibility by prohibiting the alienation
of imported capital goods for eight years after their entry into
service except upon the express authorization of the Authority.
Such approval may not be given unless replacement is necessary
to maintain or reach an optimum technological level or unless
market requirements dictate the discontinuance or reduction of
production." Basically the Decree indicates that, regardless of the
expected life of the capital goods involved, the company must
initially commit itself to keep them for a period of eight years.
Obviously, predictable wear and technological obsolescence may,
from the beginning, insure a far shorter life span. Presumably in
such cases, the Authority will interpret the necessary replacement
exception prospectively; allow the determination of a realistic limitation in the initial investment contract; and, thus, avoid an unnecessary bureaucratic encounter when the time later comes to
seek this authorization.
The Decree expressly eliminates the possibility of a longer-term
restriction in the case of goods with a more extended, predictable
life-span. Perhaps this was done in the interest of reasonableness
and smoother synchronization with the Law's rules for capital repatriation, which may begin after five years in stipulated percentages up to a maximum of twenty per cent of defined capital.
Nevertheless, the fixing of such rigid limitations in the Decree
reflects the unwillingness of the executive to trust such initial determinations to the bargaining process between the wily foreign
investor and his own subaltern Authority; it probably reflects a
justified fear of the persuasive powers of the foreign investor. A
fixed limitation may be thought to eliminate the need for discussion on the point.
Further, the Decree defines capital goods as "all those elements
entering into the productive process without being transformed or
consumed and which do not constitute a part of the finished prod43.
44.

Investment Law, art. 1(a)(2).
Investment Decree, art. 28.
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uct."4 5 For example, the Decree's considerable detail on capital
goods is a Third World reaction to the overstatement of capital
investment by means of fraudulent or unfair transfer pricing practices, which inflate the basis on which dividend remittances and
capital repatriation are computed. The head of the Legal Section
of the Andean Common Market provides a list of extravagant examples in a recent article in which he cites instances of overpricing
between foreign parents and their Andean subsidiaries of up to
3000 per cent. (Three thousand per cent is not a typographical
error.)4" This is a vice Argentines have set out to eliminate with a
vengeance.
The Decree provides instructions for determining the lowest current export or local price in the country of origin for the same or
similar goods and the lesser of these must be used. All of the above
must be verified with a variety of certificates provided by appropriate chambers of commerce, local accountants and Argentine diplomatic representatives in the exporting country. The capitalizable
value of these goods is computed FOB, but may include freight if
paid in funds emanating from outside of Argentina.47 To be capitalized as a foreign investment, however, capital goods must be new
and must represent the most modem technology in existence. Furthermore, the importing firm must show that the goods are necessary and appropriate for the operation for which they are intended. 8
Subjective considerations, the political reality of bureaucratic
interpretation as well as national economic need and the "necessary and appropriate" part of the previously mentioned stipulations, probably save the provision from hazardous rigidity. To insist on the most modern technology in existence may be too categorical; a South American version of the "computers in Africa"
theme. Argentina obviously does not want an obsolete or uncompetitive shoe company or automobile factory49 but it also may not
Investment Decree, art. 1(b).
Saavedra, El Rfgimen Comdn de Inversiones Extranjeras,14 DERECHO DE
LA INTEORAci6N 261, 266-67 (Buenos Aires, 1973).
47. Investment Decree, arts. 3, 10.
48. Investment Decree, art. 9.
49. Kaiser Motors Co. and Willys Motors Inc. installed a plant in Santa
Isabela, Province of Cordoba in 1954, under an agreement with Industrias Apronduticas y Mecdnicas del Estado (IAME). Kaiser imported used equipment from
45.
46.
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want or need the most sophisticated and, therefore, most expensive
version available in the world. In the Argentine case, the same
regulatory scheme that insists on the most modem technology offers priority status for investments that promise to absorb and
train the unemployed." An identical labor-capital factor relation
does not prevail in all countries simultaneously; indeed Argentina
may in some cases benefit by paying a bargain price for less sophisticated but labor intensive technology. Realistically, the provisions
under fire put the investor on notice that the country will not
accept unfair practices while reserving options for an alert Investment Authority by providing grounds for refusing any given proposal. Thus, before approving a new investment, the Authority
must describe the capital goods and replacement parts proposed
for importation to the Secretary of State for Industrial Development in the Ministry of Economy (Secretariade Estado de Desarrollo Industrial). This office will determine if satisfactory alternative goods are economically produced in Argentina and available
for substitution."
Thirdly, the Law encompasses foreign capital in the form of
profits derived from foreign investments eligible under the Law for
transfer abroad.2" The problem of determining eligibility for transfer abroad will be dealt with in some detail in the section treating
capital repatriation and profit remittances. The Authority may
authorize the reinvestment of eligible profits in the same firm by
simple resolution. This new investment will be subject to the conditions stipulated in the original investment contract or its modifications. However, the investment of these profits in another firm
will require a new investment contract. "
More difficult problems concern profits that are eligible to leave
the country yet are derived from foreign investments that were
made before the existence of the new Law and in firms which have
not opted to be under the Law. The Statute is unclear but the
weight of opinion, including that of functionaries acting within the
the United States with which to manufacture vehicles in Argentina. The contention that this equipment was obsolescent has never been proven.
50. Investment Law, art. 10(a).
51. Investment Decree, art. 46.
52. Investment Law, art. 1(a)(4).
53. Investment Law, art. 14, 1.
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Authority and charged with administering the Law, indicates that
authorization is necessary to reinvest in the same firm but that no
investment contract is required. Should this indeed be the Authority's policy, the question will remain sufficiently open to permit a
bureaucratic reversal at any time. The treatment would, thus, be
the same as that applied to a firm that reinvests its eligible profits
under its investment contract. In both cases a contract will not be
required but authorization will be. Conversely, investing these
profits in a different firm or activity would require a contract with
all that it implies."
The treatment accorded existing investments is of fundamental
importance both because of its dollar dimensions and because
these investors have the right to remain outside the ambit of the
Law and pay a penalty tax on remittances. Significantly, most
investors are postponing decision on this option question. Meanwhile, the Authority confirms that failure to obtain authorization
for reinvestment will mean the loss of repatriation and profit transfer rights based on the amount reinvested regardless of whether or
not the enterprise is subject to the Law. 5 If the Authority should
require the negotiation of investment contracts for profit reinvestment by firms not under the Law, an anomalous situation will
develop: these firms will find a part of their foreign capital investment subject to the Law and to an investment contract while another part would not be so subject. At the very least, this represents an additional accounting headache if not the means by which
the government will be able to eventually force recourse to the
option for the entire foreign investment.
An interesting interpretation by the Authority, and one favorable to the investor established in Argentina prior to the enactment of the Law, holds that for such firms no percentage limit of
registered capital will apply in determining the profit amount eligible for reinvestment, as is the case for firms subject to the Law.
The Authority can take this position because the Law does not
qualify its principle that profits derived from foreign investments
54. Klein, El Rfgimen Legal de la Radicacion de Capitales Extranjeros, 1
DERECHO EMPRESARIAL 6, 15 (Buenos Aires, 1974). Duggan, supra note 23, expressed the same opinion and indicated the position of the Authority as revealed
in several conversations with its members.
55. Investment Law, art. 14 (last ), art. 30.
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and eligible for transfer abroad may be capitalized as an additional
foreign investment." Profit remittances from investments made
prior to this Law are subject to a limitation and, thus, fall in their
entirety within the strictures of the provision.
Another position of the Authority on this subject is likely to
generate controversy; they insist that all reinvestments, that is,
capitalizations of retained earnings, made by existing firms since
December 15, 1973, when the Law became effective, for which
previous authorization was not sought,5 7 have lost the right to be
computed as a base for profit and capital transfers. This is a strong
stand since neither the Law nor the Decree provides much guidance for reinvestments made by previously existing firms. Furthermore, the Decree was not published until February 1974 and registration forms still had not been released in mid-July of the same
year. Obviously, any firm planning henceforth to capitalize transferable earnings should as a minimum send a certified letter to the
Authority indicating its intention and seeking authorization.
The 'Argentine treatment of profit reinvestment is in two respects more restrictive than that of Decision 24. s In defining profits eligible for transfer and, thus, eligible for reinvestment, Argentina establishes a percentage limitation based on the amount of
previously authorized foreign capital invested. Profits exceeding
the stipulated percentage become permanently Argentine capital
without transfer rights. 9 The Andean Code also limits the percentage of profits eligible for transfer abroad but unlike Argentina
poses no limit on the amount or percentage that may be reinvested
and receive treatment as a foreign investment. Like Argentina,
previous authorization and registration is required."0 Although the
second difference may seen insignificant, it involves a question of
bureaucratic interference. The Andean measures permit member
countries to allow the reinvestment of up to five per cent of profits
in the same firm without previous authorization. The same right
56. Investment Law, art. 1(a)(5).
57. Investment Law, arts. 4, 14 require previous authorization of all investments.
58. Decision 24, arts. 12, 13.
59. Investment Law, art. 15.
60. Decision 24, arts. 1, 12, 37.
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was incorporated in the Draft Argentine Law only to disappear in
the enacted version.01
Apart from the five per cent allowance in the Andean Pact countries, both Codes are identical in requiring authorization and in
leaving it within the discretionary authority of the appropriate
body in the Andean countries to limit the permissible sum as it
sees fit. The Argentines are more explicit in granting this power.
Not only do they limit reinvestment to profits eligible for transfer
abroad, but in another article the Authority is given the power to
limit the amount reinvested to a percentage of profits. 2 A limitation as a percentage of profits rather than capital may have been
unintentional since throughout the Law and Decree, percentage
limitations are related to capital. The change may have been introduced to give the Authority a basis upon which to limit the reinvestment of profits of a firm, which has grown unwelcome in Argentina or whose expansion is considered undesirable for some
reason. Limiting reinvestment possibilities to less than the amount
eligible for transfer abroad presents an affected investor with the
choice of sending his eligible earnings home or leaving them in the
Argentine firm as national capital not included in its foreign capital base.
Reinvestments will be registered in the currency in which the
original investment was registered or a similar currency. 3 Similar
currency is presumably any currency freely convertible into the
currency in which registration was effected. The conversion from
earnings stated in pesos to the registration currency will be made
at the closing selling exchange rate applicable at the date of authorization at the Banco de la Nacion Argentina, the governmentowned commercial bank. 4 This rate and those specified for other
purposes in the Law have remained fixed at just below ten pesos
to the dollar since the end of 1971. This compares with a black or
free market rate, which has ranged from slightly over the official
rate to over fifteen pesos to the dollar. Special rates combined with
61. Decision 24, art. 13. Argentine Executive Draft Foreign Investment Law,
art. 14, introduced June 14, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Draft Investment Law];
DIARIO DE SESIONES, (June 14, 1973).
62. Investment Law, art. 14, 2.
63. Investment Law, art. 14, 2.
64. Investment Law, art. 14, 2; Decree, art. 56(e).
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rebates for the exchange of dollars received in payment for certain
designated non-traditional exports produce an effective exchange
of over seventeen pesos to the dollar.65 Obviously, the low official
rate benefits the foreign investor who is, thus, allowed the registration of more dollars for a given peso amount.
A number of problems related to the reinvestment of profits will
be dealt with later in this article. These include questions involving: (1) profits in excess of those that may be transferred abroad
or reinvested, so-called nationalized profits; (2) whether distributed earnings or undistributed retained earnings not included in
stated capital serve as the basis for computations under the Law;
(3) loss of transfer or reinvestment rights for failure to comply with
certain prescribed time limitations; and (4) the effect of enjoying
the benefits of industrial promotion laws or incentive plans.
B.

Capitalizationof Technology

Although there is some difference of opinion, it is generally assumed that the list of classes of foreign capital to which the Law
applies is exhaustive. The main concern is with the question of
capitalizing-as a foreign investment-rights to future payments
for patents, trademarks and perhaps know-how; in other words the
query centers on the capitalization of a lump sum representing the
value of transferred technology. In general, the new Argentine
company law permits the capitalization of such intangible rights
when their value can be determined." Without entering into the
sometimes byzantine mechanics of actually achieving this result,
it may be affirmed that many companies have successfully included the value of patents and trademarks, and perhaps knowhow, in their stated capital.
Most relevant to present considerations, Argentina has in the
past explicitly allowed foreign investors to capitalize certain intangible rights. The 1971 foreign investment law list of items capitalizable as foreign investments is basically identical to that of the
new Law except it admits as capital certain foreign investments of
"intangible assets" (bienes inmateriales) as provided in specific
as reported in La Naci6n, June 2, 1974, at 3, and Buenos Aires Herald, June 9,
1974, at 3.

66. Law of April 3, 1972 (No. 19,550), Concerning Argentine Companies, arts.
40, 187, [hereinafter cited as Company Law].
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legislation. The Decree issued by President Lanusse under this law
prescribes that "[tihe evaluation of intangible assets included in
the investment will be accomplished in accordance with the provisions of Law No. 19,231 and its regulations.""7 The law referred to
is the 1971 statute regulating licensing contracts and technology
transfers. Although a new draft technology law is being considered
by Congress, the 1971 law is still in effect at the date of this writing. The latter not only permits the investment by means of the
payment of a predetermined global amount, but also favors such
investments by exempting them from otherwise applicable stamp
taxes."8 Further, the law favors the purchase and capitalization of
imported technology by local capital companies as defined in the
law regulating state purchases and contracting." Moreover, the
National Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Desarrollo) is
directed to establish special credit lines to facilitate these purchases.70
The Registro Nacional de Contratos de Licencias y Transferencia de Tecnologia (the "Registro") created under this 1971 Technology Transfer Law is responsible for the approval and registration of contracts involving the importation of technology. In the
past, the Registro has contemplated and permitted the capitalization of the widest array of technological rights. Its fifteen-page
form for the registration of technology transfer contracts calls for
disclosure of previously capitalized intangibles such as "patents,
trademarks, technical assistance, know-how, models and industrial designs, used machinery and equipment . . . royalty

debts, etc."'" Officials of the Registro have indicated that until the
question is clarified, any such capitalization of intangibles will be
67. Lanusse Investment Law, art. 2(e); Lanusse Investment Decree, art. 2(g).

68. Lanusse Technology Law, arts. 10, 11.
69. The applicable definition of,a local capital company is found in the Buy
National (Compre Nacional)Law and Decree, discussed infra. In most cases 51%
of a company's total capital and voting shares must be in the hands of natural
persons domiciled in Argentina and 80% of management must be so domiciled.
See Law of Dec. 23, 1970 (No. 18.875), Concerning Buying Nationally, arts. 7, 11
(Argen.) [hereinafter cited as Buy National Lavil; Decree of Dec. 23, 1970 (No.
2.930) [hereinafter cited as Buy National Decree].
70. Lanusse Technology Law, art. 11.
71. Application for Registration of Technology Contract obtained by author
from INTI, 5-6.
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denied.72 However, the Draft Technology Transfer Law currently
under congressional consideration would completely reverse previous policy. It specifically forbids the capitalization of any form
of imported technology by any company regardless of ownership
except for cases that the Authority determines to be of particular
importance to the country and which in turn must be approved by
73
the Executive Branch.

Thus, the inspiration for the Draft Technology Transfer Law
appears to have crossed the Andes. The principles embodied in the
Argentine Draft Technology Transfer Law are included in Decision
24, which provides that "[t]he contribution of technological intangibles shall give a right to the payment of royalties upon previous authorization by the competent national organism, but it
' 74
may not be computed as a capital contribution.
Although the Argentine drafting effort leaves the matter open for
speculation, its list of items subject to capitalization as foreign
investments appears exhaustive. It would be insulting to the legislators involved to suggest that they were unaware of the question
of intangible technological rights since they are treated specifically
in the Andean Code, in the previous Argentine foreign investment
law and decree and in both the current and projected technology
laws. The draftsmen of the Law may have considered it sufficient
to provide that the Statute does not cover contracts for technology
use, transports or insurance.75 The problem is that the exclusion
of technology contracts from the ambit of the Law does not tell us
unambiguously what to do with an imported patent or trademark.
Consequently, a final answer must await the sanctions of the new
Draft Technology Transfer Law. It is, however, abundantly clear
that the Law contemplates the continued use of the fee or royalty
payment system as a means of financing imported technology regardless of whether the capitalization of these rights is to be per72. Author's July 1974 conversations with INTI economist Dr. Daniel Chudnovsky.
73. Draft Technology Law prepared by the Ministry of Economy under Resolution 665/73 and entitled: Law for the Transfer of Technology from Abroad, art.
14 (undated and submitted to Congress during early 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Draft Technology Transfer Law].
74. Decision 24, art. 21.
75. Investment Law, art. 1(c).
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mitted. 8 In fact, the last article of the Law directs the President
to submit a bill to Congress regulating the sums that may be
remitted abroad as royalties or as fees for technological services.
Thus, the Draft Technology Transfer Law goes far beyond the
dictates of the Investment Law in covering the entire field of imported technology.
One reason for dwelling on the subject of capitalization of intangible rights is the now omnipresent problem of inflation. Capitalizing technological contributions in terms of dollars, or any other
convertible currency, and permitting a fixed percentage of such an
amount to be transferred abroad as dividend and capital repatriation provide no protection against worldwide inflation since the
dollar total remains invariable. National inflation assumes a neutral form as far as transfers are concerned and as long as the applicable local dollar exchange rate climbs in unison with the rate of
local inflation. The investor does enjoy some protection against
devaluation of the local currency in terms of dollars, but here, as
in the case of national inflation, he must always earn enough pesos
to buy the number of dollars that he is permitted to transfer.
Capitalization, if permitted, might seem preferable to the investor
in spite of the inflation problem because, first and most obviously,
it increases the registered capital base for computing transfers.
Additionally, in an indirect way to be explained later, the new Law
prohibits the tax deduction as a business expense of royalties paid
by an Argentine subsidiary to its foreign parent.7 7 However, if there
exists a reasonable relation between the applicable exchange rate
of the local currency and the worldwide value of the dollar, and if
local inflation generally parallels the world rate, the royalty system
provides protection. If royalties are computed as a percentage of
sales, as prices rise the percentage will increase.
IV.

DEFINITIONS AND CLASSIFICATIONS

A. Investment Categories
The Argentines chose to borrow intact the tripartite corporate
classification system used in Decision 24. The labels were changed
in the definitional section and the wording was slightly modified,
76. Investment Law, arts. 26, 36.
77. Investment Law, art. 26, 2.
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but the show of originality was somewhat in vain because elsewhere in the Law and in the Decree the draftsmen forgot their new
terminology. They begin by selecting as defined terms, "Foreign
capital enterprises," "Enterprises with foreign and national capital participation" and "National capital enterprises" 8 but by the
end of the Law refer to "national, mixed or foreign enterprises. 117
This is the irresistibly simpler Andean language,8 ° which will be
used at random in this study.
Foreign enterprises are those with less than 51 per cent national
capital and more than 49 per cent foreign capital. A fraction over
49 per cent foreign capital, although presumably leaving control in
national hands, produces a foreign enterprise. Firms with 51 per
cent or more national capital are also considered foreign enterprises when the legal decision-making power and the effective
technical, administrative, financial and commercial management
are in the hands of foreign investors. The Decree adds the language about effective power, which was apparently forgotten in the
Law since similar language is included in the definitions of the
other two categories of firms.
Mixed enterprises are those whose national capital, whether private or state, ranges from 51 per cent to 80 per cent, which allows
foreign participation of 20 per cent to 49 per cent. The borderline
cases, 49 per cent foreign and 51 per cent national as well as 20 per
cent foreign and 80 per cent national, fall in the mixed category.
The national capital must possess effective legal decision-making
power as well as prove that national investors exercise management control.8 2 National enterprises are those whose national capital exceeds 80 per cent, and thus limits foreign investor participation to under 20 per cent. Again the national capital must have real
83
control.
Some Argentine commentators question the need to import the
three-way classification system since the benefits have yet to be
proved in the Andean countries; they point out that this conflicts
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Investment Law, art.
Investment Law, art.
Decision 24, art. 1.
Investment Law, art.
Investment Law, art.
Investment Law, art.

2.
36.
2(a); Decree, art. 1(c).
2(b).
2(c).

310

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 8: 277

with Argentine legal tradition, which has always classified firms
with majority local ownership as Argentine.84 It is true that the new
categories created a number of doubts; however they also serve as
the basis for several interesting distinctions both in the Andean
Code and in its Argentine offspring. In computing the percentages
of capital necessary to classify a company, the Decree provides
that the calculation will be based exclusively on voting shares with
decision-making power.8" This raises a question about the treatment of non-voting preferred shares, which must be permitted to
vote in certain situations such as upon default in the payment of
dividends." Following the literal terms of the Decree, a company
could have majority foreign ownership expressed in preferred
shares and be considered national. This may, indeed, be the result
intended by the Decree draftsmen since Argentine corporate law
does not allow for the existence of non-voting shares other than the
described species of preferred stock. This is the only conclusion
that gives meaning to the Decree provision.
An Argentine lawyer has suggested that from a national point of
view, this literal reading of the Decree may be desirable, especially
with respect to preexisting firms." By permitting foreign investors
to hold non-voting preferred shares in proportions greater than
those used to determine the classification of a firm, he suggests
that a watering process may occur which could facilitate a gradual
transfer of ownership to Argentine hands. The capitalization of
earnings as preferred shares would reduce the book value of all the
company's stock on a per share basis and would, thus, make voting
shares more accessible to the Argentine investor. The manifest
policy of the Government of achieving maximum national control
over existing firms operating in Argentina would be advanced by
84.

Klein, supra note 54, at 8; Duggan, supra note 23.

The question of assigning nationality on the basis of ownership and/or control
to companies incorporated in Argentina has been the subject of detailed study.
See S. BioCCA,
EXTRANACIONALES

NACIONALIDAD

DES

LAS

SOCIEDADES MULTINACIONALES

Y

21 (V. De Zavalia, ed., Buenos Aires, 1974) ; E. ZALDivr, RtGI-

MEN DE LAS EMPRESAS ExTRANJERAS EN LA REPOBLICA ARGENTINA: LA ExTRATERrroRIALIDAD, LA NACIONALIDAD Y EL SISTEMA DE LA LEY DE SOCIEDADES COMERCALES

(Buenos Aires, 1972).
85. Investment Decree, art. 2.
86. Company Law, arts. 217, 244, 4.
87. Dr. Jorge Eduardo Bustamante in conversations with the author.
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reducing the cost of entry for local investors, especially at a time
when sufficient capital does not exist to meet all new investment
needs.
The validity of this idea, however, depends upon the existence
of a direct relation between the dilution of non-voting preferred
shares and the market price of voting stock as well as the willingness of the foreign investor to divest a portion of his voting capital
at a price reflecting the increased number of outstanding shares.
Furthermore, if the earnings capitalized are real and are indeed
put to work, dilution on a per share basis should not occur; more
shares would be outstanding, but they would reflect a correspondingly larger total capital base.
Rene Blondeau, head of the Foreign Investment Registration
Office, has affirmed that the Government is aware of this confusion
but has not yet decided how to deal with it.88
B.

Chain Ownership

The definitions of the Law do not aid in determining how to
classify firms that have corporate shareholders-both foreign and
national shareholders-although there are indications that a reasonable and realistic attitude may be anticipated from the Authority. 89 A simple example shows that the accumulation of percentages system produces results that clash with reality. Firm C is 70
per cent owned by firm A and 30 per cent by firm B. Firm A is 51
per cent nationally owned and 49 per cent foreign owned and is
thus a mixed company with control in the hands of Argentine
investors. Firm B is a 100 per cent foreign owned firm. C, upon the
accumulation of percentages, is 64.30 per cent foreign owned and
35.70 per cent nationally owned. The foreign component of C coming from A is 49 per cent of 70 per cent or 34.30 per cent, which
when added to the 30 per cent of C owned by B, all of which is
foreign, results in a 64.30 per cent figure for the foreign composition
of C. In reality, however, A controls C with 70 per cent ownership
and A is controlled by national investors with 51 per cent ownership. Nevertheless, C would have to be considered a foreign enterprise as opposed to a mixed enterprise. Other examples produce
88.

Interview with Dr. Rene Blondeau, Buenos Aires, April 19, 1974.

89.

Id.

312

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 8: 277

the opposite result: the corporation at the end of the chain may
show a lower percentage of foreign ownership than the corporation
controlling it. Decision 24 does not indicate the appropriate
method for adoption in the Andean countries although the question has come up for discussion in meetings of the Subregion's
Governing Board, the Junta de Cartagena.
Unfortunately the Argentine Law does not explicitly provide for
what would seem the most logical solution: each corporation
should be classified in the same category as the company controlling it and so on down the line. The category would, of course,
always depend upon effective control as well as ownership proportions.
C. DistinctionsBased on Classification
The Argentine statutory scheme makes the following six distinctions based on the classification system: (1) All investments of
foreign capital must be authorized by means of an investment
contract negotiated with the Authority. Investments in national
enterprises need no further approval, but those in mixed enterprises must be approved by the executive branch while those in
foreign enterprises require congressional approval;" (2) Prohibited
sectors are clearly off limits for foreign and mixed companies. The
Law and its Decree disagree whether national enterprises with
foreign participation may invest in these sectors;"1 (3) When more
than one national or mixed enterprise, as opposed to foreign firm,
is interested in a particular investment, the Authority is directed
to give preference to the national or mixed company that commits
itself to a fade-out program or guarantees to export an agreed part
of its production; 2 (4) Limitations on access to local credit are
applied to foreign enterprises only;93 (5) Foreign investments in
foreign and mixed enterprises, which were made before this Law
became effective and which do not opt to be covered by the Law
are subject to a graduated tax on profits remitted abroad. Profits
remitted to a foreign investor in a national enterprise are not sub90. Investment Law, art.
91. Investment Law, art.
92. Investment Law, art.
93. Investment Law, art.

4.
6(c); Decree, art. 24.
7.
17; Decree, arts. 30-33.
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ject to this tax;94 and (6) Certain restrictions on external loans
apply only to foreign enterprises. 5
D. Investors
The Law never precisely defines "foreign direct investment" as
does the Andean Code. It achieves a patchwork definition by pronouncing itself applicable to the five types of foreign direct investment listed. It then defines three types of companies according
to percentages of capital held by foreign or national investors.
Finally foreign investor and national investor are introduced as
defined terms, although once again the terminology is sometimes
forgotten in the course of the legislation.
A foreign investor is any natural person or legal entity domiciled
outside of Argentine territory that owns capital to be invested or
already invested in a defined company."
A national investor is any natural person domiciled in Argentina, the Government in any of its forms or any legal entity domiciled in the country whose capital is owned by natural persons
domiciled in the country who neither directly nor indirectly represent foreign interests. 8 It is not absolutely clear whether mixed
enterprises are excluded from the definition of national investor by
the reference to the representation of foreign interests. Although,
a mixed enterprise is by statutory definition controlled by local
investors, it could be considered an indirect representative of foreign interests.
Domicile, rather than Argentine citizenship, seems to be the
requirement although this reference to the representation of foreign interests, if taken literally, would negate the domicile principle. It indicates, however, that the national investor may not directly or indirectly represent foreign natural persons or legal entities but does not mention the question of their domicile. This is
probably a drafting error since it would make the initial references
to domicile rather meaningless: Domicile is defined in Argentina
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Investment Law,
Investment Law,
Decision 24, art.
Investment Law,
Investment Law,

art. 20.
art. 25.
1; Investment Law, art. 1(a).
art. 3(a).
art. 3(b).
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as "the place of principal residence and the principal place of doing
business."99
The Andean Code defines national investors in terms of citizenship rather than domicile and includes foreign natural persons who
have an uninterrupted residence of one year in the country and
who renounce the right to transfer capital and profits outside of the
country.' 0 In both cases, a foreigner is thus permitted to do business as would a national although Argentina does establish some
stiff nationality requirements in certain cases for persons in high
management positions.' 1
The Argentine definitional structure provokes one curious but
quite real problem. Argentina is an immigrant country with much
of its immigration relatively recent.' Anyone familiar with the
country is aware of the strong ties that often exist between its
inhabitants and the exterior. Not only have many native born
Argentines lived part of their lives outside the country and returned, but many have important family connections elsewhere in
the world. Furthermore, the amount of Argentine wealth that has
fled the country to be invested abroad is reputed to be consider03
able.
99. Investment Law, art. 3(c); C. Civ., art. 89 (Argen.).
100. Decision 24, art. 1.
101. See note 138 infra and textual discussion of this article under heading:
IndustrialPromotionPlans (VI.B infra).
102. Of Argentina's total 1914 population of somewhat less than eight million,
almost 30% were born outside the country. No other major country has had a
higher proportion of immigrants in its total population. The proportion of immigrants in the country's growing population remained high, at least into the 1930's.
See J. ROMERO, A HISTORY OF ARGENTINE PoLmcAL THOUGHT 169 (1963) (originally
published in Spanish); C.SOLBERG, IMMGRATION AND NATIONALISM: ARGENTINA AND
CHILE, 1890-1914 35-36 (1970).

103. The amount of Argentine capital that has left the country can not be
calculated because "these transfers are not captured as such in the balance of
payments statistics of the Central Bank. In any case, some not very precise
inferences may be drawn from an analysis of payments received from abroad in
Argentina for financial services. These payments reflect the repatriation of profits
and interest from exported capital, but the amount of such capital cannot be
determined with precision analyzing the ups [and] downs of the flow since these
sums may also be accumulated in the exterior rather than repatriated." Profits
and dividends reached a 1961 high of $64 million and have since been extremely
low while payments for interest have grown from $11 million in 1965 to $26 million
in 1970. CIMmLO, supra note 17, at 172-73.
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Thus arises the not improbable hypothetical case of the Argentine citizen domiciled in Buenos Aires with a fortune in Switzerland and his divorced wife and his daughter resident in Paris. He
has decided to settle down for good in Argentina and would like to
put his fortune to work at home, but he still needs to send some of
the proceeds to France. According to the Law, to transfer earnings
outside the country, one must be a foreign investor, which requires
domicile outside of Argentina. That the investment consists of
capital brought from outside is not sufficient. Obviously our hypothetical gentleman could resort to the subterfuge of using a dummy
individual or corporation abroad and classify him or it as the foreign investor. But aside from the legality of the method, the investment would be subject to all of the controls imposed under the new
Law in return for the right to transfer some part of his earnings
abroad. In practice he might be expected to bring his money in via
the purchase of pesos on the black, or as it is euphemistically
termed, parallel market, and remove convertible currency by the
same route. In this respect, the new legislation appears to encourage illegality and discourage the return home of legitimate Argentine capital.
In this case the Andean Code did not do much better than the
Argentine Investment Law. Decision 24 defines capital as contributions by foreign persons or companies entering from abroad and
foreign investors simply as owners of a foreign direct investment. 4
A Chilean commentator concludes from this that a citizen of an
Andean country investing funds transferred from abroad in his
country is quite simply not subject to the dictates of Decision 24,105
probably not the result the Andean draftsmen had in mind. He
The then Minister of Finance, (Hacienda y Finanzas) Juan Alberto Quilici,
declared in 1972 that $8 billion in Argentine capital had fled the country to be
invested abroad. The statement had political implications because the government was currently issuing dollar denominated bonds in an effort to bring these
funds home. The newspaper reports of his comments do not explain how this
calculation was made or if it covered a given period of time or represented an
historical accumulation. See, Clarin, Jan. 27, 1972. Furthermore, Quilici was at
the time being accused of the crime of covering up a continuing exodus of Argentine capital. Clarin, July 15, 1971, Aug. 4, 1971.
104. Decision 24, art. 1.
105. Casanova, Anotaci6nes a la Aplicaci6n de la Decisi6n 24: El Caso de
Chile, 15, DERECHO DE LA INTEGRACI6N 239, 248 (1974).
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suggests that the transfer would be subject to national exchange
control rules.
A reverse version of the last situation also springs from the Argentine definitions. An Argentine permanently resident outside of
Argentina is not domiciled in the country and is, therefore, a foreign investor under the Law should he wish to invest in Argentina.
This may be another undesirable result in respect of the need to
attract lost capital. Worse, the Law makes him a foreign investor
subject to its terms even when he is not interested in transferring
earnings or capital abroad. This is not to criticize the selection of
domicile rather than citizenship as the basic ground rule; however
provision might have been made for these anomalous situations.
An Argentine citizen or a foreign investor actually living in the
country is more likely to be committed to the national well-being
than is an absentee owner whose interest does not transcend corporate balance sheets. Furthermore, a citizenship standard hints of
discrimination against immigrants resident in the country.
The problems do not stop here. It will be remembered that in
defining national investor, the second tier of ownership of a national company is limited to natural persons. This is obviously
intended to avoid complicated chains of corporate ownership,
which might facilitate the hiding of the real source of capital and
decision-making. On its face, however, the provision results in the
ridiculous predicament of the absolutely pure Argentine firm with
a few shares of its stock in the hands of another unquestionably
Argentine firm. Technically the first company could not be considered a national investor although it is difficult to imagine its being
considered a foreign investor. The Authority does not intend to
apply this provision literally and anticipates searching back
through a layer or two of corporate ownership before disqualifying
firms for not being national. 6 This is fortunate since, to cite an
example, even small Argentine family firms are known to own a
few shares of other small Argentine family firms.
E. Legal Form of Investment
All foreign investments must be represented by nominative registered "shares, quotas or capital participations" transferable only
106.

Blondeau, supra note 88.
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upon inscription in the corporate records and with previous authorization.10 7 Multiple voting is forbidden and the shares may not be
transferred for a period of five years after the initiation of the
project in question except to national investors upon authorization. ' " Although neither the Law nor the Decree explicitly says so,
new investments must obviously take a corporate form. Old investments opting to come under the Law are expressly required to do
so. The foreign-owned branch is doomed except for banks, finance
and possibly insurance companies.10 9
The requirement that investments under the Law take a corpo-

rate form causes a conflict with Argentina's newly modernized
Company Law, which provides that a commercial company

(sociedad comercial) requires two or more founders and participants.110 In fact, a company's 100 per cent ownership of another

may entail the automatic dissolution of the subsidiary. The oneman corporation does not exist in Argentine law, thus, the foreign
corporation seeking to create a wholly owned Argentine subsidiary
may have to seek a nominal partner. Presumably, the other shareholder could be another foreign corporate entity or individual, perhaps an officer or director of the investing corporation or another
of its subsidiaries.
Bearer shares representing foreign investment in existing firms
107. Investment Law, art. 9; Decree, art. 11. Registration in the corporate
records is a requirement in conformity with Argentina's 1972 Company Law, art.
213.
108. Investment Law, art. 9; Decree, art. 11.
109. This is the only conclusion to be derived from the language of art. 9 of
the Investment Law, which requires investments to be represented by shares,
quotas or capital participations and refers to shareholder registration in company
books. This intention is confirmed by the Decree's treatment of preexisting investments. With one exception, art. 16 requires branches of foreign companies
and all firms, defined in the classification of enterprises provisions of the Law, to
convert themselves into types of companies envisaged by the country's legislation.
Art. 1 of the Company Law limits the forms of commercial association to those
described therein. These are the predictable civil law entities: general partnership
(sociedad colectiva), limited partnership (sociedad en comandita simple), partnership with capital and service contributions (sociedad de capital e indiustria),
limited liability company (sociedad de responsabilidadlimitada), corporation
(sociedad an6nima), and corporation with majority state ownership (sociedad an6nima con participacionestatal mayoritaria).
110. Company Law, arts. 1, 17.
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must be converted to nominal form by February 22, 1975.1 Within
the same period the Decree stipulates that foreign branches and
other investments, which wish to subject themselves to the Law,
must be converted to a corporate or commercial form provided for
in Argentine legislation. However, existing banking and other financial entities and probably existing insurance operations are excepted from this requirement. 12 Any doubt about the right of foreign financial entities to continue operating as branches in Argentina should be resolved by the new Financial Institutions Law,
which was passed shortly after the Foreign Investment Law and
which in several of its provisions was intended to complement the
latter legislation. This statute provides that private financial entities must be organized as stock companies (sociedadesan6nimas)
except "[t]he branches of foreign entities which must have a representation in the country endowed with powers sufficient to com-

ply with Argentine law .... "113
The one-year time period for conversion to company form is an
anomaly since no time limit is imposed on existing investors who
may wish to come under the Law rather than pay the penalty tax
on profit remittances."' Here, however, it is said that investors who
wish to be covered by the Law have to convert to a Company Law
form within a year. Not explained is the predicament of the branch
that decides after more than a year to come under the Law but has
not yet incorporated.
F. Special Purpose Company Classifications
Variations on the classification theme show up in other Argentine legislation in which questions of foreign ownership or control
are considered important. These include a number of industrial
promotion incentive laws, which are currently issuing from Congress and which the Foreign Investment Law indicates are to be
treated with special interest;" 5 namely, previous industrial promo111. Investment Decree, art. 12.
112. Investment Law, art. 6(c)(3); Decree, art. 16.
113. Law of Dec. 18, 1973 (No. 20.574), Concerning Financial Entities
(Argen.), art. 11(a) published in Bolettn Oficial, Jan. 4, 1974 [hereinafter cited
as Financial Entities Law of 1973] which is a modification of Law of Jan. 15, 1969
(No. 18.061).
114. Investment Law, art. 20.
115. Investment Law, arts. 1(a)(1), 5(a); Decree, art. 23.
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tion laws as well as banking, securities, state purchasing, technology transfer and other legislation. Although the substance of some
of these laws will be treated infra, it may be noted that similar key
language, even in statutes enacted at the same time, does not
always receive the same definition. "National enterprises" in the
Industrial Promotional Law"' and "national entities" in the
Amendments to the Financial Entities Law,"' both enacted during
the same month as the Investment Law, are defined by different
classification standards. In some cases the domicile standard is
replaced by citizenship as a factor in the definition of national
enterprises; this has theoretical constitutional implications when
it involves discrimination on the basis of citizenship status."'
V.

INVESTMENT APPROvAL

Like the Andean and many other investment codes, the Argentine Law requires the foreign investor to obtain previous authorization from the Application Authority and subsequently register the
amount of his investment with the government. If the application
is made on behalf of a national enterprise, approval is obtained by
means of an investment contract between the Authority and the
foreign investor,"' although at least one commentator has complained that the provision is unclear because it fails to stipulate
who will give final approval to this contract.' 0 A careful reading
of article 4 of the Law and an understanding of the logic of its
structure confirms the intention of the draftsmen to create a graduated approval mechanism based on the amount of foreign participation involved in a given enterprise. Thus, a contract involving a
mixed enterprise requires Executive Branch approval; one involving a foreign enterprise must obtain congressional approval. 2'
116. Law of Dec. 10, 1973 (No. 20.560), Concerning Industrial Promotion
(Argen.), arts. 16-18 [hereinafter cited as Industrial Promotion Law].
117. Financial Entities Law of 1973, art. 10.
118. Industrial Promotion Law, art. 17(c); CONSTITUTION DE LA NACI6N
ARGENTINA arts. 14, 20 (1853, amended 1957) (Argen.) [hereinafter cited as
CONST.I.

119. Investment Law, art. 4.
120. Bruzzon, La Ley de Radicaciones Extranjeras20.557, 21 EL DERECHO 4
(1974).
121. Investment Law, art. 4. This view of the graduated approval process is
also expressed in a mimeographed letter for circulation to clients prepared by the
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Requiring congressional approval for all investments involving a
"foreign enterprise" regardless of the dimensions of the investment
is of questionable wisdom. Perhaps a given dollar amount should
have been established below which the Authority or the Authority
in conjunction with the President might have been entrusted with
its approval. An obstacle as imposing as a special law of Congress
may frighten off all but the heartiest and especially those small
investors, which least menace Argentine sovereignty. This threat
could not have been the textbook case of the small initial foreign
equity investment out of which mushrooms a huge wholly owned
firm built on a foundation of local credits and profit retention since
this Law limits access to local and foreign credit and restricts profit
reinvestment. Perhaps the draftsmen were caught in the trap of
their own three-way logic. Conceivably, Congress will devise a
mechanism to streamline its own approval process. Although the
Andean Code appears simpler on its face since the only authorization called for is that of the "competent national organism," the
national mechanisms of the Subregion's Member States may be
22
worse than cumbersome.
Further, the Decree provides that the Application Authority
shall be the State Secretary for Economic Programming and Coordination within the Ministry of Economy. 123 Its staff has principally come from the Secretariat for Government Planning and
Action, which implemented the previous foreign investment law
within the same Ministry. 12 Articles 34-48 of the Decree are largely
devoted to the functions and prerogatives of the Authority, which
include negotiating investment contracts, analyzing the financial
condition of potential investors, seeking the advice of other governmental entities, receiving and analyzing the responses of potential
or actual Argentine competitors and generally administering and
enforcing the Law.'2 As a reminder that the control of foreign
investment must be balanced with Argentina's need to obtain external capital, the Authority is instructed to make investment proBuenos Aires law firm M. & M. Bomchil, at 1, back, Dec. 1973, and by Klein,
supra note 54, at 15.
122. Decision 24, art. 2. See Lacey, supra note 18, at 583-84.
123. Investment Decree, art. 34.
124. Lanusse Investment Decree, art. 8.
125. Investment Decree, arts. 37, 40, 42, 43, 44, 46, 48.
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motion plans known abroad and to negotiate the participation of
potential foreign investors in specific priority projects. " '
VI.

REQUIREMENTS,

PRIORITIES,
A.

PREFERENCES AND PROHIBITIONS

Requirements

The Authority is to be guided by the Law and its Decree in the
negotiation of investment contracts and the authorization of proposals. The Law speaks in terms of requirements, priorities, preferences and prohibitions while the Decree adds a number of scattered provisions. Although the result is disorganized, it gives the
government virtually absolute flexibility in negotiating most investment terms. The required conditions are vague enough to be
satisfied with either a few well placed words of good intentions or
by tightly drafted standards of specific and invariable application.
All will depend upon the interest of the Government in a particular
investment proposal assuming that it does not fall within a specifically forbidden sector or category. This flexibility increases the
chances of the Law for survival in the absence of Juan Per6n.
Priorities are equally vague and, like preferences, are only mandatory in the event that the Authority should so determine; moreover
priorities sometimes repeat the essence of requirements. Most
carelessly, the article indicating preferences is included in the section entitled "Prohibitions."
B. Industrial PromotionPlans
Article 5 of the Law requires that investment contracts must
substantially insure that the investment take place in activities
and geographic zones determined by the Executive Branch to be
of priority importance. The Decree requires congressional activity
by adding that the sectors and zones referred to are those indicated
in national development and industrial promotion plans, which
may emerge from Congress.12
This introduces a key factor into the discussion: the role of the
foreign investor in Argentina's industrial promotion programs.
Past or future plans giving special advantages to foreign capital
126.
127.

Investment Decree, arts. 35(c)-(d).
Investment Decree, art. 23.
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have been expressly outlawed by the new Law, which further provides that foreign investors in firms, which receive incentive benefits under promotion laws, lose their right to remit profits and
repatriate capital as long as those benefits continue.'1 The Decree
attempts to limit the application of this provision to foreign enterprises and permits up to 49 per cent foreign participation in mixed
or national companies receiving incentive benefits without the loss
of transfer rights." 9 This would deprive the provision of meaning
since the promotion plans currently coming into effect expressly
exclude foreign enterprises from their benefits. Furthermore, if foreign investors in mixed or national firms are allowed to make
transfers based on the Decree's provision while the firms are receiving promotional benefits, it is conceivable that a judicial complaint will result since an executive 'decree cannot abrogate an
expressly worded act of Congress. 3 '
Investments intended for the modernization or expansion of existing enterprises are exempted by the Decree from the need for an
executive declaration of priority geographical status. 3' The priority system, to the extent that it is under executive control, involves
total flexibility since the President can be expected to dictate his
wishes to the members of the Authority in the form of priority
determinations. The emerging system may be less arbitrary than
this, however, as Congress has already enacted a new blanket Industrial Promotion Law under which a general Decree 3 ' has appeared. The latter has been followed by specific decrees issued by
the Executive. The Industrial Promotion Law, which was enacted
at almost the same time as the Foreign Investment Law, is intended to promote the establishment, expansion and modernization of industrial activities, geographic decentralization, local
128. Investment Law, arts. 18-19.
129. Investment Decree, art. 8.
130. CONST., art. 86(2) provides that the President of the Nation "issues such
instructions and regulations as shall be necessary for the execution of the laws of
the Nation without altering their spirit with regulatory exceptions."
131. Investment Decree, art. 36.
132. Industrial Promotion Law and Decree of Dec. 17, 1973 (No. 719), Concerning Industrial Promotion (Argen.) [hereinafter cited as Industrial Promotion
Decree]. These measures replace Law of Oct. 20, 1972 (No. 19.904), Concerning
Industrial Promotion (Argen.).
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technology development and the consolidation of local industrial
ownership.13
An ambitious three-year development plan announced at the
end of 1973 is closely related to the Promotion Law and ensuing
decrees. The plan, which emphasizes increasing exports, calls for
direct public investment of five billion dollars during the period
and specifies the goals of the Government in each major sector of
the economy. Although the role of foreign investment is not spelled
out, the emphasis on exports is certain to become a major factor
as in the case of the automobile industry described elsewhere in
this study.134
One of the benefits of the Promotion Law is available only to 100
per cent locally owned firms. The Executive Branch may grant
"Industrial Promotion Certificates" to firms that meet standards
set in the law. The certificates, valued up to two million pesos or
about 200,000 dollars (U.S.) depending on the capitalization of the
firm, are valued for ten years in payment of income and sales
taxes. 3 ' The remaining benefits are limited to firms with a majority of national capital and which are otherwise far more restrictively defined than the national and mixed enterprises of the Investment Law. As in the latter, the owners of national capital
businesses must be domiciled in the country with actual control
identical to their share of the capital. The Argentine-domiciled
owners must also possess a "decisive majority" of the capital. 3 ' No
contract or agreement requiring capital or profit transfers to the
exterior may exist; the behavior of the firm must indicate that it
is Argentine in character; and it must have no dependent ties with
public or private entities abroad.13
Significantly, the statute provides that to qualify, 80 per cent of
the directors and 90 per cent of the professional, technical and
executive personnel of a firm must be Argentine citizens domiciled
in the country. The Investment Law Decree contains a similar
provision, 3 ' but it does not relate to the definition of firm or inves133.
134.

Industrial Promotion Law, art. 1.
For a summary of the plan see Business Latin America, Jan. 9, 1974, at

135.
136.
137.
138.

Industrial
Industrial
Industrial
Industrial

9.
Promotion
Promotion
Promotion
Promotion

Law,
Law,
Law,
Law,

arts. 2-3.
arts. 2(I)(f), 16-17(b).
arts. 17(d)-(f).
art. 17(c); Investment Law Decree, art. 4.
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tor; rather it is a requirement for authorization of an investment
already defined as foreign and, therefore, does not affect a local
company without foreign interests. The Promotion Law citizenship
provision may be important to existing firms that do not opt for
treatment under the Investment Law and are, therefore, not subject to its restrictions but do encounter difficulty in their exclusion
from future participation in the benefits of the Promotion Law.
As an immigrant country, which has taken pride in giving protection and opportunity to citizen and permanent resident alike,
Argentina's citizenship requirements strike at a group of individuals accustomed to being treated as nationals. The Constitution
promises that "[floreigners enjoy in the national territory all of
the civil rights accorded the citizen; they may exercise their industry, commerce and profession, own purchase and dispose of real
estate

. . .,"I

The immigrant, resident most of his life in Argen-

tina, may discover that his business no longer enjoys the benefits
of promotional legislation vital to his competitive survival. (The
author is aware of such cases.) This is somewhat more disturbing
than the application of a comparable provision as a prerequisite to
the establishment of a new business by non-citizens in the country.
On the other hand, Argentina allows the immigrant to spend his
entire life in the country without ever obliging him to acquire
citizenship. In addition, unnaturalized residents are excused from
such public obligations as military service. A number of wealthy
businessmen may suddenly find it opportune to seek Argentine
citizenship or to bow out of management in favor of their locally
born offspring.
The Industrial Promotion Law offers qualifying majority owned
firms the following possibilities: (1) state participation in capital;
(2) medium and long term credits at preferential terms and interest rates including government guarantees when necessary; (3)
government guarantees for foreign credits to be used in purchasing
capital goods not produced locally; (4) tax exemption, reduction
or postponement for periods of up to ten years; (5) state aid in
obtaining raw materials and in infrastructure development; (6)
subsidies for extra location costs; (7) technological assistance; and
(8) exemption or reduction of import duties on imported capital
139.

CONST., art. 20.
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goods not locally obtainable under reasonable conditions. 4 '
That the Foreign Investment Law limits (and the Decree attempts to prohibit) foreign investment in certain sectors"' will
presumably be reflected in sectorial decrees issued by the Executive under the Industrial Promotion Law. Those decrees referred
to below incorporate the general provisions discussed unless otherwise noted.
1. Regional Promotion.-The blanket Promotion Decree contains provisions intended to discourage further industrial concentration within a 60 kilometer radius of Buenos Aires by excluding
offending investors from the benefits of the Promotion Law and by
imposing a one-time tax on capital invested.' This was followed
by a Regional Promotion Decree,1 3 which divides the country into
very specific zones and quantifies the incentives applicable in
each.
2. Mining.-An exception to the described pattern of executive
decrees issued under the blanket Industrial Promotion Law is the
mining industry, which is covered by its own law and decree enacted a few days before the basic statute.' The mining statute
uses the same language in characterizing national capital but restricts its benefits to firms with over 80 per cent local ownership,
that is, firms defined as national enterprises in the Foreign Investment Law.4 5 In its nascent stages the Foreign Investment Law
reportedly excluded foreign capital entirely from both mining and
petroleum.' The question whether the denial of benefits offered
in the mining promotion law and decree is tantamount to exclusion
is beyond the scope of the present analysis.
In spite of this tough stance toward foreign participation in mining, the emergence of more congenial attitudes to foreign investment in this sector of the economy is not unlikely. The area is
140. Industrial Promotion Law, arts. 3(b)-(i).
141. Investment Law, art. 6(c); Decree, art. 24.
142. Industrial Promotion Decree, arts. 31-34.
143. Decree of Dec. 26, 1973 (No. 922), Concerning Regional Promotion
(Argen.).
144. Law of Nov. 20, 1973 (No. 20.551), Concerning Mining Promotion
(Argen.) and Decree of Feb. 5, 1974 (No. 443), Concerning Mining Promotion
(Argen.).
145. Mining Promotion Law, arts. 4, 6.
146. Business Latin America, June 28, 1973, at 202.
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particularly appropriate for expansion since the country imports
400 million dollars worth of mineral products per year while producing only 150 million dollars worth. Argentina is, thus, supply47
ing only 27 per cent of her own mineral needs.'
3. PetrochemicalIndustry.-An initial decree issued under the
Industrial Promotion Law covered the petroleum industry and entrusted further elaboration and specific project formulation to the
Ministry of Economy, which a month later issued its first resolution."4 The respective amounts of Argentine private, Argentine
state and foreign participation permitted and the benefits available are stipulated according to three detailed lists of products.
Thus, the products named in List I may be produced by firms with
any percentage of private Argentine capital and such foreign capital as is generally permitted by applicable law such as the rules of
the Foreign Investment Law and the Industrial Promotion Law
and their decrees. The state may only participate in limited
cases.' The products in List II may be produced by firms with 51
per cent state ownership and state decision-making power. The
remaining 49 per cent may be in private Argentine or foreign
hands, the latter again subject to general law governing foreign
investments. The state's portion may be increased if adequate Argentine private or foreign participants are not forthcoming.' 0 List
III products are reserved for state production.1 51 Special rules apply
for firms involved in producing products from more than one list.5'
Existing firms with "private capital participation" in excess of
that permitted by these measures may continue production but
may not modify their installations or increase productive capacity
without express authorization from the Ministry of Economy.'53 It
is not expressly stated whether foreign capital is included in this
provision. It is probably covered by the Foreign Investment Law,
147. La Naci6n, June 12, 1974, at 18.
148. Decree of Dec. 10, 1973 (No. 592), Concerning National Petrochemical
Program (Argen.) [hereinafter cited as Petrochemical Decree] and Plan for the
Fulfillment of the National Petrochemical Program, Ministry of Economy Resolution No. 753, Dec. 11, 1973.

149. Petrochemical Decree, arts. 3-4.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Petrochemical
Petrochemical
Petrochemical
Petrochemical

Decree, arts. 5-6.
Decree, arts. 7 ff.
Decree, art. 16.
Decree, art. 12.
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which provides that existing foreign investment in two out of several sectors denominated prohibited by that Law, may be taken
over for management purposes (intervenidas) by the Authority,
which is granted the discretion to recommend expropriation or
nationalization by Congress."'
The Petrochemical Decree uses its lists as the basis for a graduated system of benefits or incentives. The more Argentine capital,
the more favorable the treatment in most cases. For instance, income taxes may be deferred for ten years for List Ill products and
for nine and seven years respectively for Lists II and I. Many of the
benefits enumerated in the Industrial Promotion Law may be
granted by the Ministry of Economy on the basis of individual
project evaluations.'5 5
According to the Argentine press, the feasibility of the Petrochemical Law and the foreign investment control system in general
has been demonstrated by the interest of the Italian MontedisonMilano group in a multimillion dollar investment in the petrochemical sector. The Italians are reportedly entering into agreements with the Argentine Government to invest their own capital
and that of other international lenders for approximately one billion dollars and have expressed their willingness to abide by the
country's foreign investment rules including those reserving the
power of decision to Argentine interests. 5 '
4. Steel Industry.-Firms with majority national capital as
defined in the Industrial Promotion Law are eligible under this
decree. 5 7 In this case firms are grouped into three classifications
according to the degree raw materials are industrialized. The benefits offered increase as the level of industrialization rises. The situation of existing companies is comparable to that of firms in the
petrochemical industry.
5. Other Industries.-Otherdecrees issued under the aegis of
the Industrial Promotion Law may be expected to follow patterns
154. Foreign Investment Law, art. 20.
155. Petrochemical Decree, arts. 20(e)-(f).
156. La Nacion, May 21, 1974, at 1; El Cronista Comercial, May 21, 1974, at
1 (includes text of Ministry of Economy announcement); La Naci6n, July 8, 1974,
at 2 (later details); Business Latin America, June 19, 1974, at 193.
157. Decree of Feb. 21, 1974 (No. 619), Concerning, Steel Industry Promotion
(Argen.), as amended, Decree of April 10, 1974 (No. 1.126).
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similar to those described above. The forestry15 and the newsprint
industries 59 have been covered. The forestry decree ignores foreign
investors because the Foreign Investment Law and Decree declare
the sector off-limits to outsiders."9 Banking, securities and state
purchasing will be treated elsewhere.
C. Additional Investment Contract Requirements
Following the reference to priority activities and geographical
zones in section 1 of article 5 of the Foreign Investment Law, this
article further requires inter alia that investment contracts insure
that the investment: (1) contributes to a better employment of the
human and natural resources of the country; (2) tends to better the
living conditions of the population; (3) includes necessary provisions to prevent or limit environmental pollution; (4) leads to import substitution or includes an express commitment that it will
export and have a favorable effect on the country's balance of
payments.
An example of the form that such export commitments might
take is embodied in an agreement dictated to the automobile industry by the Minister of Economy, Jos6 Ber Gelbard, and confirmed by a presidential decree. The "Compromise Agreement" is
a contract signed by Minister Gelbard, the chief executives of the
seven foreign-owned passenger car manufacturing companies in
Argentina and a number of union and industrial dignitaries."'
Under the Compromise Agreement the firms are required to increase exports in each of the succeeding five years by a determined
percentage of the firm's total sales in the base year of 1973. In 1974
the industry must export automobiles equal to fifteen per cent of
its total 1973 sales with annual percentage increases until reaching
100 per cent of the base figure for 1978. Excesses of one year may
158. Decree of Feb. 3, 1974 (No. 465), Concerning Forestry Promotion

(Argen.).
159. Decree of April 16, 1974 (No. 1.177), Concerning Promotion of Newsprint
and other Products (Argen.).
160. Investment Law, arts. 6(c), 7; Decree, art. 24.
161. Compromise Agreement of the new Automobile Edict (Acta Compromiso
del Nuevo Ordenamiento Automotriz), Dec. 14, 1973; Ministry of Economy Executive Decree of Dec. 1973 (No. 680); and Ministry of Economy Press Release, Dec.
14, 1973. For a brief English language description of these measures see Business
Latin America, May 8, 1974, at 146.
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be applied to succeeding years. Firms are rewarded for success by
being allowed to increase domestic sales by up to eight per cent of
the figure for the previous year. The failure of a company to meet
its export requirements in a given year will cause it to lose all of
the eight per cent potential increase plus subject its sales to "inverse readjustment in proportion to the exports not accomplished."162
The industry privately insists that it will have great difficulty
meeting these quotas in the highly competitive international automobile market especially given production costs in Argentina and
the country's distance from many potential markets more rationally served from elsewhere. Enormous sales to Cuba were negotiated by the government in 1974 and may enable most manufacturers to meet their quotas for this first year of the plan's existence. 6' 3
The Cuban sales were designed for political impact as well as
economic gain and serve as an ironic reminder of the many factors
entering into the foreign investment question. They were highly
publicized in the country as a diplomatic victory over the United
States, which was still clinging to the notion that its effective
jurisdiction extended to the activities of companies incorporated
in sovereign states. Eventually, however, increasing total production will necessitate many millions of dollars in new investment.
If these sums cannot be met from domestic profits, firms may have
to consider bringing in fresh outside capital subject to the rules
applying to foreign investment.
Several well-placed Argentines have suggested that the government is using these measures to rationalize the automobile industry (seven firms and over 30 models) by forcing a couple of the less
profitable companies into merger or bankruptcy. If this is so, the
Agreement is a double reminder of the weapons available to a
sophisticated government in the pursuit of its national economic
aims. Although the conceptual underpinnings will likely be similar, the government may take a milder approach to initial export
commitments under the Investment Law when it faces the question of enticing desirable new investments into the country.
The Andean Investment Code provides an interesting special
option for the foreign enterprise (51 per cent or more foreign capi162.
163.

Executive Decree, art. 2(c).
Business Latin America, May 8, 1974, at 146.
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tal) primarily interested in exporting. If such a firm exports 80 per
cent or more of its production to non-Andean markets, it is not
required to meet the fade-out provisions of the Code. On the other
hand, it is consequently denied the benefits of the Andean Common Market tariff reduction program.' 4
Article 5 of the Argentine Law further requires that investment
contracts insure that the investment incorporates technology necessary for the socio-economic objectives of the country and contemplates the development of local technology. The draft omnibus
foreign technology law currently in Congress is an attempt to
achieve these goals by means of a set of precise rules. As noted, the
Foreign Investment Law merely directed the Executive Branch to
prepare a law regulating the amounts of royalties and other fees. '
The drafting committee from the Ministry of Economy went further in determining that "much more desirable than the reform
and updating of Decree-Law 19.231 [the old technology law] and
the drafting of a law regulating fees would be the formulation of a
single bill which would replace the Decree. [The goal of the proposed technology transfer law is] the development of our capacity
66
to resolve our own technological problems.'
Investment contracts must also insure that the investment will
employ directors, scientists, technicians and administrative personnel of Argentine nationality in such proportions as the Authority shall indicate on a case-by-case basis. The Decree adopts a
rigorous minimum of 85 per cent Argentine top-level personnel'67
and reflects the foreign investment law of the Lanusse Regime,
which required the same percentage. This previous law also allowed a three-year grace period if the Authority should be convinced that qualified Argentine personnel were not available.' 68
Since this requirement applies to the negotiation of contracts with
foreign investors who wish to be treated as such, the problem of
the local businessman of non-Argentine nationality should not
arise as it does under the Industrial Promotion Law. If this busi164.

Decision 24, art. 34.

165. Investment Law, art. 36.
166. Statement to Congress by the Executive Branch Committee responsible
for the Draft Technology Law, undated, at 2, 9.
167.

Investment Decree, art. 4.

168. Lanusse Investment Law, art. 14.
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nessman has foreign associates entitled to receive dividends, the
provision could affect him if the outsiders should seek to increase
their investment with new outside capital or if the company should
opt to be subject to the Investment Law. Both cases would imply
the negotiation of an investment contract and the possible invocation of the percentage rule.
Further, under the Law the investment contract must not cause
the present or future displacement of national enterprises from the
market. The Decree is more specific in providing for a system of
publication of investment proposals and answers by affected parties composing "installed industry."'69 A government spokesman
explained that the quoted phrase means that any firm already
functioning in the country, regardless of its foreign ownership category, is protected from new entrants if it is determined to be oper70
ating rationally and efficiently.Y
Finally, the investment contract must insure that the investment will not require the capture of internal savings beyond limits
to be established under the Law and will possess a financial structure adequate for the project proposed. However, the reference to
internal savings is not clear. One commentator argues that the
provision is unrelated to the question of local short-term credit
covered elsewhere in the Law."' The Decree offers no alternative
clue although it seems probable that Congress was attempting to
avoid foreign participation in ultra-dynamic sectors of the economy with high internal growth potential. As will be seen, only a
limited portion of reinvested earnings may be considered foreign
capital available as a base for calculating remittances. However,
a fast growing foreign-controlled firm remains foreign controlled
regardless of the classification assigned to its reinvested earnings,
a situation in fundamental conflict with the aim of insuring maximum national decision-making power. Such subtle determinations
obviously must be based upon flexible sectorial or individual project judgments.
D. Prioritiesand Preferences
The Authority is instructed to give priority to investments that,
169.
170.
171.

Investment Decree, arts. 42-44.
Investment Decree, art. 42; Blondeau, supra note 88.
Bruzzon, supra note 120, at 5.
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in addition to meeting the above mentioned requirements, also
offer some of the listed advantages. Overlapping the requirements
provisions, these advantages include offering jobs and training to
the unemployed, using Argentine technology, raw materials, intermediate products and capital goods and contributing to economic
decentralization. The Decree elaborates even further on the first
of the above by granting priority to the investor (assuming there
are more than one) who will hire the maximum number of unemployed Argentine citizens and offer the most attractive commit72
ment for the provision of state approved training programs.

The reference to Argentine nationality rings unfortunate since it
is not in this case a reference to highly paid international executives or local businessmen lacking Argentine citizenship. Instead,
it is an attack on the most disfavored and least protected of the
country's inhabitants: the immigrants, legal or otherwise, principally from neighboring Bolivia, Paraguay and southern Chile. This
provision undoubtedly reflects the wishes of organized labor, which
through the powerful Confederaci6n General de Trabajo is dedicated to the protection of the vested interests of its members while
constituting the backbone of the Peronist movement. Only a statistical survey would reveal if this criticism is entirely fair, as the
government is reputedly engaged in a campaign to facilitate the
conversion of immigrants to Argentine citizenship. To the extent
it is actually doing so, the present criticism loses practical force.
Priority is offered the investor willing to guarantee the deposit
of earnings (in excess of those he is permitted by the Law to withdraw from the country) in the National or other development
banks. This may be seen as a solution to the problem cited in
allowing a foreign firm to enter a potentially fast-growing sector of
the economy as excess earnings development bank the foreigner
obviously loses decision-making power over this portion of the internal savings of the country. The limitation to government-owned
banking institutions reflects a congressional bias against banking's
private sector, whether in foreign or national hands. Presumably
government institutions are considered more apt to use these funds
for the common good.
Finally, priority is offered the investor willing to reinvest his
172. Investment Law, art. 10; Decree, art. 26.
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earnings. It is not clear whether reference is exclusively to those
earnings the investor would otherwise extract from the country or
to earnings in excess of such amounts. In the latter case, the provision clashes philosophically with the commitment to deposit excess earnings in development banks.
Article 7 of the Law directs the Authority in cases involving
multiple proposals by foreign and mixed enterprises to give "preference" to the firm that will commit itself to a described fade-out
plan for conversion into a national enterprise and to the firm subscribing to a predetermined export program in the investment contract.'7 3 The export commitment is a virtual repetition of the requirement illustrated by the automobile industry agreement.
Obviously, the Decree writers were disturbed by the poor drafting revealed in these provisions establishing standards for judging
investment proposals. They attempt to remedy the confusion of
preferences, priorities and requirements by providing that
"[w]hen various investment proposals are presented for the same
project and for reasons of economy of scale it is not considered
desirable to approve all of them, preference will be given to the
most advantageous as determined on the basis of the extent to
which they meet the requirements set forth in articles 5 and 10 and
when appropriate, article 7 of the Law.' ' 7 In other words, it would
have been possible to make a single list of all of these considerations and evaluate them as provided above.
This is essentially the Andean approach and was the approach
of the Lanusse foreign investment law, which covered much of the
same ground. The latter legislation briefly lists fifteen items for
consideration by the Authority in its evaluation of investment proposals.'75 The new Argentine Law represents a gallant but unsuccessful effort to achieve sophistication by presenting distinct levels
of criteria for consideration. A little less sophistication, although
more than that of the Lanusse Law, might have worked: for instance, a list of a few unmalleable requirements followed by another list of considerations or recommendations. In an annex to the
Andean Investment Code, guidelines for investment approval are
presented in the form of a summary outline of information to be
173.
174.
175.

Investment Law, art. 7.
Investment Decree, art. 25.
Lanusse Investment Law, art. 4.
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furnished by the potential investor. Thus, an investor must show
how each proposal fulfills certain local requirements and must
indicate its effects on a number of listed local conditions, such as
new employment generated and use of imported or national materials.'
E. Fade-Out
The fade-out preference referred to is essentially a milder version
of the concept pioneered in the Andean Investment Code. The
Lanusse Government legislation did not contemplate fade-out; it
merely instructed the Authority to give preference to investments
with Argentine participation." Article 22 of the new Law, not part
of the preference section, gives the Executive Branch virtual carte
blanche to dictate fade-out provisions in the future. As a condition
to entry the executive may require the gradual conversion to national status of designated classes of foreign and mixed enterprises."' Provisions governing the fade-out and expropriation of
existing foreign investments are treated separately in this study.
The preferences section'79 prescribes a single and detailed fadeout method. This is strange since the preference is incorporated as
one of a number of rather vague considerations to be weighed in
comparing alternative investment proposals. Why should only one
version of a fade-out plan be worthy of attention? This section
offers preferential consideration to the firm that will become a
national enterprise in ten years and will convert at least twenty per
cent during the first five years of operations and at least sixteen
per cent per year thereafter. To belabor the point, does it seriously
mean that an investor, offering to fade-out according to these
terms, is to be considered preferable to another equally attractive
investor willing to fade-out in six years? Should no special consideration be given the investor willing to fade-out in fifteen years if
the competition refuses any fade-out plan? Fade-out was reportedly required in all cases in early internal executive drafts of the
bill preceding the version sent to Congress and made public. When
fade-out became a preferential consideration rather than an abso176.
177.
178.
179.

Decision 24, Annex No. 1, Parts III, V.
Lanusse Investment Law, art. 1, 2.
Investment Law, art. 22.
Investment Law, art. 7, intro., 7(a).
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lute requirement, the necessarily precise terms of the earlier version were probably left behind inadvertently.
The Andean provisions require the transformation of foreign
companies into mixed companies as a condition to the approval of
new investments except in the cited case of a company that exports
80 per cent or more of its production outside of the area. More
developed Colombia, Chile and Peru are to give foreign investors
fifteen years to accomplish the transition while Bolivia and Ecuador have a total of 22 years at a more gradual pace, which includes
an initial grace period. Firms failing to comply with these provisions lose access to the Andean Common Market tariff liberation
program. 8 ' Thus, Argentina has taken a milder initial position
while expressly reserving for itself the right to impose fade-out as
a condition for entry. Except for exporters, the Andean countries
make fade-out an invariable condition for entry.
The Argentine fade-out provision involves a contradiction or at
least reveals a gap in the Law's instructions. When imposed, fadeout will require foreign investors to transfer twenty per cent of their
initial investment to Argentines within five years. This clashes
with the injunction against the repatriation of invested capital for
five years after entry."8 ' What is the foreign investor allowed to do
with the liquidity received from the fade-out sale of twenty per
cent of the firm's capital? It is not clear whether it should be
considered an exception to the nonrepatriation rule or if not,
whether it can be freely reinvested in Argentina while awaiting the
lapse of the designated time.
F.

Prohibitedor Restricted Sectors

At least since Mexico's nationalization of its oil industry, modern foreign investment laws have tended to limit or prohibit foreign
activity in at least some economic sectors. Argentina's prior foreign
investment law only exercised this prerogative in relation to military production.'82 The Andean Code seeks to impose the concession system on the raw material and primary production sectors
and applies special rules or prohibitions in the public utility-public
180.
181.
182.

Decision 24, arts. 30-36.
Investment Law, art. 12(c).
Lanusse Investment Law, art. 7(a).
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service sectors, in finance, insurance, domestic transportation,
advertising, virtually any aspect of the media and domestic marketing.'83 Argentine has chosen to limit new investment activity in
generally the same economic sectors although the restraints imposed are not identical.
There is an element of confusion or discord in the Argentine
measures: The Law provides that new investment will not be authorized in the designated sectors except as part of national enterprises, and thus, limits foreign participation to under twenty per
cent.'84 Except for banking and insurance, which it continues to
permit in national enterprises, the Decree expressly prohibits any
new foreign investment in these activities.' This contradiction
will have to be resolved. since the President has no right to modify
the plain meaning of a congressional mandate. 8 ' Meanwhile, it will
be difficult for the Authority to rely on the Decree provision to
deny an investment otherwise permitted by the Law. Regardless,
these measures offer an abundance of unrelated grounds for denial
should the Government be intent upon exclusion.
On its face, the prohibition article does not unequivocably specify whether (1) only new foreign investment qualifying and registered as foreign capital is to be denied entry into the designated
sectors or (2) it excludes all new economic activity by firms with a
given percentage (or any) foreign participation. Article 6 speaks in
terms of "new investments" rather than using the defined term
'"direct investment of foreign capital" and specifies that investments in national enterprises will not be considered new investments. This change in wording plus the philosophical goal of the
Law of achieving maximum national control of the economy, particularly in sensitive or key sectors, argue for the second interpretation. Thus, companies to which these provisions apply are not
allowed to dedicate any of their resources to prohibited sectors
since this would result in an extension of foreign economic control.
The consequences of this conclusion may prove disturbing to
some well-established foreign firms operating in Argentina. For
instance, the prohibitions of the Law relating to domestic market183.
184.
185.
186.

Decision 24, arts. 38-44.
Investment Law, art. 6(c).
Investment Decree, art. 24.
See note 130 supra.
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ing would prevent a foreign-owned consumer goods company with
an excellent national distribution system from taking on the distribution of a nationally owned company's products. Coca Cola or
Pepsi could not distribute wine for a family-owned Mendoza vineyard desiring to go national even though this might be the winemaker's most efficient and least expensive alternative. Consistent
with the goals of the Law, the measure is intended to stimulate
new Argentine competition for entrenched foreign interests.
The sectors in which new foreign investment is to be limited or
prohibited are activities related to defense and national security; 87
public utilities; advertising; the communications media; activities
reserved by law for state or national capital companies;' 88 agriculture; cattle and forestry, except when new technology is involved;189 and fishing, except when the opening of new international markets is promised.'
187. The Decree limits the prohibition to the production of goods directly
related to the national defense as determined by the Ministry of Defense. Investment Decree, art. 5.
188. An example is the government-owned petroleum company Yacimientos
PetroliferosFiscales (Y.P.F.), already dominant in the industry. A bill introduced
to Congress by Mrs. Per6n and the Ministry of Economy on July 25, 1974, would
greatly expand that role. The bill, said to have multiparty support, is intended
to return "absolute control of energy policy to the State; return the exploitation,
refining and sale of hydrocarbons to Yacimientos PetroliferosFiscales;and deny
international consortiums any presumed right to supply the local market. As a
fundamental principle, market expansion must be reserved for YPF." La Naci6n,
July 26, 1974, at 1 (reporting on the Draft Hydrocarbons Bill).
189. A Buenos Aires newspaper suggests that the restriction on foreign participation in agriculture and cattle should perhaps be reconsidered in view of ambitious schemes emerging elsewhere in the world for investing huge sums in capital
intensive, high productivity food production. Argentina, Brazil and Australia
have reportedly been singled out by Japanese and Italian groups as possible
locations for the formation of joint food-production ventures. A percentage of the
food would be guaranteed for the outside investor with the remainder belonging
to the host country. Argentina is already developing similar ideas for its highly
promising fishing industry. Ideally, the Law might have provided more explicitly
for the possibility of foreign participation in these circumstances when and if such
participation is considered desirable for the country. Nevertheless, the exception
for new technology could probably be invoked should the government be interested. See El Economista, July 12, 1974, at 7.
190. Recent examples of possible exceptions to the prohibition of foreign participation in the fishing industry in order to develop export markets involve
Poland and Spain. Both countries are reportedly interested in forming joint ven-
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As noted, the Decree and the Law agree that foreign investments
of up to twenty per cent will be permitted in insurance, commercial banking and finance.' 9' Foreign bank branches-in cases of
reciprocity and when it is judged in the interest of the country as
well as investment banks-are exempted from these percentage
limitations on new investments and are subject to the general provisions of the foreign investment measures and other applicable
law.'92 More specific regulation of foreign activities in these and
other sectors may be expected in the decrees being issued under
the Industrial Promotion Law discussed above.
A last center from which new foreign investment is excluded, the
domestic marketing by firms of products "other than those of
[their] own elaboration,"1 3 may prove troublesome. The Andean
provision is even stronger, forbidding the domestic marketing of
products of any type, ' but has the virtue of eliminating certain
doubts. The apparent intention in Argentina is to forbid the marketing by a foreign-owned firm of anything manufactured by any
other firm whether Argentine or foreign, parent or subsidiary. On
its face, the prohibition would, therefore, embrace the marketing
by a firm in Argentina of products manufactured by its 100 per
cent owned subsidiary also located in Argentina.
Further questions arise around the definition of the term "own
elaboration." If the finished product has to be entirely manufactured by the same corporate entity, Congress is also prohibiting
foreign-owned firms from subcontracting with locally owned enterprises for a part in the productive process, an exclusion of doubtful
tures with controlling Argentine interests to utilize the fishing resources off of

Argentina's Patagonian coast. The Government says that in the Polish case,

fishermen from the two countries will work together but that eventually 75% will
be Argentine citizens. Poland is to buy the entire catch with the Argentine Government retaining an option to keep 20% for local needs. No indication is given
of how prices are to be determined or costs allocated or of the anticipated term
of the agreement. See Buenos Aires Herald, July 14, 1974, at 9. See also El
Economista, May 17, 1974, at 1, 3; El Cronista Comercial, May 29, 1974, at 24;
La Nacidn, May 9, 1974, at 1-2; La Naci6n, May 10, 1974, at 1-2; Business Latin
America, March 6, 1974, at 79.
191. Investment Law, art. 6(c)(3) and paragraph following art. 6(c)(8); De-

cree, art. 24.
192.
193.
194.

Investment Law, art. 6(c)(3).
Investment Law, art. 6(c)(5).
Decision 24, art. 43, 1.
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benefit to the country. Since it has been determined that marketing without production should not be in foreign hands, local content requirements may be directed at the foreign-owned firm that
markets a finished product with which it has had only limited or
last stage industrial contact. This is a well-known practice long
deplored in the non-industrial world. Goods are manufactured at
home by the parent company and merely assembled by subsidiaries for sale on local markets. Unfortunately, the Law does not tell
us how much of the productive process must be entirely local (or
within a given enterprise) to qualify as "own elaboration.:'
Regional economic bodies are making an effort to define more
adequately what is meant by local content. This can be fundamental, for instance, if greater benefits are available in several countries for the same product when it is manufactured in a given
country. The more developed Andean countries offer special benefits for products manufactured in Bolivia and Ecuador. Preferential trading arrangements in the Latin American Free Trade Association require the definition of what constitutes national manu19 5
facture.
These marketing restrictions also reflect the frequent complaint
that through their commercial efforts, the industrial countries,
particularly the United States, have imposed alien cultural values
on other social systems.'96 In Argentina, as elsewhere, the sociedad
de consumo ranks with dependencia as a call to arms. The lack of
control over foreign investments in the past has meant, according
to President C~mpora, that "the dependent country adopts the
consumer patterns of the dominant countries ...
"I"
Moreover, the proposed technology law seeks to increase national control over consumer patterns by virtually eliminating the
195. As an example, see Argentine Decree of May 23, 1973 (No. 4877), regulating exports in the autoparts industry compensated by similar imports from
LAFTA countries.
196. Coca Cola is a favorite for attack. In Argentina, as elsewhere, it is widely
consumed and frequently condemned. After more than 30 years in this market,
Buenos Aires is said to "enjoy" the highest total consumption of the beverage of
any city in the world, including the principal cities of the United States and
in spite of plentiful competition from Pepsi Cola. See La Opini6n, Aug. 3, 1972,
at 12. The firm is occasionally threatened with the suggestion that the advertising
and sale of any beverage not based on local fruits should be prohibited.
197. Cdmpora speech, supra note 7.
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licensing of new foreign trademarks in the country. Within five
years, existing trademarks must be replaced by local substitutes
or the original trademarks acquired without payment of any
kind.19
G. Additional Prohibitions
1. Export Limitations.-Predictably,the Law prohibits investments by firms party to agreements limiting exports or by firms
that appear to be subject to any other "unacceptable" contractual
provision. 9 The injunction may seem superfluous, if not naive,
since prospective investors would hardly be expected to admit to
the existence of such agreements. However, its inclusion is justified
by restrictions of the type imposed by the United States on the
export to certain countries of products incorporating United States
technology. The limitation of exports in technology transfer contract was common, at least until the practice was specifically
outlawed by the 1971 Technology Transfer Law."' The Government Instituto Nacional de Transferencia de Tecnologia (INTI)
found that in 1,408 contracts signed before October 1971, 53 per
cent restricted sales to the Argentine market."'1
2. Choice of Forum and Subrogation.-Investorsmay not deny
the jurisdiction or competence of Argentine courts for the settlement of disputes nor may other States or international legal entities be subrogated to the actions and rights of the foreign investor."' This view of choice of forum clauses is in direct opposition
to modern Anglo-American practice." 3 Furthermore, prohibiting
subrogation by international legal entities goes beyond Argentina's
own Calvo Doctrine0 4 and is an addition to the otherwise compara198. Draft Technology Transfer Law, art. 7.
199. Investment Law, art. 6(a).
200. Lanusse Technology Law, art. 3(f) reaffirmed by Resolution No. 119 of
the Secretaria de Desarrollo Industrial. Normas para la evaluacion de contratos
inscriptos automdticamente, art. 2(1)(a), Dec. 19, 1973.
201. INTI study, supra note 12, at 13.
202. Investment Law, art. 6(b).
203. Farquharson, Choice of Forum Clauses-A Brief Survey of AngloAmerican Law, 1 Im"L LAw. 83, 99-100 (1974).
204. The well-known Calvo Doctrine is the century old product of the Argentine Carlos Calvo who argued the principle of absolute equality of sovereign
states. According to one authority Calvo maintained that "the courts of the coun-
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ble Andean provision.2 This additional ban not only eliminates
the possibility of contract subrogation by international development agency direct investors such as the International Finance
Corporation of the World Bank but would also affect the future
development of a multipartite investment insurance program."'6
The clause would also prohibit submission to the dictates of an
international arbitration agency and would presumably prevent
access to the financial and political risk guarantee programs of the
United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).2°
Argentina's nationalistic attitude in this respect obviously derives
from the conviction that most international entities are controlled
by the developed countries and in particular by the United States.
3. Take-Overs of Existing Companies.-Although the ramifications are not entirely clear, the Law and Decree apparently prohibit foreign investors from purchasing shares or other interests in
national enterprises (those with over 80 per cent Argentine ownership) from national investors." 8 It is not known whether the term
"national investor" includes mixed enterprises. Taken literally,
these provisions sanction the purchase of shares in mixed enterprises, a result inconsistent with national policy since it would
allow passage of control from Argentine to foreign hands. It is not
yet possible to say with assurance in all cases who has the right to
buy what interests from whom. It is clear that, with authorization,
foreign investors may purchase interests in foreign enterprises from
other foreign investors. With previous authorization, new capital
investment in existing businesses is sanctioned by a Decree provitry are not subject to appeal in cases where the rights of foreign nationals are
involved. [Consequently,] the so-called Calvo clause, inserted by most Latin
American governments in contracts with foreign nationals. . . stipulates that in
case of any doubts or disputes arising out of the contract, the foreign party to the
instrument agrees that they shall be settled by the courts of the country, and
forswears the right to appeal to his own government for the defense of his rights."
BEMUS, THE LATiN AMERICAN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 230 (1943).
205. Decision 24, art. 51.
206. Oliver, supra note 5, at 773-75.
207. In the past, OPIC reportedly has refused its guarantees when international arbitration and the subrogation of an investor's interest to his state were
not permitted and recognized in bilateral agreements. See Valdez, The Andean
Foreign Investment Code: An Analysis, 7 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 1, 15 (1972).
208. Investment Law, art. 6(d); Decree, art. 6.
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sion amplifying the definition of foreign capital direct investment.
In all cases, the foreigner must participate in the risks and the rewards of the enterprise." 9 These provisions thus distinguish between a basic goal of preventing the absorption of existing firms
by foreign investors and the addition of fresh risk capital to the
same firms.
4. The Bankruptcy Exception.-As an exception to the above
restrictions the assets of a national enterprise may be acquired by
foreign investors during liquidation for bankruptcy if there are no
Argentine buyers available. 20 The Argentines introduced an unfortunate variation to the Andean Code concept. The Andean Code
permits the purchase if the local firm is proved to be in imminent
danger of bankruptcy whereas in Argentina, the firm must already
be in liquidation.2 11 While the Andean provision requires a commitment to resell the firm to national investors within a stipulated
period, which shall not exceed fifteen years, 12 the Argentines impose no such explicit requirement although fade-out may be made
a condition for investment approval.
5. State Purchasing-Buy Argentine.-Predatingthe Foreign
Investment Law by several years, the Buy National Law seeks to
direct the purchasing and contractual power of the national government, including majority state owned enterprises, to the local
marketplace.2 13 The principal architect of the Law and Minister of
Economy under two Presidents, Aldo Ferrer, recently noted that
in addition to supporting the purveyors of local goods and services,
the measure "should serve as an engine for stimulating the development of local technology and for escaping dependency on package deals. ' 2 1 By package deals he was referring to the practice of
international companies of selling capital goods, patents, knowhow and licenses as complete units and, thus, excluding the participation of available local technology and stifling its progressive
development.
209. Investment Decree, art. 1(a).
210. Investment Law, art. 6(d).
211. Decision 24, art. 3.
212. Decision 24, art. 3(c) as amended by Decision 37.
213. Buy National Law and Decree, supra note 69.
214. Address by Aldo Ferrer, Instituto de Desarrollo Economico y Social
(IDES) Lecture, in Buenos Aires, July 12, 1974.
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Basically the law directs the national government and dependent entities to buy from and contract with firms defined as "local
internal capital enterprises" (empresas locales de capital interno)
whenever possible. Industrial, construction and service firms with
corporate domicile in the country are so defined when 80 per cent
of upper management is domiciled in Argentina and genuine effective control emanates from the country. In addition, at least 51 per
cent of both the capital and the voting power must belong to natural persons domiciled in Argentina.2 15 To be considered local, an
engineering or consulting firm is subject to more rigorous norms,
and
including the requirement that 100 per cent of the capital
216
voting power belong to persons domiciled in the country.
6. Import-Export Controls.-Legislation philosophically akin
to the Buy National statute and to other measures intended to
increase the participation of Argentine interests in the economy
emerged from Congress on October 24, 1973, a few days before the
appearance of the Foreign Investment Law. The Law for the Protection of Labor and National Industry 217 grants the Executive
Branch ample powers to regulate and control foreign trade so as
to favor the purchase and export of local goods produced by "national capital enterprises." Although the Statute neither defines
the latter term nor refers to the Foreign Investment Law, by analogy a "national capital enterprise" presumably must have over 80
per cent local participation.
The Law for the Protection of Labor and National Industry followed a trajectory similar to that of the Foreign Investment Law.
It was introduced by Cdmpora accompanied by a Presidential message couched in nationalistic terms but became law after Per6n
had assumed the Presidency. Cdmpora said that:
Within the framework of national liberation, the draft law. . .snbodies a fundamental decision in favor of the development of national production with the object of stimulating the development of
local technology thus breaking ties by means of exporting manufac215.
216.

Buy National Law, arts. 7, 11; Decree, art. 7.
Buy National Decree, art. 11.

217.

Law for the Protection of Labor and National Industry (Ley de Protec-

ci6n al Trabajoy a la Producci6nNacional), which became Law of Nov. 15, 1973
(No. 20.545), as amended, Law of Dec. 29, 1973 (No. 20.636) [hereinafter cited
as Labor Law].
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tured goods . . . eliminating the debt. . . imposed by the centers
of international finance, of preventing the use of foreign exchange
for the purchase of luxury goods which can be done away with or
produced nationally and, finally, of orienting public and private
investment to the purchase of capital goods of national origin.21
Among other things, this Statute authorizes the limitation or suspension of imports and exports as well as the establishment of
quotas and fixed prices for determined goods. New tariffs and export duties may be imposed at rates of up to three times the present levels, and the existing systems of tax rebates and special price
reimbursements may be modified. Invariably, these measures are
intended to favor the competitive situation of national capital enterprises in relation to those with foreign capital participation. For
instance, in fixing import or export quotas the Executive is directed to consider the "oligopoly or monopoly coverage of national
or foreign capital" in the sector involved. In issuing import or
export licenses to fill those quotas, "national capital enterprises
will have absolute priority.""2 9 Although the law consistently
adopts this tone, its application remains firmly within the Presidential grip. The administrations of both Perons have demonstrated a reluctance to apply grossly discriminatory sanctions
against foreign investors. Regardless, this import-export law offers
the present or a future administration the flexibility to be as discriminatory as it may wish.
VII.

CAPITAL REPATRIATION AND PROFIT REMITTANCES

A.

Defining Repatriable Capital

Foreign investors in Argentina may eventually repatriate determined percentages of "repatriable capital" as defined by the Law.
Rejecting the Andean term "reexportable capital," the Law adopts
the definition of Decision 24 with one variation. 20 Repatriable capital is the amount of the original investment in the currency of
218. President Hdctor J. Cimpora, message to Congress introducing executive
draft of the Labor Law. See also Decree of Dec. 11, 1973 (No. 618); Decree of
March 8, 1974 (No. 751); and Resolution 44 of April 25, 1974.
1-2. Preferential references to national capital
219. Labor Law, art. 10,
enterprises appear in this law in arts. 1, 3(b), 4, 4, 7, 8, 10.
220. Decision 24, art. 8.
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origin plus authorized reinvestments of profits eligible for transfer
minus capital repatriated and net losses.22'
The Andean provision does not require the subtraction of repatriated capital in determining the base amount while a literal reading of the Argentine version suggests that each profit repatriation
should be subtracted to arrive at the amount on which the next
transfer is calculated. A determined percentage would always be
repatriated from a constantly declining amount. If this method is
followed, the total investment would never be repatriated just as
the indefinite subtraction of half from half will never produce a
nullity. In spite of this drafting, it is probable that the percentage
will be applied to the original capital base before subtracting previous repatriations so that a firm will eventually be able to repatriate 100 per cent of its initial investment. 2 The limitation was
probably included to show that more than 100 per cent of the base
amount could not be transferred out of the country; e.g., annual
percentage transfers could not continue after reaching the 100 per
cent total.
This interpretation is supported by comparison of the Andean
and Argentine repatriation provisions. A foreign investor in the
Andean countries may only repatriate his investment by selling to
national investors or liquidating his business.2 2 Since the capital
figure is not used as the basis for a percentage calculation, no
question arises with respect to amounts already repatriated that
would require selling or liquidating the same thing twice. The Andean method fits in with its required fade-out philosophy; the
foreigner loses his investment permanently as he repatriates capital whereas in Argentina the foreign investor recoups his original
investment over a period of years without sacrificing his equity
position in the enterprise. He is not forced to dispose of his interests and leave the country unless committed to fade-out. Argentina, on the other hand, does not permit the transfer abroad of
capital gains in excess of the profit percentage maximum on the
221. Investment Law, art. 11.
222. Blondeau, supra note 88, expressed this view and felt that any other
interpretation was out of the question. Duggan indicated that the government's
foreign investment office had definitely decided upon this interpretation. See
Duggan, supra note 23.
223. Decision 24, art. 7.
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amount of the original investment should it be sold to national
investors or liquidated. Under the Andean Code, such capital gains
2
may leave the region after the payment of appropriate taxes . 21
Argentina, therefore, offers no protection against the effects of
world inflation on capital investment, particularly significant
since the country limits the percentage of profits which may be
remitted and denies any capital repatriation for at least five years.
This may constitute a serious disincentive for new investment
since profit transfers may barely or not even keep up with the
annual rate of global inflation and the eventual capital repatriated, although the dollar equivalent of the original amount, will
certainly be worth far less in real terms than when it entered the
country. Given alternative investment opportunities elsewhere in
the world offering probable rates of return roughly comparable to
the profit transfer limit imposed in Argentina, the inflation protection offered by the possibility of realizing a capital gain may prove
decisive. By expressing investments and permitted transfers in
convertible currencies, Argentina does offer protection against
purely internal inflation and currency devaluation; however the
investment alternative may be in Europe or North America, home
of these currencies.
Both the Andean and Argentine definitions of repatriable capital
subtract net losses (perdidas netas), a case of borrowing by the
Argentines since the term has no established meaning in the country and does not appear in previous foreign investment codes. The
definitional rationale is obvious: An investor should not be allowed
to enter a country, misuse and lose his capital and then transfer
the same amount abroad, which would raid national savings and
cause a net loss of capital stock for the recipient country. This
rationale holds true even though the balance of payments effects
of the original investment bear no relation to the performance of
the investment once in the country. A functioning and profitable
factory is not the same thing as a collection of rusting imported
machinery or red ink representing losses attributable to the misuse
of working capital by high living executives. On the other hand, it
would be neither fair nor logical to subtract the normally inevitable losses of the first year or two after start-up of an eventually
224.

Decision 24, arts. 9-10.
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successful industrial project from the amount originally invested.

The Law gives no hint of the intent of its drafters. The term does
22
not as yet appear to have acquired a precise Andean definition
although it is likely that it was adopted for lack of an expression
common to all of the member countries.
A possible source of local content for the term net losses is the
Argentine Company Law, which demands a reduction in stated
capital when losses reach a sum equivalent to reserves plus 50 per
cent of stated capital. Stated capital must be brought into line
with the company's net tangible assets (patrimonialsocial).26 This

is consistent with the Latin concept that a corporation must have
tangible assets, which upon liquidation would produce a sum equal
to stated capital. A less legalistic interpretation involves a minor
twisting of the literal terms of the statute but produces the result
that was probably intended. Each time that a capital repatriation
is to be effected, an overall historical computation of net losses
might be made. Starting from day one of the investment, profits
and losses would be netted in order not to support the repatriation
of capital that has been lost and not compensated for by later
profits. This interpretation allows for the usual losses during the
first year or two or during any lean period but does not subtract
them permanently from the amount the investor is eventually entitled to repatriate. The twisting is necessary because the literal
terms of the Law require the subtraction of net losses each time a
calculation of repatriable capital is made without providing for
their later recuperation from future earnings. Neither interpretation, however, has received official sanction of any kind.
B.

Terms of Repatriation

The terms of capital repatriation are to be negotiated and included in the investment contract but in no case may repatriation
225. Felix Pefia, head of the Legal Section of the Instituto para la Integracion
de America Latin (INTAL) in Buenos Aires and a membeer of the group of
advisers who collaborated in the drafting of Decision 24, informally opined that
no such Andean definition so far exists. Conversation with Felix Pefia, Buenos
Aires, May 21, 1974. A two volume loose-leaf service covering Andean group legal
developments is silent on the subject. See J. VANEGAS, R#GIMEN DEL MERCADO
ANDINO (Legislaci6n Econ6mica Ltda-a looseleaf service).
226. Company Law, arts. 205-06.
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exceed twenty per cent of repatriable capital or begin during the
first five years of the existence of the contract. Repatriations must
be previously authorized by the Authority and will be made in the
currency in which the investment was registered or in its equivalent at the exchange rate in effect at the time of transfer. The
continuity of the firm must not be affected by the transfer. '
Krebs made an interesting point in his ill-fated diplomatic note
with reference to this last stipulation. He suggested that the continuity provision will make it impossible for the investor to recuperate a part of his investment should external economic factors, not
attributable to the investor, make profitable operation impossible. 2 The Law, thus, adopts an all-or-nothing approach in this
respect.
C. Profit Repatriation
Profits eligible for transfer abroad must also be stipulated in the
investment contract and expressed as an annual percentage of registered capital after the deduction of income and withholding
taxes. This annual amount may not exceed the higher of 12.5 per
cent or four points over the 180 day certificate of deposit rate paid
by top banks for the money in which the investment is registered." 9
The later calculation would produce a limit in excess of fifteen per
cent at the time of this writing. These rates compare with a fourteen per cent maximum for the Andean countries, which may allow
higher rates in special cases and which are free to determine their
own arrangements in the raw materials and primary products sectors."'
Other than upon express authorization, companies are limited
to their own liquid resources for profit transfers and are denied
recourse to credit of any kind for the purpose.23 This could be
applied with unrealistic severity since a normally leveraged company operates with a continuous flow of loan funds. In keeping
with the philosophy of the provision," a general flow-of-funds
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Investment Law, art. 12; Decree, art. 18.
Krebs note, supra note 33, at 2.
Investment Law, art. 13; Decree, art. 7.
Decision 24, arta. 37, 40.
Investment Law, art. 13.
Climpora's speech presenting the original executive Draft Law to Con-
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analysis would insure against deliberate and consistent dependence on debt capital for the purpose of profit remittances.
D.

Special Restrictions on Transfers

Transfers will not be authorized if a firm has outstanding tax or
social security obligations. 231 This is a potent weapon since a firm
could be required to obtain certification of its fiscal standing from
the appropriate authorities, a procedure viewed with Kafkian apprehension in Argentina. The capital repatriation rules do not contain the above restrictions limiting transfers to the firm's own liquid capital and imposing the tax restriction. This may be because
sufficient protection was perceived in the elimination of net losses
from the base amount in conjunction with the requirement that
the continuity of the firm should not be affected. It is also possible
that the process of adapting the Andean Code to different circumstances led to the omission of requirements that might have been
included. Capital repatriation in Argentina is not limited to the
sale or liquidation of a business as in the Andean countries. In the
Andean case, the restrictions are unnecessary because investors are
permitted to repatriate the entire amount received upon partial or
complete sale of their local interest, including capital gains, after
payment of appropriate taxes. In the Argentine case, however, the
reasons for imposing these restrictions on profit remittances apply
with equal vigor to capital repatriation.
In addition to the tax and liquidity restrictions on profit transfers, neither profit nor capital may be transferred in two additional
situations: (1) while the country suffers critical balance of payments difficulties as determined by the Ministry of Economy and
the Central Bank,234 and (2) while benefiting from special developgress suggests that this provision may be accepted at face value and is not an
attempt to restrict further access to credit, national or foreign. He refers to Decision 24 of the Andean Pact and to the earlier Peronist Law and decree. They
"provided that profit remittances as well as capital repatriation had to be accomplished with a company's own funds. In this way recourse to internal (Argentine)
bank or other credit for these purposes is prevented." See Cimpora speech, supra
note 7.
233. Investment Law, art. 13.
234. Investment Law, art. 16; Decree, art. 22.
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ment or industrial promotion incentive plans, as previously indicated. 3' 5
Moreover, the right to transfer profits is lost a year after the close
of the fiscal year of their realization or 90 days after authorization
of the transfer. However, the investor is allowed to preserve his
transfer rights after the expiration of these periods when the balance of payments situation is declared critical, when restricted for
tax or liquidity reasons and when there exist special provisions in
the investment contract. Preserving transfer rights after the expiration period is accomplished by placing the sums in a reserve
account in the name of the foreign investor entitled to their receipt."' Furthermore, profit remittance rights may not be accumulated from year to year. Unused annual percentage rights are lost
forever upon expiration of the indicated time limit. 3 ' This rule also
presumably applies to profits and capital not remitted during periods in which a company benefits from industrial promotion incentive laws. The unused transfer rights are apparently also lost forever.
E. External Dollar Bonds
Discussing restrictions on transfers of profits and capital would
be unrealistic without consideration of dollar denominated external bonds (bonos externos). Previously alluded to, the external
bond system was devised after the March 1971 Central Bank suspension of foreign exchange sales for profit and for certain other
remittances as a result of an unfavorable balance of payments.
Foreign exchange for these purposes remains unavailable from the
Central Bank as of this writing although the payments situation
has improved.23 Rather than permit the outflow of foreign ex235. Investment Law, art. 18; Decree, art. 8.
236. Investment Decree, arts. 20, 21, 29(b).
237. Investment Decree, art. 29(c).
238. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) the value of Argentine exports during 1973 was in excess of $3 billion,
the highest in the country's history and 57% over the previous year's figures. This
produced a current account balance of payments surplus of $660 million and
accumulated reserves of $900 million. Much of this success story is attributable
to increases in international prices for the products exported by Argentina rather
than a major increase in export volume. See La Naci6n June 25, 1974, at 1. For
the following reasons, similar results are not guaranteed for 1974 or succeeding

Spring 1975]

ARGENTINE FOREIGN INVESTMENT LAW

change, the Government authorized the purchase of bonds for the
payment of certain debts to foreign creditors. Thus, the first of
seven bond issues emerged in September 1971. So far eligible debts
have been limited to dividends, royalties and branch profits except
for the latest issue, which may also cover certain other currently
due debts with the exterior. However, no other legal means of
meeting these obligations is currently available. The bonds are also
viewed as a means of repatriating Argentine flight capital, at least
temporarily.
Enabling laws followed by decreesnl have provided for issues
years: The petroleum crisis and other factors have caused a cutback in international demand for Argentina's most important export products, meat and grains,
with the European Common Market leading the way; imports were artificially
held in check during 1973 and pent-up demand will continue for some time into
the future; and in general, international terms of trade have become less favorable
for the country.
The questions of terms of trade and import demand are matters of great importance to the less-developed, primary-product producing countries of the world,
which insist with considerable statistical support, that they suffer an unfair disadvantage in relation to the world's exporters of manufactured goods. Argentina's
import statistics for the first quarter of 1974 compared with the same period
during the previous year show these characteristics, although various other factors
and explanations obviously play a part. Imports increased 45.4% from $562.9
million to $818.7 million while the physical volume of the goods increased by
slightly more than half as much or 23%. The average cost of imported goods
increased by 18.1%. Predictably petroleum appears to have been the greatest
offender: The price for somewhat less than double the volume jumped from $30.8
million to $165 million. El Economista, June 14, 1974, at 1; June 28, 1974, at 3.
239. The system was created during the Lanusse administration. Law of July
29, 1971 (No. 19.145), published in BOLmiN OFic4L July 30, 1971. The First Series
appeared in Sept. 1971. Decree of Oct. 11, 1971 (No. 4590); Decree of Sept. 8, 1971
(No. 3759); Ministry of Treasury and Finance Resolution of Sept. 8, 1971 (No.
57); Central Bank Circulars R.C. 407, 408 (Sept. 16, 1971). With the exceptions
indicated in the text, the provisions for the issuance of succeeding series have
been virtually identical. The currently effective enabling law under which the
Seventh Series was announced is Law of July 15, 1972 (No. 19.686), accompanied
by Decree No. 3.767 during the Lanusse Government. The Seventh Series, with
slightly less attractive terms, is the first to be announced by the Peronist government. It was authorized by Decree of May 22, 1974 (No. 1.576) and partially
modified by Decree of May 29, 1974 (No. 1640). For further details see Resolution
(No. 726) of May 22, 1973 and Central Bank Circular R.C. No. 495 (June 3, 1974).
For brief references to external bonds in English see INTERNATIONAL MONErrARY
FUND, FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATIONS: ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1973 36 (1973) and
Bus. INT'L CORP., 3 IvESTING, LICENSING & TRADING CONDITIONs ABROAD 11 (1974)
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ranging in value from 20 to 70 million dollars each. Companies
with qualifying obligations abroad, upon obtaining the obligee's
written acquiescence to payment in this form, may apply to the
Central Bank for the purchase of bonds, which apparently are
rather selectively sold. Since they are sold at the official controlled
exchange rate of a fraction under ten pesos to the dollar while the
free market dollar has at times been 30 or 40 per cent more costly,
it will be seen that Central Bank purchase approval is of significant and immediate monetary value.
The bonds have been issued for five-year terms with semiannual
interest payments and somewhat varying amortization schedules.
Interest is determined for each six month period on the basis of the
prevailing 180 day London interbank eurodollar rate. For the first
five issues it was set at one and one half per cent over this rate, at
one per cent for number six and with no premium in the case of
the recently announced seventh series. Minimum interest rates for
these series were respectively set at eight, seven and six per cent,
rather wishful thinking on the part of the Government.
The bonds are exempt from all taxes, freely transferable and in
bearer form. No restrictions on movement in or out of the country
are imposed. Interest and amortization are paid in Buenos Aires,
New York, London, Frankfort or Zurich in US dollars or an equivalent at the holder's option. A secondary market in dollars exists in
Argentina where these bonds normally command a premium in
excess of their face value. Over the counter markets exist elsewhere
in the world.
In the past, enough bonds have not been issued to absorb the
demand resulting from legitimate, qualifying foreign obligations.
However, the Government has permitted the purchase of bonds for
pesos on the secondary market if for use in meeting the same
categories of foreign obligations for which initial sale was permitted. The secondary market price in pesos is a function of the parallel or black market dollar rate. Given a significant spread between
the two exchange rates, the attractiveness of being permitted to
purchase these securities at the official rate rather than on the
[hereinafter cited as IL&T]. For new issues, developments and interest rate
announcements see BANK OF LONDON & SOUTH AM. REv. See, e.g., 8 BANK OF
LONDON & SOUTH AM. REv. 206 (1974). Price quotations for each series appear in

the El Economista.
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secondary market, is apparent. The exact legal status of this secondary market for the purchase of bonds for pesos is not clearly
defined. Dealers indulge in the curious self-deceit of preparing
sales receipts, which do not state the exchange rate used to relate
pesos to the dollar denomination of bonds involved in transactions.
For the time being though, when bonds are available, lucky investors obtain them from the Government at the official rate while
less fortunate firms must do so at a hefty premium in the secondary market. In both cases purchases permit firms to indirectly
extract foreign exchange from Argentina without immediately affecting the balance of payments situation.
The external bond device is obviously not a permanent panacea
for the country's balance of payments problems since these securities remain medium term debt obligations at international commercial rates regardless of their immediate impact on the Argentine payments situation.4 0 Furthermore, the often considerable
spread between the Central Bank and secondary market price may
be a tempting opportunity for graft. There is a real and immediate
financial prize for obtaining approval to purchase these bearer
securities from the Central Bank and the sums available for distribution according to bureaucratic discretion are impressive. The
first issue authorized for 1974 was set at 70 million dollars. Approval is currently a ticket to buy dollars for ten pesos today and
sell for fourteen or fifteen tomorrow. At some point, Argentines
should decide whether the risks are worth the gain of a temporary
deferment of certain foreign exchange obligations.
On the other hand, the graft problem may simply be endemic
to countries that find it necessary to establish artificial exchange
rates while simultaneously purchasing foreign exchange at special
rates in determined cases. As a practical matter, the privilege of
purchasing pesos at a dollar price 40 per cent under the black
market price does not differ appreciably from the right to purchase
dollar bonds at a similar price. The question is whether the added
240. The bond device does not necessarily offer the country a debt capital
bargain. A record interest rate for external bonds was recently announced to cover
a six month period for the first series of 1972. Holders of this series will receive
14.48%, the result of adding a point and a half to the 180 day London eurodollar
rate. See La Naci6n, June 29, 1974, at 5. As indicated, the Seventh Series will
pay no premium over the London rate.
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complexity of external bonds facilitates dishonesty.
The new Foreign Investment Law offers no unambiguous assurance that foreign investments subject to it will actually enjoy access to foreign exchange for transfers to which that Statute entitles
them. There is no apparent reason to assume that the external
bond system or the Central Bank's ban on sales of foreign exchange
are about to be suspended because of the new Law. The May 1974
announcement of a new bond issue only answers part of the question; obviously the Government intends to make use of the dollar
bond mechanism. The announcement does not reveal what relation will exist between the bonds and the Foreign Investment Law.
Since the payments situation is much improved over that of 1971,
it is possible that foreign exchange will be sold for transfers guaranteed in investment contracts negotiated under the Law while new
and succeeding bond issues will be selectively sold to cover foreign
obligations of other companies. The new issue may also be devoted
to meeting outstanding obligations as the Central Bank is apparently deluged with applications for bonds to cover legitimate foreign transfers. Most likely, they are envisaged by the Government
as, among other things, an accessory tool in the conduct of Argentine foreign investment policy. They can be part of a rewards and
penalties system to encourage desirable behavior on the part of
foreign investors. For instance, even if foreign exchange is not
made available for obligations under the Investment Law, bond
purchases could be effectively limited to firms subject to the Act.
They would be a potent force in a government campaign to push
companies toward acceptance of the Law's option.
Regardless of other considerations, the Law appears to leave the
Government in possession of the power to block payments in foreign exchange and use external bonds for meeting obligations
under investment contracts. The Law gives the Central Bank express authority to defer the right to repatriate capital and remit
dividends during periods of balance of payments difficulty.24 1 That
the right to remit profits blocked by balance of payments problems
may be preserved by means of their deposit in a special account
241. Investment Law, art. 16. The Decree in art. 22 shifts the responsibility.

The Minister of Economy, with the advice of the Central Bank, is charged with
determining and declaring the existence of such difficulties.
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does not alter the conclusion.242 Since the establishment and use

of such an account is subject to authorization by the Authority,
there exists the possibility that authorization might be denied. In
such a case, external bonds whether at the official or the parallel
rate would be the only recourse short of permanently foregoing the
transfer. Even though the use of a special account, once it is unblocked, has been authorized there exists no guarantee that the
Government will not determine that the availablity of dollar bonds
adequately meets the obligation of the country to allow transfers
to foreign investors with whom it has entered into investment contracts.
F. Nationalized Profits
Profits that annually exceed the permitted percentages or for
which transfer authorization has not been properly obtained or
which have not been timely remitted after authorization become
permanently nationalized and in no case may leave the country.
Upon the agreement of the Authority they may be invested as local
capital although not in prohibited sectors. 243 As seen in the discussion of capital susceptible to foreign investment treatment, profits
eligible for transfer abroad may be reinvested in the same firm
upon authorization without the need for a new investment contract.
A fundamental question exists with respect to the determination
of exactly when earnings are subject to the above treatment and
which earnings are so affected. The Decree gives the impression,
rather contrary to normal corporate concepts, that undeclared,
undistributed retained earnings as well as distributed earnings or
dividends are intended. 244 This would involve several unattractive

consequences for the foreign investor. Unable to accumulate earnings in excess of the percentage permitted for profit transfers or
reinvestment as foreign capital because of the year limitation, the
foreign investor would be prevented from applying this excess
amount from good years to reach his profit percentage in less successful periods. No form of averaging through accumulation of
242. Investment Decree, art. 20.
243. Investment Law, art. 15; Decree, art. 21.
244. Investment Decree, art. 29(b).
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retained earnings would be available. The erratic performer could
not transfer profits or reinvest earnings that were not actually
produced during the course of the year in question.
Furthermore, since these excess retained earnings could not be
registered as a reinvestment they would become national capital.
An exceptionally profitable firm might see itself gradually transformed into a national company with respect to the status of its
capital assets although this would not proportionately change the
holdings attributable to foreign and Argentine interests. A company could, thus, become quite large in terms of accumulated
capital while retaining a relatively meager capital base on which
to compute allowable profit remittances and capital repatriation
allowances. Ironically such a company would be subject to the
restrictions of the Law affecting foreign enterprises such as limitations on access to local capital and to the benefits of promotional
laws.
A foreign minority participant in a joint-venture with Argentine
capital would be particularly vulnerable to the consequences of a
denial of the right to accumulate earnings for later declaration.
The controlling Argentine interests could perpetually block the
declaration of dividends. The Law is silent on whether the Authority could approve as a reinvestment the applicable percentage of
the foreign investor's share of these undeclared retained earnings.
Should government authorization be denied, the investor would
see all of his part of the company's earnings annually transformed
into national capital yet not even available as part of the total
figure on which future profit transfers or capital repatriation could
be based.
The question is less momentous under Decision 24. As in Argentina, upon authorization, profits may be reinvested in the same
firm as an addition to registered foreign capital subject to the
original investment contract. 4 5 Since Decision 24 neither limits the
amount to profits eligible for transfer, in this case fourteen per cent
of the registered investment, 46 nor imposes time constrictions on
profit transfers, the problem of distributed versus undistributed
earnings does not arise. Earnings may be maintained within the
firm indefinitely without risking transformation into national capi245. Decision 24, arts. 1, 12, 13.

246. Decision 24, art. 37.
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tal, which lacks the rights accorded registered direct foreign investments.
The Argentine doubts may be the result of borrowing from the
Andean rules. More probably, the Argentines quite consciously
added the time limitation on profit transfers to the Decree precisely to nationalize earnings in excess of the annual percentage.
Unfortunately, the Statute leaves the question unresolved.

VII.

EXISTING INVESTMENT

Given the dimensions and importance of the foreign presence in
Argentina, the treatment of existing investments under the new
Law is undoubtedly the issue that most interests the international
investment community. These investors are already committed in
varying degrees. The Argentines also view the question of installed
investment as primordial. According to President Cdmpora:
in all countries in the process of liberating themselves from foreign
dependence there arises the need to establish standards governing
foreign investments and conforming the activities of multinational
companies to the national interest. [He also indicated that the
new] policy will be based on principles of economic independence,
political sovereignty and social justice maintained by the National
Government.247
Given the scarcity of new foreign entrants over the past years and
the general tone of the Law and of current policy, questions of
dependency are obviously allied to the activities of those already
on the scene. On the other hand, to the extent that existing investment cannot be physically removed from the country but can be
regulated successfully, Argentines can concentrate on determining
new capital investment needs, finding the necessary resources and
putting them to work to the benefit of the country.
A.

Registration of Existing Investments

To preserve the right to remit profits and repatriate capital even
in cases when such right is established by contract with the Government under previous laws or incentive promotion plans, the
amount of foreign capital invested must be registered with the
247.

Cdmpora speech, supra note 7.
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Authority. This is of the utmost importance to the investor since
all future transfers of profits or capital will be based upon having
accomplished this registration. 28 Foreign investors, seeking to register the maximum amount possible as a base for future percentage
transfers, will soon be engaged in a bureaucratic contest with the
officials of the Authority who are apparently determined to restrain their generosity.
Although the Law grants existing firms (or certain existing firms
if one interpretation of the Law is accepted) the option of refraining from subjecting themselves to most of its provisions,249 no such
option exists with regard to registration. By not opting, firms with
investment contracts under prior laws and perhaps all existing
firms may avoid the percentage limitations of the Law on profit
and capital transfers. However, it is still very decidedly in the best
interests of the investor to register the maximum amount possible
because, as will be seen, a penalty tax applied to profit remittances
by non-opting firms decreases in inverse relation to the amount of
2
capital registered. 11
Furthermore, cynical students of official behavior are likely to
agree that the Government will eventually and inevitably seek to
push the new legislation to its outer reaches. Since a variety of
tools exist for forcing the recalcitrant into the mold, exposed to the
percentage limitations of the Law, the investor has reason to fight
from the beginning for registration of a maximum amount.
A June 23, 1974, deadline was fixed for the submission of registration requests but that date has been extended. By mid-July,
appropriate forms and instructions still had not appeared. 21 It is
likely that definitive registration for all applicants will be a rather
lengthy process since about 1400 are anticipated and many of them
25 2
are likely to be challenged.
B.

Qualifying Capital

In spite of the vital importance of determining the amount of
capital that qualifies for registration as an existing investment, the
248. Investment Law, arts. 20, 23, 32.
249. Investment Law, art. 20.
250. Investment Law, art. 20.
251. Investment Decree, arts. 50-51.
252. Blondeau interview, supra note 88.
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Law offers inadequate guidelines for its calculation. There is an
initial problem of the eligibility of capital invested in the country
independently 6f previous investment or promotion laws. Registration is available for those investments of foreign capital defined in
the Statute that "entered the country by virtue of any norm in
effect prior to the Law, [which ae] the property of foreign investors, are actually (efectivamente) invested in the country and au'253
thentically verified by the Authority.
Members of the Authority have privately suggested, as has at
least one commentator,2 54 that registration will be denied those
investments effected without registration under a prior law or specific government approval. Such approval would be reflected in an
investment contract specifying the terms under which profits may
be remitted and capital repatriated. This interpretation is exceptionally harsh considering that only the ephemeral Peronist legislation of twenty years ago and the Lanusse Statute, which was
never effectively applied, were mandatory in requiring registration
of foreign investments and that other measures were optional and
involved contracts with the Government if the investor were interested in the benefits offered. The result appears yet harsher if
investments effected prior to the existence of any measures offering
the possibility of registration or contractual guarantees are to be
similarly treated. Some of the advocates of the harsh view limit it
to those investments that have entered the country since the enactment of the first Peronist law in 1953.
The proponents of the above views could argue that any investor
anywhere in the world who has not obtained the guarantees of a
government, when these are available, risks modification in the
legal climate in which he is operating. Argentina cannot be required to provide a static legal environment for the convenience of
the foreign investor, the Government need only respect its specific
obligations. If the Authority takes this view, the matter will be
hotly debated since many important investments fall in the free
entry category. Those affected will certainly allege expropriation
without adequate compensation upon finding themselves abruptly
denied repatriation and profit transfer rights.
253. Investment Law, arts. 20-21.
254. Bruzzon, supra note 120, at 7.
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The type of capital defined in the Law and discussed earlier in
this study are eligible for registration. As seen, capitalized technology rights are probably excluded. The Authority had indicated
that it will only register assets capitalized prior to the effective
date of the Law and will definitely exclude uncapitalized retained
earnings. 55 Some companies reportedly capitalized their assets as
completely as possible in anticipation of this position.2 In all
probability, this limitation is the fruit of the union of bureaucratic
convenience and governmental interest in reducing registration
amounts. Neither the Law nor any other legal norm brought forth
requires this interpretation rather than one permitting greater reference to the economic reality of total equity including net assets.
A rationalization for this approach would undoubtedly be based on
the rather fatuous presumption that capitalization of assets implies a greater commitment to the country and to the enterprise.
The Authority has indicated that the value of the foreign currency to be registered will be computed on the basis of the historical official exchange rate of the peso. This means that original
investments and the capitalization of internal growth will be registered in terms of their official dollar equivalents at the time the
investment or capitalization took place. 271 This is only fair considering that as recently as mid-1971 the dollar purchased only half
as many pesos from official sources as has been the case since.
The treatment of historical growth may turn out to be an important question. Although the Law speaks of the types of capital
listed in terms of having "entered (ingresadas) the country," the
defined items include reinvestment of profits eligible for transfer
abroad. However, it does not indicate the treatment envisaged for
companies that have enjoyed long histories of growth based on a
small initial capital investment but have chosen to recapitalize
earnings rather than transfer them out of the country. Will all such
historically capitalized earnings be registered as foreign capital or
will the 12.5 per cent limit be imposed retrospectively? In the latter
case, the Law on its face would require allowance of a higher limit
if in any past year the bank rate plus four per cent exceeded this
255. Duggan lecture, supranote 23. According to Dr. Duggan, members of the

Authority so indicated to him.
256. Business Latin America, Dec. 5, 1973, at 389.
257. Blondeau interview, supra note 87.
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figure. On the other hand, if non-opting companies are to be
allowed the future right to reinvest profits in excess of the rate
applicable to companies covered by the Law, consistency would
decry any such historical limitation on existing investors. It is
inconceivable that the Authority would grant this future right to
companies th-at choose not to be covered by the Law and not
allow them the same right during a period when the Law did not
even exist. In both cases, the indicated logic applies with equal
force: not subject to the Law, not subject to its percentage
limitations.
If prior investors without contracts under previous laws are to be
considered subject to this Law without the right of option, the
above reasoning loses some of its force. Clearly non-opting, existing
investors with contracts will continue to have the right to reinvest
or transfer the profits stipulated in the contract even though they
might be in excess of the limitations of the new Law. Presumably,
no argument would be made with respect to the right of these firms
to register earnings up to this amount, which were capitalized
historically rather than transferred. However, if the firm without
a contract is to be entirely subject to the Law, the percentage
limitations, it may be asserted, should apply to historical reinvestment.
In view of the new statutory limitations on credit, especially
from local sources, and the reasons for them, the policy makers
may attempt to introduce standards designed to measure the type
or quality of internal growth. One of the commonplaces of the
dependencia-economic imperialism theme is the use of local
credit by foreign investors as a means of achieving rapid growth on
the basis of a small initial commitment of capital. For instance,
reference is often made to the ties between international banking
institutions and foreign investors, particularly multinational companies. The latter have been said to enjoy easier access to local
credit and on better terms than their competitors through these
institutions .25s Avoiding a polemical (or empirical) fray in these
258. See FIEL, supra note 8 La Asignaci6n del Cr6ditoy el Comportamiento
de los Bancos Extranjeros Ch. IX, at 154; Goff, El Bank of America tiene a
su Hombre en la Agricultura Latinoamericanain EL PODER DE LOS BANCOS
EXTRMJEROS 117 (1972) (originally in English in NACLA Newsletter, New York,
Sept. 1970); Amadeo, Dependencia y Estructura del Sistema Financiero
Argentina, 1 CUADERNOs NAcIoNAnEs 93 (1974); CmuaLo, supra note 17, at 51;

362

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 8: 277

pages, it will be seen that the Foreign Investment Law vigorously
reflects this attitude in its measures dealing with credit. Unfortunately, it offers no definitive guidance with respect to registration
of historical capital growth by companies that have benefited from
prior access to local capital.
The Government will face another difficult problem should its
policy decision be to impose an historical value judgment on company growth. The secrecy and scarcity of corporate financial records, particularly the less recent, may relegate adequate analysis
to the land of pipe dreams. It simply may not be feasible to determine if a successful growth pattern resulted from privileged access
to local capital or was, instead, the honest result of the application
of superior management, better technology or greater expenditure
of energy.
Original direct capital investments introduced from the exterior
would seem less troublesome. Nevertheless, since "direct proof as
to the actual entrance to [sic] the country of the foreign investment may be difficult or impossible,"" 9 an,important Buenos Aires
law firm suggests the use of a series of evidentiary materials. These
include minute books, shareholder registers, banking vouchers recording the remittance or crediting of dividends, certificates of
chartered public accountants attesting to matters not otherwise
documented and home country tax records. 211 The data supplied
in accordance with the registration provisions of the Lanusse investment law have no probative value. Applications were received,
collected and organized but no registrations of capital were accomplished. The present position of a firm will certainly suffer if it
estimated low in its previous submission, while the Government is
in no way committed to acceptance of the earlier self-serving generosity of the business community. These complex and rather technical questions about capital evaluation should be of interest beyond Argentina; other countries seeking tighter control of foreign
operations will or have faced the same issues. Venezuela adopted
an easy solution in its extraordinarily prompt incorporation of the
Onnes, Bancos Extronjeros en la America Latina, (prepared for Consejo Interamericano de Comercio y Producci6n, (CICYP)1972).

259. Letter to clients by the Buenos Aires law firm Marval & O'Farrell, at 3,
April 4, 1974.

260. Id.
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rules of Decision 24 into the its national legislation; all foreign
investments must be registered. "In the case of enterprises in existence in the country as of January 1, 1974, foreign direct investments will be made up of their own actually existing capital, calculated at book value .... ,,261
C.

The Option

Having registered their foreign capital investment, companies
are given the option of subscribing to the new Law or declining to
do so. The option may be exercised at any time. Companies that
do not opt for the Law are subject to a special tax on profits
transferred abroad. The tax is expressed as a graduated percentage
of the transfer increasing in relation to the percentage that the
transfer represents of capital on which profit remittances may be
calculated. It ranges from twenty per cent of transfers equalling up
to six per cent of capital to forty per cent of transfers that are the
equivalent of over fifteen per cent of capital. The Law does not
indicate whether the top percentage is to be applied against the
entire amount of the remittance or if the tax is to be calculated on
a step-by-step basis. The latter alternative would tax twenty per
cent of the first six per cent of capital, twenty-two per cent of six
to nine per cent and so on. It is assumed that the Government
prefers the first interpretation.
This tax is applied to payments made to foreign participants in
foreign enterprises and mixed enterprises. The less than twenty per
in national enterprises may receive
cent foreign interest permitted
22
profits free of the levy.
261. Decree of April 29, 1974 (63 (Venez.), supra note 28, arts. 19, 32.
262. Investment Law, art. 20; Decree, art. 13; Resolution of May 20, 1974 (No.
1623), Direcci6n General Impositiva (regulation regulating collection of this tax).
The scale is as follows:
Per cent that profit transfer represents
of total capital base on which such
transfers may be calculated:
Up to 6%
Over 6% up to 9%
Over 9% up to 12%
Over 12% up to 15%
Over 15%

Tax as percentage of
profit transfer:
20%
22%
25%
30%
40%
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This study does not attempt an examination of two important
peripheral questions related to the option decision. First, to the
extent that the option really is a free choice, United States investors must determine if the United States foreign tax credit applies
to the profit remittance penalty tax. Secondly, the effect of the
option on insurance coverage for inconvertibility would demand
study.
In the Executive Draft version of the Law, it was relatively clear
that only those investments confirmed by previous registration or
a contract under an earlier law could be registered. These would
have been allowed to voluntarily subject themselves to the new
Law or "remain subject to the terms ('regimen') under which they
were made." '63 Other existing investments were to be nationalized;
registration and treatment as a foreign investment would be denied. This is the position currently in vogue among certain hardliners and discussed in the preceding section of this study.
The Executive Branch drafted the original version of the Law
and in the Decree reaffirmed its earlier position in spite of a contrary expression of congressional intent, just as the Executive had
done with the question of foreign participation in prohibited sectors. Since the Authority is part of the Executive Branch and reflects its viewpoint, it is very probable that the Decree provision
will be utilized to force companies into the framework of the Law
in spite of the option. It says that existing foreign investments,
which "do not opt to be subject to the Law, will continue to be
governed by the norms under which they entered the country. 2 64
Those companies, which never entered into an investment contract or registered their investment under a previous law and do
not opt for the new Law, may find their applications for foreign
exchange or dollar bonds denied on the basis of the Decree provision when they seek to transfer profits or capital. The Central Bank
can easily choose to inquire by what authority such a transfer must
be authorized if it is not provided for in a written instrument
negotiated under the new Law or under previous norms. In spite
of the evident perversion of congressional intent involved in such
executive sanctions, political realities insure that should the Executive wish to bring foreign investors within the ambit of the Law,
263. Draft Investment Law, art. 19.
264. Investment Decree, art. 15.
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the means to do so are available.
The optional character of the new Law is an Argentine feature
added to the Andean model. The executive version of the Law
undoubtedly reflected a desire to extend its control over as wide a
field as possible. Rights conceded under other laws could only be
voluntarily renounced, hence, an option to do so was provided, and
it was correctly assumed that the Government had the power to
"encourage" recourse to the option. Those improvident foreigners
who had chosen to take their chances and, therefore, did not enjoy
the contractual guarantees of the Government, were to lose out
entirely. The Decree provision reflects the same attitude, and the
same general conclusions apply. In the measure that the Government elects to extend the applicability of the Law by means of the
option, it will in all likelihood do so successfully.
Providing that non-opters will be governed by the norms under
which they entered the country has a second aspect. It reaffirms
Government commitments expressed in previous contracts for
those investors who are so protected. Most of these contracts were
made under promotion laws and include tax and other incentive
benefits, which will not be lost. The prohibition of better-thanequal treatment for foreign investors265 is clearly prospective and
will not affect previous contractual dispositions.
On the other hand, the existing investor unprotected by a contract under an earlier law who avoids opting for the new Law is in
an ambiguous situation. It is unclear to what extent, if any, the
new legislation applies to him other than the special profit remittance tax, its capital registration requirement, the transfer restriction for periods of balance of payment difficulties and the limitations on access to local credit. 26 As suggested, the coercive power

of the Government may bring all the restrictions of the Law to bear
on the existing investor. Moreover, until mid-1974, apparently no
existing investor had manifested an intention to opt to come under
the Law.2

7

In the June annual meeting of Business International

in Buenos Aires, however, about six of the sixty major firms repre265. Investment Law, art. 19.
266. Investment Law, arts. 16, 17, 20; Decree, art. 15.
267. This has been the advice of the Commercial Section of the United States
Embassy in Buenos Aires as well as that of the City's major law firms. See, e.g.,
supra note 259.
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sented indicated that they had decided to opt. Since the only
penalty for remaining outside the control of the Law is the special
tax on profit transfers, no obvious reason exists for rushing forth.
Until the capital registration process is completed, the Authority
is not permitting profit transfers, which, in any case, would only
have been possible through the external dollar bond secondary
market at disadvantageous parallel market rates.
Should a company decide to opt for the new Law it will then be
required to negotiate and enter into an investment contract subject
to the rules applying to those negotiated with newcomers. 218 It is

realistic to assume that a firm having manifested its intention to
opt will be able to back out if unable to agree upon mutually
satisfactory contractual terms with the Government.2 19 Contact
with the Authority will be sufficiently open to avoid the necessity
of exercising the choice blindly. It is virtually inevitable that terms
will be agreed upon before the formal option is itself manifested
unless the Government dictates contracts by fiat and, thus, ignores
the substance of the option concept.
The Law directs the Executive Branch to consider imposing a
fade-out requirement in investment contracts negotiated with existing investors.7 0 Curiously, this application of the fade-out concept is not burdened with the rigid divestment formula applying
to contracts for new investments. Contracts will be for a term of
five years, automatically extended for an equal term unless during
the first four years the Authority demands the introduction of a
fade-out system in the second contract."' Theoretically, by opting
and negotiating a contract, the fade-out possibility exposes a company to a greater risk of forced nationalization. As in the case of
new investments, Argentina has avoided the mandatory fade-out
requirements of the Andean Code but has given the Government
almost absolute case-by-case flexibility. This represents a congressional softening of the Executive Draft Law, which adopted the
Andean approach in combination with the Argentine idea of an
option. Under the Andean scheme, after the first step of opting to
268. Investment Law, art. 20; Decree, art. 13.
269. Some parties fear that opting will put a firm at the government's mercy.

The Bomchil letter supra note 121, at 3.
270. Investment Law, art. 22.
271. Investment Decree, art. 14.
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be subject to the Law, fade-out was to have been mandatory.,,
Beyond the scope of this article some obvious questions arise: Will
the uncertainty of the divestment provisions erode investor confidence? Will the introduction of new technology and methods be
reduced in view of the possibility of fade-out?
D. Expropriationof Existing Firms
In addition to the rights of the Government to impose fade-out
requirements in investment contracts negotiated with existing
firms that opt for treatment under the new Law, there exist two
possibilities for outright expropriation of certain investments.
These are, first, foreign ownership of companies acquired from
Argentines and, secondly, foreign participation in certain now prohibited sectors.
1. Firms Acquired from Argentine Interests.-Article 33 empowers the President to take measures during a period of three
years to reconvert to national companies any firms that, once Argentine, have been taken over by foreign investors by direct acquisition. Excepted are firms absorbed during bankruptcy proceedings
when no Argentine buyer was available." 4 The President's decision
must be based on the same factors that determine whether fadeout is to be insisted upon in investment contracts, e.g., "characteristics of the sector, company volume, balance of payments situation and the possibilities of national investment.

7'2 5

Decision 24 of the Andean Code contains no precisely comparable disposition. There is a provision for the nationalization of firms
operating in prohibited sectors, while investors who entered prior
to June 30, 1971, are given three years, until June 30, 1974, to
decide if they will subscribe to the fade-out provisions of Decision
24. Foreign firms are not required to submit to fade-out, but not
agreeing to it costs them the duty-free advantages of the Andean
Common Market.
272. Draft Investment Law, arts. 19(a), 21.
273. Investment Law, arts. 20,
1, 33.
274. Investment Law, arts. 6(d), 33.
275. Investment Law, art. 22.
276. Decision 24, art. 43. With the approach of the three-year deadline, the
Junta and the Commission of the Andean Pact have reportedly softened the fade-

out provision. Anew ruling is said to continue the lock-out from tariff concessions
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The Argentine rule, on the other hand, gives the President the
power to force the expropriation of the defined class of firms without consulting Congress. Events in Chile and Peru are reminders
that the inclusion of facilitating clauses in Andean Pact Commission Decisions is not a prerequisite to nationalization in member
countries. It is, nevertheless, interesting that the Argentine Congress chose to grant the President this right to by-pass the legislative branch. When the Law was passed, Congress was still acting
as Per6n's right arm and public opinion apparently favored a firm
approach to foreign investors who had taken over Argentine companies.
This section entered the Argentine Law as a result of public
resentment toward the economic policies of General Onganfa's military regime, which took office after a 1966 coup (or for cultural
consistency golpe). Onganfa's controversial Minister of Economy,
Adalberto Krieger Vasena encouraged or permitted the take-over
of Argentine companies by foreign interests. The current situation
of seven foreign-controlled banks lends credence to this supposition.
On August 2, 1973, while the foreign investment bill was being
considered, Congress sanctioned Law No. 20.522, which provided
for the expropriation of seven Argentine banks taken over by six
different foreign banks since 1966. The treatment accorded these
banks as well as their identities give content to article 33. These
banks came under foreign control after 1966, including the only
branch of First National City Bank affected, whereas the pre-1966
acquisitions of City Bank were not touched. In addition, about
fifteen other foreign banks that own branches and subsidiaries in
Argentina were ignored.
Law 20.522 is skeletal. It singles out the banks affected and
directs the President through the Central Bank to see to their
continued normal functioning. It directs the President to dictate
measures by which the expropriated banks will eventually be
for firms unwilling to begin a divestment plan providing an immediate minimum
of 15% national equity participation. Nevertheless, according to the ruling, firms
that later comply with the fade-out plan will be granted the subregional tariff
concessions. The entry of national participants has ceased being an academic

problem in 1974 since international firms have been forced to face the first stages
of the process. See Business Latin America, May 29, 1971, at 170; June 5, 1974,
at 183; June 12, 1974, at 186.
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transferred back to national hands-private, federal, provincial or
municipal-with preference to be accorded the public sector assuming other factors equal.2 7 The Central Bank is instructed to
determine the amount of indemnification to be offered on the basis
of book value plus the nominal value of collectible credits minus
obligations. No intangibles such as good will, names or insignias
278
are to be considered in the evaluation.
Decree 1.430 dated September 23, 1973, contributes detail, especially to the indemnification question. It also adds a theme not
mandated by the original measure but consistent with the public
reaction against foreign takeovers of Argentine companies: The
Central Bank while administering these banks during the period
between expropriation and sale to national interests is ordered to
consider the reincorporation of personnel who lost their jobs "as a
consequence of the application of efficiency and reorganization
policies during the period when such entities were managed by
foreign capital."' Further, Decree 1.430 established September
30, 1973, as the evaluation date and Decree 889 of March 25, 1974,
provides for adjusting this figure to the date of indemnification.
Later decrees have established values ranging from 1.3 million
dollars to 8.5 million dollars. 0 Decree 889 gives the banks 60 days
to reach a decision. Should a bank refuse the offer or not respond
during this lapse, the Central Bank is directed to assume control.28 '
The banks appear to be promised cash payment in convertible
currency rather than forced to convert payment into external
bonds.2 12 A publication distributed in early May 1974 reports that
no bank has yet indicated its position although Chase Manhattan
has said that it intends to continue negotiating. Most of the other
277. Law of Aug. 23, 1973 (No. 20.522), Concerning Bank Expropriation, art.
4.
278. Bank Expropriation Law, art. 3.
279. Decree of Sept. 9, 1973 (No. 1.430), Concerning Financial Entities, art.

9.
280. Decrees of April 16, 1974 (Nos. 1.183, 1.184, 1.185, 1.186, 1.187), Concerning Bank Expropriation Indemnization . See also Business Latin America, May
1, 1974, at 141.
281. Decree of March 25, 1974 (No. 889), Concerning Norms for Bank Expropriation, arts. 8, 9 [hereinafter cited as Decree 889]. See La Naci6n, Mar. 26,
1974, at 12.
282. Decree 889, art. 10.
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banks apparently do not feel that they are likely to get more.
General opinion is that the amounts are fair although some are
under book value and, of course, none represent the arguably considerable value of intangibles."'
Present policy, thus, seems to be limited to the expropriation of
companies sold to foreigners after 196621 except for operations in
prohibited sectors or special cases. Furthermore, that the Government has manifested its intention to pay cash compensation for
expropriated interests suggests that selective criteria will be applied; the country is in no position to be reckless with its foreign
exchange. Although the executive faculty expires in a mere three
years, its extension is a foregone conclusion unless major political
realignments interfere in unpredictable ways.
2. Participationin ProhibitedSectors.-The Law adopts a relatively lenient and flexible approach toward foreign investments
already operating in so-called prohibited sectors of the economy.
Existing investment is affected in only two of the several general
areas in which the entry of new foreign investment is restricted. In
cases of foreign investment in these sectors, the Authority may
take over management of firms and, if it so chooses, recommend
their expropriation by Congress. The vulnerable activities are
those related to the armed forces and such mass media activities
as advertising, radio, television and publishing.1
283. Business Latin America, supra note 280.
284. Admittedly, the provision is drafted to facilitate its application in other

cases and would, thus, cover additional past take-overs of Argentine firms by
foreigners should a more active expropriation policy be considered desirable.
However, such a policy is feasible with or without this provision, given current
political realities, such as the influence of the Peronist Government over the
political process. Thus, judgment may be limited to Government intentions as
currently manifested. The Government's present expropriation policy is unambiguously stated in the presidential message to Congress accompanying the draft
Industrial Promotion Law. The first in a list of objectives advanced by the measure is to "[i]ncrease national decision-making power in the industrial sector.

For this reason, support will be given national capital enterprises for which promotion benefits will be reserved. The objective is also to reverse the process of
the economy's denationalization resulting from the economic policy of the last few
years which has resulted in the shift of a great number of industrial companies
to the domain of foreign capital." See Executive message accompanying draft
Industrial Promotion Law in 15 DERPCHO DE LA INTEGRAcI6N 299 (1974).
285. Investment Law, arts. 6(c)(1), (4), 20; Decree, art. 5.
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This represents a considerable Congressional softening of the
Executive Draft Law, which took a harsh view inspired by the
Andean Code. Established firms with contractual legitimacy
founded in other legislation were allowed, as always, to remain
subject to the terms by which they entered the country.28 Perhaps
unwittingly, the executive office draftsmen did not include a word
about the consequences envisaged for these non-opting companies
if they were engaged in prohibited sectors. Those without prior
investment contracts would probably have been forced by the
ambiguity of the Draft Law to opt either for the Law or see their
capital considered national and, therefore, without transfer rights.
The option would have assumed more importance because opting
foreign investments in any of the listed prohibited sectors would
have been obligated to divest until the companies reached national
enterprise status, that is, less than twenty per cent foreign participation. As a backdrop, it might also be borne in mind that this
draft required the 'transformation of all opting majority-held foreign enterprises to mixed status."'
The Executive Branch can probably achieve the result sought in
its Draft Law by way of the Industrial Promotion Law and decrees
issued thereunder. Thus, no foreign investor in a sensitive sector
of the economy can rely with certainty on the limitations to executive omnipotence included in the new Law. However, some judiciousness seems to be evidencing itself in the process of issuing
decrees since promotion decrees have so far allowed existing businesses to continue with the same ownership while requiring special
authorization for plant expansion or modifications in the business.
To participate in the Andean Common Market tariff reduction
scheme, all foreign enterprises are required to submit to a prescribed fade-out plan. 28 Each of a number of prohibited sectors is
accorded individual legislative treatment with considerable detail
left to the discretion of member governments. 28 Thus, in broad
terms, the Andean Code includes provisions that Argentina has
generally reserved for promotional and other specific legislation. In
general and in addition to other requirements, Decision 24 requires
286.
287.
288.
289.

Draft Investment
Draft Investment
Decision 24, arts.
Decision 24, arts.

Law, art. 19(b).
Law, art. 19(a).
27-36.
38-44.
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a reduction in ownership to an 80:20 ratio for preexisting foreign
participation in the sectors treated. As in the Argentine Executive
Draft, these reductions are obligatory, 290 whereas the new Argentine Law places them within the discretionary realm of the Authority subject to congressional approval. The softening of the final
Argentine version with its consequent estrangement from Andean
origins, in part, reflects a different legislation-producing mechanism. The Argentine Executive Draft was based on a document
drafted by a group of rather like-minded, internationally oriented,
technocratic idealists. At least some of the details of that innovative document might not have survived a congressional ordeal
comparable to that undergone in Argentina.
3. Participationin ProhibitedSectors-Banking.-Banking
(with finance in general as well as insurance) is a sector in which
both the Law and the Decree allow new foreign participation of up
to but less than twenty per cent. 2 1 Neither measure suggests that
existing foreign participation in banking is marked for extirpation
when it exceeds this limit.9 2 It was, thus, noteworthy when a respected lawyer involved in foreign investment questions observed
that two recent Central Bank circulars order the conversion of all
commercial banks and other financial entities to national status as
defined in the Financial Entities Law and its modification.293 For
a financial entity to be considered "national" under these statutes,
Argentine citizens must hold over 80 per cent of both the capital
and the vote. 294 The Bank circulars in question repeat the relevant
text of the law referred to and order "entities which do not conform
to the cited proportions to formulate a plan enabling fulfillment
290. Decision 24 permits member countries to apply different norms when the
country involved determines that special circumstances exist. In the absence of
such a specific determination, Decision 24 requires the indicated reduction in
foreign participation. The products of companies that do not make the reduction
due to a determination of special circumstances are denied the benefits of the
special tariff program. Decision 24, art. 44.
291. Investment Law, art. 6(c), last ; Decree, art. 24.
292. Banking is not an area in which the Authority is empowered to take-over
(intervenir) firms in order to propose their nationalization or expropriation to
Congress. Investment Law, art. 20, 1.
293. Klein, supra note 54 at 29-30. Financial Entities Laws, supra note 113.
294. Financial Entities Law No. 20.574, art. 10. Klein, supra note 54, at 29-
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of the requirement before July 13, 1974, which plan shall be made
known to this Institution no later than next March 15. ... "I"
In spite of this mandatory language it is more probable that the
Central Bank was telling the financial community that to maintain "national bank" status, these institutions would be required
to conform their ownership and voting to the provisions of the
newly modified Financial Entities Law. Credence is given to this
conclusion since as of late July the Bank had not issued any further
circulars touching the question. If in fact, it was the intention of
the Bank to order the conversion of all banks to national status,
"the Central Bank by means of a circular letter is attempting to
29
nullify legal norms of superior authority.""
4. Nationalizationof Bank Deposits.-Coincidentally with the
recent changes in ownership requirements for consideration as a
national banking enterprise, Congress enacted controversial legislation affecting all deposit receiving institutions in Argentina. Although foreign banks are not specifically discriminated against in
the measures, the Central Bank is granted increased control over
commercial banking activities. Given the previously noted attitudes of the Central Bank toward foreign participation in this sector of the economy, it is likely that foreign deposit receiving institutions will find themselves under close scrutiny.
The law in question nationalized the deposits of all banks and
financial institutions regardless of ownership.29 Banking institutions in a sense are transformed into paid agents of the Central
Bank as all peso deposits are to be considered Central Bank deposits. The Central Bank is given generally complete control over the
use of these funds as well as interest rates paid and received;
however, the Central Bank guarantees deposits without limitation
as to amount or title. The law includes standards to guide the
Central Bank in its determination of rediscount rates to be granted
to all banks of a like class.
"Foreign banking entities" are singled out only once as follows:
"In determining rediscount limits and conditions for foreign banking entities, special attention will be given to the extent to which
295.
296.
297.
Central

Central Bank Circulars, B 1106 and IF 433 (Feb. 21, 1974).
Klein, supra note 54, at 30.
Law of Aug. 16, 1973 (No. 20.520), Concerning Deposit Nationalization,
Bank Circular, B 1055 (Aug. 22, 1973).
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such entities contribute to the development of favorable financial
and commercial relations with the rest of the world.""29 "Foreign
banking entities" must be those defined in terms of capital and
vote by the modified Financial Entities Law although the Statute
was enacted some four months after deposits were nationalized.
This is obviously a fine case of reciprocal backscratching: More
local lending funds made available for banking operations in return for doing a good job on behalf of Argentina in international
financial and export markets.
The Andean scheme for banking outlined in Decision 24 is generally stricter than the Argentine treatment although once again
rather close to that of the Executive Draft Bill. Under the Andean
Code no new investment in any percentage is allowed in insurance,
banking or finance whereas Argentina permits up to but under
twenty per cent. Far stricter in principle than the Argentine nationalization of bank deposits, Decision 24 orders foreign banks to
stop receiving such deposits within three years. To avoid the latter
prohibition, banks must sell at least 80 per cent of their ownership
99 Thus, Decision 24
to local interests within this three-year period."
would eliminate any banking activity based on the receipt of local
deposits by institutions with more than twenty per cent foreign
participation.

IX.

CREDIT, INTEREST, SEcuRrrIEs AND TECHNOLOGY PAYMENTS

A. Local Credit
In the case of foreign, as opposed to mixed and national enterprises, the Authority is directed to fix maximum limits of local
indebtedness from banks or from any other Argentine domiciliary.
Foreign enterprises are limited to short-term internal credit of a
one-year maximum except for firms that the Central Bank declares
eligible under special financial incentive measures."'0 Although at
least one commentator feels that these limitations even extend to
credits for local capital goods,0 ' a less rigid approach is conceivable. The General Manager of the Central Bank suggests that the
298. Deposit Nationalization Law, art. 5.
299. Decision 24, art. 42.
300. Investment Law, art. 17; Decree, arts. 30-33.
301. Klein, supra note 54, at 22.
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principal use of internal credit will be for the financing of credit
sales; he does not indicate that such credits will be subject to a
302
maximum term.
Rather than specify maximum limits of local debt on an acrossthe-board basis, the Decree elected a case-by-case approach, obviously because the Executive preferred flexibility. The Authority
is directed to impose guidelines in each investment contract with
foreign capital enterprises. Further, these must be based on the
particular situation and expressed in relation to the sum of capital
3 3
plus reserves computed according to Central Bank standards.
Existing companies with local debt in excess of established limits are directed to reduce it to prescribed levels over a period of six
months with an additional six-month period offered for cause.
Longer term debts may be phased out in due course." Since virtually no existing firm is likely to have opted and negotiated an
investment contract during this period, and since the local credit
provisions are amongst those few that apply regardless of the option, it is not clear what is intended by the prescribed rules. Unless
a general directive is issued, there does not appear to be any practical limitation on firms that have not been individually notified.
Rejecting the invitation of the Law to declare a fixed maximum
standard was perhaps sensible since it permits matching the accessibility of local credit to the attractiveness or importance of
each investment proposal. This almost total flexibility was not
anticipated although a trend in this direction may be discerned in
an examination of the relevant precedents. The Executive Draft
Law also directed the establishment of individual limits in investment contracts but in no case permitted such limits to exceed the
sum of repatriable capital plus nationalized reserves. The draft
was, in turn, less restrictive of executive prerogatives than was its
predecessor. The Lanusse investment law limited access to local
bank credit by firms with majority foreign ownership to short-term
loans totalling an amount equal to half of registered capital plus
accumulated reserves.3 15 It is unclear, however, to what extent
302. Cairoli, El R~girnen para las Inversiones Extranjeras en la Repablica
Argentina, 20 BoLETiN FINANCIERO, 1, 4 (1974).
303. Investment Decree, art. 32.
304. Investment Decree, art. 31.
305. Lanusse Investment Law, art. 12.
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these restrictions were actually applied if applied at all. Actual
comparison of the severity of the two measures is imprecise since
the Lanusse provision did not include nonbank credit as does the
new Law.
The final Argentine provision without its Decree resembles its
Andean counterpart since the latter also denies access to other
than short-term local credit while also shifting responsibility for
the formulation of terms, in this case to the Andean Commission.3 6
Since the Commission has not yet issued directives, the question
has been left in national hands for the time being. The Andean
measure was itself borrowed from Peruvian legislation, which, like
the Argentine Draft Law, permits such credit up to a maximum
equal to the capital plus reserves of each firm. Peru is said to also
allow foreign enterprises some exceptions to the short-term limitation.307
Since all of these precedents are quite restrictive, it cannot be
assumed that the decision of the Government to drop its selfimposed limitation was accidental. Presumably in what it considers appropriate cases, it will adopt a generous approach. Even a
generous approach would, according to the Law, preclude access
to medium- or long-term credit, but as a practical matter such
credit has not been available on a significant scale. Foreign investors are said to be relatively unconcerned about local credit restrictions but rather uneasy about the rules applying to international
308
sources of credit.
This question of local credit restrictions may be viewed on a
macro as well as on a micro level. One aspect of the macro view
was revealed recently by the Central Bank's establishment of standards governing commercial bank loans to "local external capital
enterprises.""3 9 The latter firms are those of Argentine domicile
with fewer than 80 per cent of their technical and management
personnel domiciled in the country and with over 49 per cent of
their capital and votes in foreign hands.310 Total loans to these
306. Decision 24, art. 17.
307. Furnish, El Rgimen Comdn del Grupo Andino para las Inversiones
Extranjeras,14 DERECHO DE LA INTEGRAcI6N, 85, 94-95 n. 63 (1973).
308. Business Latin America, Dec. 5, 1973, at 389.
309. Central Bank Circular, B 1102, Feb. 7, 1974.
310. Central Bank Circular, B 765, art. 3 (Nov. 12, 1970).
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firms as a group, which are basically those defined in the Foreign
Investment Law as foreign enterprises, are limited to the proportion that such loans represented in the total loan portfolio of each
bank on September 30, 1973. The proportion is said to be 25 per
cent while banks that have not previously loaned to foreign-owned
firms are allowed three per cent of their total loan portfolio."
B.

Stock Market Tax Incentives

Foreign and mixed firms are excluded from legislation creating
tax incentives for both the purchase of shares in other companies
and the sale of their own shares on the domestic market. Passed
after the Foreign Investment Law, the Stock Market Promotion
Law312 makes it possible for both individual and corporate taxpayers to purchase shares in firms approved by the Ministry of Economy with a portion of the funds that would otherwise go toward
payment of tax obligations for the years 1974 through 1976. Familiar to students of the Brazilian model, the system permits individuals with small tax bills to devote the entire sum to these purchases with the permissible percentage decreasing to just over
eight per cent as the tax obligation increases. Corporations are
permitted to use three per cent of their tax obligation for stock
purchases in 1974 and two and one per cent respectively in 1975
313
and 1976.
Only the shares of national enterprises as defined in the Foreign
Investment Law (over 80 per cent Argentine capital) are eligible
for purchase in lieu of the payment of income taxes.31 4 Generally,
the Government has been strict in denying eligibility to firms with
foreign participation under similar previous incentive laws. ' ,5 Foreign and mixed firms are, thus, cut off from a potential capital
source and, in addition, are apparently denied the tax exemption
for the purchase of shares in approved companies since the Foreign
Investment Law specifically proscribes the purchase by foreign
investors of shares in national companies except during liquidation
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

IL&T, supra note 239, at 16.
Law of Feb. 5, 1974 (No. 20.643), Concerning Stock Market Promotion.
Stock Market Promotion Law, art. 1(c).
Stock Market Promotion Law, arts. 3(a), (b), 12.
IL&T, supra note 239, at 18.
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for bankruptcy.3 10 Thus, only national firms will be permitted to
buy these shares even though purchases are limited to a maximum
of two per cent of the total capital of the issuing corporation and
the total portfolio this special class of securities may not exceed ten
per cent of the total capital of the purchasing corporation. ' ,' Since
the device is an attempt to popularize and broaden stock ownership and increase available equity capital, permitting a maximum
foreign participation of two per cent would not have sullied the
principle of national control over the economic destiny of the country. However, it would have involved the sacrifice of an equivalent
amount of tax revenue. Just as access to local credit is restricted
by the desire to reserve national savings for Argentine companies,
foreign and mixed enterprises are excluded from a potential source
of equity capital by the ineligibility of their shares for purchase
under this program.
C.

Foreign Credit

With the exception of foreign credits for the purchase of capital
goods and to cover imports, all external credits are subject to prior
Central Bank authorization and registration. The Bank may also
3 18
fix overall or sectorial debt limitations for determined periods.
According to a provision of the Law included in an article dealing
with another question,31 the effective annual interest rate may not
exceed the equivalent of two points over the prime rate paid in the
country from which the currency to be registered originated. This
rate may in no case exceed overall rates established by the Central
Bank.
Subject to the same exception indicated above, a number of
special limitations are imposed on foreign credits conceded to foreign enterprises32 as distinguished from national and mixed com316. Stock Market Promotion Law, art. 4; Investment Law, art. 6(d).
317. Stock Market Promotion Law, art. 4.
318. Investment Law, art. 24.
319. The first paragraph of article 26 of the Law applies to foreign credits in
general. The rest of the article deals with and bears the title "Credits and other
contributions between parent and/or branches or between subsidiaries."
320. Investment Law, art. 25. Actually the article refers to "foreign enterprises" although it undoubtedly means "foreign capital enterprises" as defined
in article 2(c) of the Investment Law. This is an example of slipping into the
handier Andean terminology.
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panies. The foreign enterprises are allowed Argentine bank guarantees only in special cases; the amount of any transfers related to
certain penalties incurred under the loan is directly discounted
from the repatriable capital of the firm; and credit lines without
fixed terms or totals are subject to additional Central Bank control.2 ' Special rules governing loans by foreign parents to their
Argentine subsidiaries will be discussed below.
Again with the same exception, future modifications or extensions of existing credits must conform to the rules for foreign loans
while credit lines without fixed terms or amounts have a year to
adjust. After this period transfers abroad for servicing will not be
permitted.2 2
In this case the Argentine measures are somewhat stricter than
their Andean prototype. Authorization, registration and overall
limits are provided for in Decision 2413 while only official or semioffical institutions are prohibited from guaranteeing external
credits granted to foreign enterprises. Guarantees may be offered
to firms that include state participation. 324 Thus, as long as private
banks exist, 325 they may guarantee foreign loans. Except for foreign
credits to subsidiaries, a maximum interest rate is not imposed but
is to be nationally determined. As in Argentina the rate must be
related to the financial market in the country from which the regis32
tered currency originates. 1
D.

Parent-SubsidiaryRelations

Previous Argentine foreign investment laws did not deal with
external credits, whether with third-parties or between a foreign
parent and its local subsidiary. This was undoubtedly because
these pioneer statutory draftsmen were wed to the notion of regulating capital rather than debt investment. The primary reasons
321. Investment Law, art. 25.
322. Investment Law, art. 27.
323. Decision 24, art. 14.
324. Decision 24, art. 15.
325. Their immediate demise is far from assured. Article 44 of Decision 24
permits member countries to modify the rules with respect to prohibited sectors.
Bolivia is reportedly inviting proposals for new foreign investment in banking and
finance. See Business Latin America, June 12, 1974, at 190..
326. Decision 24, art. 16.
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for the inclusion of debt in the statutory framework of the Andean
Code and consequently in the new Argentine Foreign Investment
Law are well-known. As Cdmpora recognized in his congressional
speech, "the limitations on foreign indebtedness by foreign companies . . . prevent these firms from being able to transfer hidden
profits abroad in the form of interest payments. ' '321 Even better for

the foreign investor, interest payments had been tax deductible.
Thus, in some instances capital was not only illegally removed
from the country, but the operation also received a windfall in the
form of a tax deduction. Identical principles apply and have applied to technology transfers and technology payments in the form
of royalties, licensing fees and the like.
Before the Foreign Investment Law was reality, Argentine courts
took what, even in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions, might be considered
legislative action. Borrowing from Brazilian and Andean statutory
foreign investment provisions,2sa the Supreme Court affirmed what
is now known in Argentina as the Parke Davis rule.329 The rule
springs from the conviction that arms-length transactions cannot
be expected between a parent and its subsidiary and, therefore,
denies the tax deduction of royalties paid by an Argentine subsidiary to its foreign parent.ms The same principle is extended to include interest 32' and other payments between related entities.
327. Cdmpora speech, supra note 61.
328. Law of Sept. 3, 1962 (No. 4.131), art. 14 (Braz.) and Decision 24, arts.
16, 21; see Sibato, El Cronista Comercial, Oct. 8, 1973.
329. Parke Davis y Cia. de Argentina S.A.I.C. s/ recurso de apelaci6n, Fallos
de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n, 151 La Ley 353 (1973). Gordon,
Argentine Jurisprudence:The Parke Davis and Deltec Cases, 6 LAw. AMERICAS
320 (1974); Martinez de Sucre & A. Corti, Parke Davis-Caso Rector, 49 EL
DERECHO 481 (1973) (originally appeared Aug. 20, 1973, No. 3262, at 1); La
Opini6n, Sept. 9, 1973, at 12.
330. Sixty-four percent of the firms making technology transfer payments
between March 1972, and December 1973, were over 50% foreign-owned while
only 19% were 100% locally owned. Most payments probably went to parent
companies. Instituto Nacional de Technologi'a Industrial study, supra note 12, at
11. The weekly newsletter Business Latin America, no enemy of foreign investment, commented "that foreign investors were avoiding the risks of doing busi-

ness in Argentina by shunning direct investment in favor of relatively safe licensing based on sales volume." Business Latin America, April 24, 1974, at 130.
331. Ford Motor Argentina, S.A., Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de
la Naci6n, La Ley June 19, 1974, at 7 (advance sheet), File No. 70.475, No. 117;
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Thus, the new Income Tax Law, enacted during the last days of
December 1973, a few weeks after passage of the Foreign Investment Law, incorporates these principles as follows:
Payments resulting from financial or technological contributions or
for technical assistance provided to a foreign enterprise located in
the country by its parent, by another subsidiary or branch or by a
third party economically tied to these will not be tax deductible by
the enterprise which makes such payments. Such payments will be
subject to the same treatment provided in this law for profits from
firms referred to in article 63, section (b) of this law.3 '
The same treatment will apply even though a parent-subsidiary
or similar relationship cannot be shown, if an analysis of the situation indicates that decision-making power is not in the hands of
the Argentine company or if the relevant contract or agreement
with a third party fails to conform to normal international commercial practices. These references to commitments negotiated on
an other than arms-length basis recognize the use of tax-haven
jurisdictions by multinational corporations and other investors.
Panama has proven particularly popular since a dummy company
with absolute ownership secrecy can be formed in a matter of hours
to serve as the "unrelated" firm to which payments are made.333
Article 63(b) imposes on these payments a 45 per cent tax rate,
which is the same rate applied to profits earned by foreign
branches operating in Argentina. The rate applied to businesses
incorporated in Argentina, regardless of the nationality of their
ownership, is 22 per cent.3 3 Besides applying the Parke Davis roysee also Martinez de Sucre, Compendio, Afirmaci6n y Extensi6n de Principios
Aplicados por la Corte Suprema, La Ley, June 19, 1974, at 6.
332. Law of Dec. 29, 1973 (No. 20.628), Concerning Income Tax, art. 14.
333. See Stebbings, Panam6 y la Empresa Multinacional:Su Papel de Paralso Fiscaly Otras Consideraciones,15 DERECHO DE LA INTEGRACI6N, 258 (1974),
which appears in English as Panama and the Multinational Corporation:Tax
Haven and other Considerations.3 INT'L LAW. 626 (1974); The INTI study, supra
note 12, at 9 indicates that companies doing business in Argentina planned on
remitting over $7 million to Panama for technology payments during 1973. One
may ask how much of this technology was actually developed in and provided by
Panama. The figure is undoubtedly inflated, but any significant amount makes
the point.
334. Income Tax Law, arts. 63(b), 64. Article 64 of this law imposes an additional 29.5% tax on the amount of undistributed earnings remaining after the
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alties rule to all payments from Argentina to related foreign firms,
the Income Tax Law dared to double the normal corporate income
tax rate on the principle that a subsidiary really does not differ
appreciably from a branch. This philosophy is consistent with another recent and already famous judicial decision in Argentina,
involving the Swift-Deltec group in which the judiciary dissipated
the Argentine corporate veil on the grounds that the activities of
unit under common
the group were basically those of an economic
35
considered.
so
be
control and should
Again, the author does not propose to enter into the economic
and psychological wisdom of these measures, which some say will
frighten away new foreign technology and perhaps capital as well.
However, these restrictions may pose problems for the automotive
industry or other industries or firms subject to agreements requiring the expansion of existing investment. In addition to denying
access to medium- or long-term local credit, loans from the foreign
parent are effectively rendered impossible. Should local profits not
be sufficient to cover new investment capital needs and should
external credits from unrelated sources not be available on reasonable terms, some difficult questions may arise for investors. It may
payment of these taxes, whether the latter be 22% or 45%. There is a withholding
tax of 29.5% on dividends paid to the exterior (art. 98 of the same law). The 45%
nondeductible rate referred to in the text is, of course, the equivalent of a withholding tax on interest and technology transfer payments. Income Tax Law, arts.
14, 63.
Two emergency surtaxes have been enacted covering at least fiscal 1973 and
1974. One imposes an additional 30% tax on the total of all other income and
earnings taxes and the other involves a 1% levy on total capital including reserves.
Surtax Law of May 11, 1973 (No. 20.372), Concerning Federal Emergency; Law
of Dec. 29, 1973 (No. 20.629), Concerning Tax On Capital.
335. Compama Swift de la Plata S.A., Frigori'fica s/ convacatoria de acreedores, Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n, 151 La Ley 516 (1973).
See C. ARAMBURIO, EL CASO SwIPr-DELTEc: LA REPARAC16N JUDICIAL DE UNA AGREs16N ECON6miCA FORANEA (Buenos Aires, 1973); Laguis, El Caso Swift y laInterdependencia Econ6mica, 51 EL DERECHO 223 (originally appeared Nov. 16, 1973, No.
3326, at 1). This book includes the judicial material related to the case with an
explanatory introductiQn; Gordon, supra note 329; Justicia: El Escanddlo de
Swift, PANORAMA, July 13, 1972, at 30; Caso Swift: Poderjudicial versus poder
nacional?, PANORAMA, June 15, 1972, at 28; Lozada, El Caso Swift-Deltec, La
Opini6n, Aug. 26, 1973, cultural section, at 8 (Lozada, the Commercial Court
judge whose decision was confirmed by the Supreme Court, is the man most
intimately associated with Swift-Deltec).
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be necessary for them to face the choice of either suffering the
penalties incurred as a result of not fulfilling a given agreement,
such as loss of domestic markets, or making a new capital investment in Argentina.
The latter alternative, of course, implies the negotiation of an
investment contract, submission to the new Law and all that is
involved in a new capital investment decision. In this case, there
may exist more appealing alternatives than a long-term commitment to Argentina, which offers no possibility of capital gains or
spectacular earnings. There remains a possibility for the foreign
investor unwilling to introduce new capital into the country, which
happens, not by chance, to be consistent with the policy motivating the architects of the entire panoply of measures under discussion. Local equity capital participation may be sought leading to
at least a percentage change in ownership and initiating the process of economic "nationalization" considered so fundamental.
The Income Tax Law refuses to risk omitting anything; article
63(b) quoted above ends with the paragraph: "Likewise, any contractual agreement between persons or enterprises provided for in
this article shall be without tax effect and any payments actually
made shall be treated according to the principles governing contributions and profits."' 6
Moreover, subsidiary is not defined in article 63(b) of the Income
Tax Law although Parke Davis Argentina was 99.95 per cent
owned by its Detroit parent. The tone and logic of the tax measures
suggest that majority ownership and, hence, foreign control or control without ownership would be enough to thrust a firm into the
prejudiced category.
None of the above was reflected in the Executive Draft of the
Foreign Investment Law although after Parke Davis was decided
the issues became the subject of heated congressional debate. 37
Crossfertilization with the Income Tax Law, which was in Congress
at exactly the same time, led to a generally unintelligible provision. Thus, awareness of Parke Davis is essential to give it meaning. The provision was included as the second of the two paragraphs of article 26, which is entitled "Credits and other contributions between parent and/or branches or subsidiaries." The first
336. Income Tax Law, art. 14, last .
337. Slbato, supra note 328.
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paragraph treats interest rates for foreign loans on a general basis
while the second part deals with the subject of the article's title
and excludes the question from the general treatment of foreign
credits.
Furthermore, article 26 borrows its language from the Income
Tax Law without providing the surrounding content of the tax
statute. As an obvious minimum, it is intended to guarantee the
same result; more can not be said with certainty. The terms parent
(casa matriz) branch (filial) and subsidiary are borrowed directly
from the tax legislation, again without definition. It is ironic that
a Law so dependent upon its defined terms should be so careless
in using them. It also refers to loans, technology and any other kind
of payment between the entities in question and provides for their
treatment according to the rules governing contributions and profits. The latter could mean that royalties, interest and other payments will not only suffer the described tax consequences but will
be subject to the liquidity, percentage limitation and other rules
of the Investment Law covering profit transfers. If it means that
technology and credit contributions between parent and subsidiary
must be capitalized and registered and are subject to the negotiation of an investment contract with the Government, the provision
is in direct conflict with the list of items defined as direct foreign
investments in the Law.
Unfortunately, the Decree makes no attempt at clarification.
Until the Government takes its stand, the provision may be regarded as the incorporation of the Parke Davis rule as expressed
in the new Income Tax Law, without other interpretative dimensions. The omission of any reference to parent company credits for
the purchase and importation of capital goods is probably an error.
An exception for such credits was included in the provisions for
foreign credits in general, for such credits granted to foreign enterprises and for existing foreign credits. As noted, no reference was
made to credits for purchasers of capital goods in the rules governing access to local credit. Since the parent-subsidiary provision
was a legislative after-thought, the omission in this case may have
been inadvertant.
As noted, the Andean Code deals with the same problems and
was a conceptual inspiration for the Parke Davis case. It does,
however, make the granting of foreign credits to a subsidiary more
feasible than do the Argentine rules. These are permitted with the
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sole reservation that the interest rate may not exceed three points
over the prime rate in the country from which the currency registered originates."' In the Andean judgment, then, parent company
credits are still regarded as desirable given reasonable service
charges.
The Andean approach to technology, however, is rigid. Royalty
payments to a parent will not be authorized and any made will not
be deductible. As seen earlier, Decision 24 is unequivocal in its
declaration that intangible technology transfers may not be capitalized. 39 This is an expression of the extreme view that technology
should be the unpaid, uncapitalized accompaniment of the investment of a foreign company in a local subsidiary. Compensation
should take the form of profits resulting from the ultimate economic success of the venture. It is still far too early to measure the
economic results of this view in terms of the flow of new technology
into the Andean countries. This eliminates the possibility of offering predictions applicable to the Argentine case.
Another expression of the doctrine, which unites related companies, makes the foreign investor jointly and severally liable (forma
conjuntay solidaria)with the "local enterprise which receives the
foreign investment" for obligations assumed in the investment
contract. 40 This is obviously harsh if a foreign minority investor
without effective control is to be made liable for risks beyond his
control. On the other hand, it should be possible to insure reasonable terms in the investment contract, at least for the potential
entrant negotiating reasonable conditions for initial entry. Harshness would result in the case of existing firms forced to exercise the
option of the Law and then required to accept onerous contractual
terms theoretically binding upon a foreign minority shareholder.
A situation reportedly troubling Argentine lawyers and some of
their international clients focuses on another version of the
transfer-of-disguised-profits theme. The Foreign Investment Law,
coupled with the Argentine Company Law, indirectly adds a new
weapon to the Government arsenal for use against the oftcondemned practice of transfer pricing,34 already alluded to in
338.
339.
340.
341.

Decision 24, art. 16.
Decision 24, art. 21.
Investment Law, art. 31.
According to the FIEL study on foreign investments in Argentina, supra
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reference to the capitalization of imported capital goods. There are
obvious variations on the theme, but an example will make the
point. The meagerly capitalized Argentine subsidiary of a foreign
company imports over-priced raw materials from its parent, which
makes its profit on the inflated sales prices. Meanwhile, the Argentine firm operates at a loss and assumes a heavy and constantly
growing debt burden with its parent-supplier.
As has been seen in relation to the role of net losses in the
determination of repatriable capital, the Argentine Company Law
requires the maintenance of a defined equilibrium between stated
capital plus reserves and book losses. 42 Since the Argentine side
of the operation is not allowed to generate profits, past practice has
been to reestablish the equilibrium endangered by the potential
default of this debt by simply capitalizing the latter as an addition
to the investment of the parent. It appears that the new Law can
be used to end this practice although the problem is not attacked
specifically. Capitalizing debt owed a foreign investor requires government authorization and the negotiation of an investment contract. The Government may force the dissolution of a subsidiary
under corporate law by not permitting capitalization of the debt;
it may force a change in the pricing policies of the parent to allow
the local firm sufficient profits to eradicate past debt and maintain
future profit-loss equilibrium ; or finally, it may permit capitalization under an investment contract guaranteeing modification of
undesirable practices.
It must be granted that the above does not represent a total
solution. Many firms may succeed in collecting inflated transfer
prices from their subsidiaries without allowing the latter to show
negative balances. In such cases, the Government can marshall its
forces and oblige the offending company to "opt" for coverage
under the new Law and negotiate an investment contract. Pressure
note 8, United States companies have not been great transfer pricing offenders
because the United States Foreign Tax Credit has made it advantageous for
foreign subsidiaries to show the best results possible rather than concentrate
earnings in the North American based parent. FIEL assumes that transfer-pricing
abuses between foreign subsidiaries cancel themselves out in the case of Argentina. See FIEL, supra note 8, at 109-10. Motivations may be expected to change
with Argentine taxes in excess of United States corporate rates and with the
imposition of percentage limitations on profit transfers and capital repatriations.
342. Company Law, supra note 66, arts. 205-06.
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by the Central Bank or the tax authorities should be adequate.
Further pressure could be applied by the Authority should the
company, finding itself unable to remove profits from the country,
seek to capitalize them to increase its foreign capital base for eventual transfers. Even though the company is not covered by the Law
and has not exercised its option to be so covered, this capitalization of reserves would require independent authorization and possibly an investment contract. The complications of authorization
and the mixture of new Law capital and old capital might be such
that the firm would eventually opt for complete submission to the
Law.
E. Contractsother than Loan Agreements
This is the last of the three areas listed in the first article of the
Law as within the ambit of the statute, accompanied by direct
investments of foreign capital and external credits. Foreign remittances under any type of agreement will only be permitted after
authorization by the Authority with the advice of the Central
Bank. " ' A literal reading would include import purchase agreements although they are specifically exempted from all but one of
the provisions dealing with external credits. Their status remains
unresolved although importers are conducting themselves as if the
provision did not exist.
Contracts for technology use, transportation and insurance are
excluded from the control of the Foreign Investment Law. The last
article of the statute 4 directs the President to submit to Congress
a bill regulating amounts payable for technology use of any and all
kinds. As seen, a much more comprehensive foreign technology
transfer act is currently in Congress; thus, further discussion of
this very important legislation is impossible here. The Andean
Code provides guidelines for the treatment of technology but
leaves many areas open for determination on a national level. 45
The initial exclusion of technology agreements from the control of
the Argentine Law is contradictory given the addition of the Parke
Davis rule to article 26. Since Argentina has introduced a revolu343.
344.
345.

Investment Law, arts. 1(c), 28.
Investment Law, art. 36.
Decision 24, arts. 18-26.
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tionary change in the treatment offered transfers of foreign technology, it is strange that no one thought to modify the text of the
Act accordingly. The initial reference to the exclusion of technology agreements was merely to put the reader on notice that the
draftsmen had decided to split the Andean Code into two parts and
would come back later with a new technology bill.
X.

CONCLUSION

While recognizing a need for foreign investment capital in their
economies, many countries and regions have created specific statutory schemes for its regulation and have invariably referred to the
importance of clearly defining the "rules of the game." Once these
rules have been spelled out their stability has usually been considered crucial. The head of the legal section of the Andean Pact
points out that Decision 24 may not be unilaterally modified; its
modification is only possible with the approval of two-thirds of the
member countries and in the absence of negative votes. Consequently, he insists that "the stability of Decision 24 is greater than
that of national Foreign investment codes."3'46 That may be argued
and it is, indeed, a fact that Argentina has had at least six different
foreign investment regulatory schemes since 1953,117 but it is
doubtful that potential foreign investors are excessively concerned
about the durability of given investment laws.
In Argentina and in the Andean countries, new investments as
well as some old investments are to be subject to contracts negotiated with the national government according to the "rules of the
game." For each investor, the basic rules will be or should be those
346. Saavedra, supra note 46, at 262. Unfortunately, the Chilean military
junta seems to have proved Dr. Fern.ndez Saavedra wrong by its passage of a
new foreign investment statute in July 1974. See note 26, supra.
347. Under Per6n:
Law 14.222 (1953)
Decree 19.111 (1953)
Decree 637 (1955)
Under Aramburi:
Decree-Law 16.640 (1957) (Merely revoked the Peronist
measures and confirmed a free exchange system.)
Under Frondizi:
Law 14.780 (1958)
Under Ongania:
Law 18.587 (1970)
Under Lanusse:
Decree-Law 19.151 (1971)
Under Per6n:
Law 20.557 (1973)
Decree 413 (1973).
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established in these bilateral instruments. Investors will be interested in the respect of the country for its national commitments
and in its general attitudes toward foreign investment and private
enterprise. The supposed difficulty in modifying Decision 24 does
not make it superior to the Argentine model, especially in view of
the development of sometimes significantly different attitudes
toward foreign investment in the various member countries of the
Andean Pact.
An attempt has been made throughout this article to emphasize
the general flexibility of both statutes. Actual national application
of the measures as they stand may be more significant than their
substantive differences or their inherent stability. It is probably
true that "economic growth rates and development prospects of
capital-receiving countries

. . .

determine the flow of foreign in-

vestment much more than do their tax or specific foreign investment policies (short of expropriation or nationalization)." ' ' Regardless, the measures to be applied to that investment remain
important especially in view of the considerable latitude granted
the government in its selection of contractual terms to be offered
to potential entrants.
Avoiding extensive analysis of the many difficult philosophical,
political and economic decisions required of the proponents of the
Argentine legislation, one may criticize them for not achieving a
higher level of statutory workmanship. This is to be particularly
deplored in Argentina, a country replete with exceptionally gifted
lawyers, economists and other specialists who have produced other
legislation of the highest quality. The Andean model is fortunately
available to aid in understanding the intentions embodied in the
hazy areas of these Argentine measures.
Regional level Andean officials are interested in demonstrating
that foreign investment can be effectively controlled in a way beneficial to the host region without sacrificing its continued availability. They have prematurely begun claiming quantifiable, statistical success in attracting desirable new investment into the area
under the rules.34 This may be their prerogative, but the infancy
348. Grunwald, supra note 30, at 158.
349. 23 Grupo Andino 1, 7 (April 1973), official information organ of the
Junta of the Cartagena Agreement (published in Lima, Peru) states at 1 that
"[i]t has been proved with statistics in Columbia that the Common Regime for
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of the Andean experiment coupled with a plethora of impinging
and largely unrelated events make the data meaningless. Consequently, no hard predictions for Argentina can be based on Andean
experience.
Understandably, Argentina is also anxious to attract outside
capital while simultaneously subjecting it to regulation. The leaders of the country often manifest a decidedly congenial attitude
towards foreign investors in spite of the turmoil, which surrounded
the birth of the Investment Law. Their words represent an attempt
to mold national attitudes as well as tranquilize foreign investors.
Referring to the General Motors automobile sales to Cuba as well
as to the general expansion of Argentine foreign trade, the Minister
of Economy said in late June 1974 that "we would not have been
able to accomplish this without the efforts of the companies.""35
Since the automobile industry is entirely in foreign hands, he was
applauding an important group of foreign investors, at least for
their role in boosting exports. He added that "in almost every case,
what you produce requires many Argentine technicians, engineers
and workers. This is what we are selling: Argentine work at the
price for which Argentina should sell it."3"'
The country is by no means relying entirely on prosaic efforts to
boost exports and attract new conventional investments. Conditions have been such that the flow of new equity capital has been
limited over the last few years. The government has put Peronist
Third World principles into action by aggressively seeking jointventure capital from the Soviet Bloc countries. Theoretically subject to the new Law, these bold overtures are part of a logical effort
to expand the economic horizons of the country by adding new
alternatives.
In essence, the new Foreign Investment Law and the eventual
the Treatment of Foreign Capital inspires confidence in investors. In Peru, some-

thing similar is happening." Seffor Luis E. Ramos, director of the National Department of Planning in Colombia recently made a similar statement. See 102
DE LA INTEGRAC16N, 319 (1974).
350. Jos6 Ber Gelbard, in La Naci6n, June 26, 1974, at 5.
351. La Naci6n, June 26, 1974, at 5. To add a little uncertainty to the picture,
at precisely the same time, which happened to be the week preceding President
Per6n's death, another Buenos Aires newspaper reported that "Gelbard described
his critics as agents of international monopolies and his opponents as 'immature
pigmies."' Buenos Aires Herald, June 23, 1974, at 3.
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Technology Transfer Law are part of the response by a sophisticated country to problems perceived by much of the capitalimporting world. The impact of this amalgam of both Argentine
and Andean ideas merits continued attention.

